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Naturalists and Phenomenologists have contrasting conceptions of
philosophy and its purpose. The naturalist takes philosophy to be a discipline
that is continuous with the natural sciences, while phenomenology defines
itself by its opposition to such a view of philosophy. My thesis project argues
that this opposition is unfounded.
The phenomenologist takes the world we consciously experience to be
a world of subjective facts. My thesis begins by introducing the
phenomenologist's conception of a subjective fact. I call a situation "a
subjective fact" when it essentially involves a subject of experience. I go on
to explain why phenomenologists thought the world we experience is a world
of subjective facts.
Naturalists hold that all facts are objective facts, and it is generally
supposed that no fact can be both subjective and objective. I argue that it is
the contrast between these two kinds of facts that led phenomenologists to
conclude that a naturalistic theory of mind will have no place in it for
subjective facts.
A central claim in my PhD thesis is that a fact can be both subjective
and objective. I argue that a naturalist could accept the existence of
subjective facts if s/he could admit the existence of situations that essentially
involve relations to subjects of experience. If a naturalist is to accept the
existence of situations of this kind, a naturalist account must be given of what
it is to be a subject of experience.
A creature becomes a subject of experience, I claim, when it tokens
representations with reflexive content. I offer an account of what it is for a
representation to have reflexive content in terms of a special kind of
representation I call 'an implicit self-representation'. I offer a naturalist
account of implicit self-representation by appealing to the role this notion of
representations plays in embodied and situated accounts of perception.
I conclude that naturalism can admit into its ontology subjects of
experience. The phenomenologist says naturalism must exclude subjective
facts with the result that our relation to the world gets misdescribed. I argue
that naturalists can admit subjective facts, thereby opening up the possibility
of a naturalised phenomenology.
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Introduction
Naturalism takes science to be our best guide to what exists. Naturalistic
theories of mind have however always had difficulties making room for
consciousness. Consciousness seems to us to be something that is
essentially subjective. As such it strikes us as something that must of
necessity resist the kind of objective descriptions of the mind we get from
science. Those features of the mind which make consciousness subjective
seem to point to a limit in our scientific conception of the mind. They seem to
indicate the existence of something which cannot be accounted for by
science. It is undeniable that there is something subjective about our
conscious mental life. Yet subjectivity looks to be something which by its
very nature must elude description in scientific terms. Must we conclude
then that science cannot be our only guide to what exists, and hence that
naturalism is false?
The idea that consciousness has a nature which resists scientific
explanation is almost a working assumption of Edmund Husserl, the founder
of a school of philosophy known as Phenomenology. Husserl's
Phenomenology sought to describe all of the ways in which consciousness
literally constitutes the world as it is perceived by us. To the extent that
consciousness plays a role in generating the world we experience, Husserl
thought that consciousness must be something that science can never
explain. Later phenomenologists like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty were to
add to Husserl's critique of naturalism. They were to concur with Husserl's
thought that consciousness plays a role in shaping the reality we inhabit, so
that there is something about this reality which can never be given an
objective description.
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Part of the aim of my thesis is to argue that there is something importantly
right about this critique of naturalism. I agree with Husserl and the later
phenomenologists that the world we perceive is shaped and given form
through our ways of perceiving and interacting with it. However I argue that it
is recognising this point which holds the key to defeating the argument
against naturalism which I sketched above. I take up the idea that
consciousness (and indeed our existence as persons more generally) play a
role in shaping the reality we experience. I use this idea to develop a
naturalistic account of the conscious mind.
The approach I shall take to thinking about consciousness in what follows I
will call "naturalised phenomenology". Other philosophers have claimed to
be doing naturalised phenomenology (see for instance Petitot et al 1999).
What relation, if any, does my project bear to these philosophers?
Francisco Varela (1996) proposed a method for studying consciousness
he dubbed "neurophenomenology". Neurophenomenology makes use of
first-person data gathered from subjects engaging in careful reflection on
their experiences to study brain processes. Varela proposed the following
working hypothesis:
'Phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their
counterparts in cognitive science relate to each other through reciprocal
constraints.' Varela (1996: 351)
The idea I take it is that the descriptions of conscious experience supplied by
phenomenology are to act as a constraint on the account of consciousness
we get from science. They are the explanandum if you like which it is the
task of science to explain. However science equally counts as a constraint
on what phenomenologists say about consciousness. This is to say that
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science could reveal some description of conscious experience arrived at
through phenomenological reflection to be mistaken.
The idea that phenomenology might contribute to a science of
consciousness is one we also find in Flanagan (1992). Flanagan suggests
that the appropriate method for studying consciousness, which he dubs "the
natural method", is to listen carefully to what phenomenology, psychology
and neuroscience have to say about consciousness and then to see 'whether
and to what extent the three stories can be rendered coherent, meshed and
brought into reflective equilibrium.'
Both describe exactly the approach I shall be following in my thesis.
However neither Varela nor Flanagan are particularly clear on why they think
phenomenology can help when it comes to settling on a scientific theory
about consciousness. A working assumption in my project will be that when
we sense an object, say a flower, and this object seems to us to be a certain
way - the flower looks to be pink and seems to have a subtle scent to it - the
appearance the flower presents to me is real. Appearances are subjective.
An object cannot appear to be a certain way unless there is someone, a
subject, to whom the object appears. Appearances are also real. This
immediately generates a puzzle as to how something can be both subjective
and real.
One response to this puzzle is to try to explain it away. Daniel Dennett
(1991) for instance seems to be of the view that a flowers appearing to me to
be pink is just a matter of my reactive dispositions, in particular what I would
be prepared to think and say about the flower and the way it seems to me.
Dennett collapses the distinction between the way the flower seems to me
and the way I think it seems to me. To collapse the distinction between a
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thing seeming to be x and my thinking that it is x is surely a mistake.
Merleau-Ponty captures the point well:
'Ordinary experience draws a perfectly clear distinction between sense-
experience and judgement. It sees judgement as the taking of a stand, as
an effort to know something valid for me at every moment of my life, and
for other minds, actual and possible; sense experience, on the contrary, is
taking appearance at its face value.' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 34)
We may not be convinced by Merleau-Ponty description of what is involved in
making a judgement, but the distinction he draws between sense-experience
and judgement is surely right. Judgement requires one to actively take a
stand on a question. Perception doesn't, we simply take things as we find
them.
Where Dennett takes what people say and think about their conscious
experiences as his datum, I shall take as my datum to be explained, how
things ordinarily appear to us. The problem consciousness presents to the
naturalist is to account for why things ordinarily appear to us as they do or
indeed why they should appear any way whatsoever. It is these questions
that I will use phenomenology to address in what follows.
My thesis has three parts. The first three chapters are concerned with
explaining the relation between naturalism and phenomenology. In chapter 1
I set out what I understand to be the commitments of naturalism. I go on to
present Husserl's critique of naturalism. I argue that Husserl's argument is
unsuccessful. It rests on an idealist construal of phenomenology. I sketch
an alternative way of thinking about his phenomenological project which is
neutral on the question of idealism.
Chapter 2 presents Heidegger's argument against naturalism.
Heidegger's argument presents more of a problem for my proposal to use
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phenomenology to develop a naturalistic account of consciousness.
Heidegger gives us an argument against naturalism which doesn't rely on
idealism. He argues that there is something phenomenology can describe -
our ordinary lived experience - which will always be missing from a
naturalistic account of the mind. In chapter 3 I connect this point with
arguments that have been given which purport to establish the existence of
an explanatory gap with respect to consciousness. I argue that the
explanatory gap is located exactly where the phenomenologists attack
naturalism. Phenomenology identifies just what it is that naturalistic theories
leave out from their account of the mind.
The phenomenologists think that the hole they have identified right in the
centre of the naturalist's account of the mind is one that cannot be filled. The
remainder of my thesis take up this challenge on the naturalist's behalf. In
chapters four and five I set out in detail a phenomenological account of
conscious experience. Chapter 4 describes the account of perceptual
intentionality we find in phenomenology. It is argued that the aboutness
which attaches to our perceptual experiences cannot be understood as a
causal or historical relation between perceiver and world. Instead there is a
distinctively phenomenological species of intentionality which belongs to our
experience purely in virtue of the ways in which they present the world as
seeming to a subject.
Chapter 5 looks to phenomenology for an account of what it is to be a
conscious creature. I present an account of consciousness according to
which a conscious creature is always self-conscious. The self-
consciousness doesn't require the creature to be constantly engaged in
thinking about itself. Rather it is a pre-reflective form of self-consciousness.
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I contrast this account of creature consciousness with the account we find in
higher-order theories.
The second part of my thesis pins down more precisely exactly what it is
that the naturalist is supposed to be incapable of explaining. The third and
final part of my thesis returns to the opposition between naturalism and
phenomenology. In chapter 6 I offer a response to the argument that has
been given against naturalism thus far. I show how, contrary to the
arguments of the first half of the thesis, the naturalist could in principle
account for the conception of experience we find in phenomenology. The
anti-naturalist argument the phenomenologist has given rests on a false
conception of naturalism. In chapter 7 I take up the account of conscious
experience that has been presented in chapters four and five and use this
account to sketch in broad brushstrokes a naturalistic account of
consciousness. Chapter 7 will show that phenomenology is something that
can be naturalised and that the process is already well underway.
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The Conflict Between Naturalism and Phenomenology
Chapter 1
Introduction
Naturalists and Phenomenologists1 have contrasting conceptions of
philosophy and its purpose. The naturalist takes philosophy to be a
discipline that is continuous with the natural sciences, while phenomenology
defines itself by its opposition to such a view of philosophy. Merleau-Ponty
tells us, in answering the question what is phenomenology:
'Husserl's first directive to phenomenology, in its early stages, to be a
'descriptive psychology', or to return to the 'things themselves', is from the
start a foreswearing of science. I am not the outcome of the meeting point
of numerous causal agencies which determine my bodily or psychological
make-up. I cannot conceive of myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a
mere object of biological, psychological or sociological investigation...'
(1962, p.viii, my emphases)
From the phenomenologist's perspective then, any attempt to build a
naturalistic account of the mind based on phenomenological description will
appear misconceived from the outset. By the end of my thesis I will have
argued that it is the phenomenologist's misgivings about naturalism that are
misconceived. The phenomenologist's anti-naturalist stance rests on a
mistaken understanding of naturalism. I will show that in reality it is possible
for a naturalist philosopher to accept many of the insights phenomenology
has to offer. First we must get clear on how the phenomenologist argues
against naturalism. This will be my aim in this chapter and the next.
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In this chapter and throughout the thesis I will sometimes take the traditions of naturalism
and phenomenology to be represented by two characters, "the naturalist" and "the
phenomenologist", who will speak on behalf of their respective traditions. Where there is a
point of disagreement within either of these camps I will make reference to specific texts and
thinkers, but when there are themes upon which all phenomenologists or all naturalists are
agreed, I will use these two characters to give expression to these themes.
The Conflict Between Naturalism and Phenomenology
This chapter will explore the naturalist and the phenomenologist's differing
conceptions of philosophy. The principle difference between these two
traditions concerns the relation each takes philosophy to stand in to science.
Phenomenologists think that science occupies a subordinate position in
relation to philosophy. They ask how scientific knowledge is possible, and
set about identifying the conditions of the possibility of knowledge of the
natural world. Naturalists for there part, take the task of philosophy to be to
demonstrate how our thinking about some philosophical question can be
made to cohere with the theories of the sciences. It is in this light that Ruth
Millikan (1998) tells us:
'As a naturalist, I must understand my own self and mind as well as those
of others to be part of nature. Thought, including my own thought, must
be discovered in nature, rather than helping to establish nature.' (ibid
p.65)
We can see already, just from these brief comments, that naturalists and
phenomenologists approach philosophy in very different ways. The
prospects for securing any kind of common ground look decidedly bleak.
In section 1 and 2 I will sketch what I take to be the key commitments of
the naturalist with respect to metaphysics and epistemology, the key areas in
which naturalism comes into conflict with phenomenology. Having sketched
the commitments of the naturalist I will then consider how Edmund Husserl,
the founder of phenomenology, challenged naturalism. First I will describe
his philosophical method. We will see how the practice of this method leads
Husserl to propose the radical metaphysical thesis that the world we
experience is an accomplishment of certain conscious processes. I will
propose two readings of this thesis, one of which is idealist and the other of
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which is metaphysically neutral. The chapter will close by considering
Husserl's argument against naturalism. I will argue that Husserl challenge to
naturalism rests on a commitment to idealism. Husserl takes his
descriptions of conscious experience to entail idealism. If he is right,
phenomenology and naturalism are almost certainly in irreconcilable conflict.
In Chapter 2 we shall see that existential phenomenologists reject
Husserl's idealism. Unfortunately this will not clear the way for a naturalised
phenomenology of the kind I wish to develop. There we shall see that
existential phenomenologists advance a similar argument against naturalism
to Husserl, the only difference being that they reject his commitment to
idealism. Thus it would seem that the conflict between phenomenology and
naturalism may be independent of the issue of idealism after all.
1. What is Naturalism?
Naturalists agree with Wilfred Sellars that "Science is the measure of all
things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not." (Sellars 1963,
p173) Sellars is making the point here that there is no position outside of
science from which we can answer ontological questions, questions about
what there is. We shall see in the next section how naturalists extend this
conclusion to cover epistemology: naturalistic epistemologists argue that
there is no place outside of science from which to account for the possibility
of our knowledge.
A naturalistic account of some property or entity will seek to locate that
property or entity in nature. This it will do by explaining how that property or
entity relates to the other properties or entities that the sciences of the day
appeal to in their various theories.
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Consider the difficult case of colour. There seems to be two kinds of
properties that we refer to in our discourse about colour. First, there are the
properties we refer to in describing our colour experiences when we say, for
instance, what coloured things look like. In addition, there are the properties
that are appealed to by science. Commonsense tells us one story about
what it is for a thing to be coloured: a thing is coloured when it look a certain
way to viewers like us. Science tells us another story about what it is for a
thing to be coloured. It may tell us, for instance, that a thing has a particular
colour, in part, because it has a surface spectral reflectance property such
that it reflects light of a certain frequency.2 We have at the outset, two
theories of colour; a naturalist must demonstrate how these two theories can
be made to cohere.
The naturalist can achieve this task in one of three ways. S/he could
argue either for (1) elimination; (2) peaceful coexistence, or (3) assimilation.
1 will consider each of these possibilities in turn.
In the nineteenth century it was widely supposed that no mechanistic
explanation of life was to be had. Instead, philosophers and scientists
posited the existence of a life force that animated living things, an elan vital.
Nowadays, life is explained by mechanisms that bring about reproduction,
adaptation and so on. With the advances in biology the theories of the past
have been replaced by theories which render unnecessary the appeal to an
animating life force. Might something analogous happen for our
2 Of course this cannot be the whole story, for the way coloured things look remains constant
even with large changes in illumination. Green things for instance reflect a high percentage
of middle-wave light and a low percentage of long-wave and short-wave light. Yet an object
can continue to look green even though it is reflecting a higher percentage of long-wave and
short-wave light than medium-wave light. What colour the object seems to have depends on
the scene or the background against which the object appears. It is also true that two objects
can seem to have different colours even though they are reflecting light of the same
frequency. Again this happens because the colour we see something to have depends on
the surroundings in which it is placed. See Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991, ch.8, 160-5
for further discussion.
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commonsense theories like our ordinary understanding of colour? Could it
be that the theories of a future science of colour vision completely replace
our commonsense theory of colour? It is this possibility of science revealing
some category of commonsense to be explanatorily redundant that I have
given the name "elimination".3
Our commonsense theory of colour performs a very different function from
the theories of the colour scientist. We use our commonsense theory to talk
about how objects look to us. While perhaps it is possible that we could give
up our ordinary ways of talking in favour of those of the colour scientist, it is
hard to see what explanatory advantages would accrue from such a change.
When the theory of vital forces gave way to a mechanistic theory of life, talk
of vital forces became explanatorily redundant. There was no longer any
need for our explanations of life to appeal to such a concept. It is hard to
conceive of something similar happening for the terms we employ in
describing the ways coloured things look to us. How could a mature colour
science make our ordinary ways of talking about colour redundant?
Setting aside the case of colour, it is the exception rather than the norm
for science to come up with a theory that renders a previous theory wholly
redundant. Sometimes, when an old theory T-i is replaced by a new theory
T2, it is possible to deduce T1 from the conjunction of T2 and bridging
principles connecting the terms of T1 with those of T2.4 There are however
many cases from the history of science where such a deduction isn't
possible because the pair of theories are not consistent.5 Moreover, even
when we can deduce one theory from another, the result isn't necessarily
that one theory is superceded by another.
3
The leading proponents of this form of naturalism are the Churchlands. See, for example,
Churchland (1988).
4
See Nagel (1961, ch. 11) for an account of reductive explanation along these lines.
5
This point was originally made by Feyerabend (1962).
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Smith (1992: 30-1) suggests that while fluid mechanics, for instance, can
be deduced from a molecular theory of matter taken in conjunction with
Newton's Laws and Thermodynamics, the latter theories do not make fluid
mechanics redundant. For the latter theories do not have the problem
solving power of fluid dynamics. Complex fluid systems exhibit interesting
regular but non-periodic behaviour. The more basic or fundamental theories
from which the principles of fluid dynamics are deducible tell us about the
microstructures of fluids. They do not account for the kinds of macroscopic
behaviour that we learn about from fluid mechanics.
I conclude then, that elimination is only appropriate in those rare cases
when one scientific theory supercedes or makes redundant another, as was
the case with explanations of life that appeal to an elan vital. This doesn't
seem to be the case for our colour concepts.6 Thus we are still in need of
some means of characterising the relation between our commonsense
conception of colour and the conception of colour we get from science. Let
us turn then to the second possibility which I labeled peaceful coexistence.
The naturalist who seeks the peaceful coexistence of commonsense and
science pursues a strategy which is the polar opposite of elimination. Rather
than seeking to displace commonsense in favour of science, the proponent
of peaceful existence argues that the theories of commonsense are not in
tension with those of science. Both, s/he claims, supply equally good
6
Thompson (2000) argues that we can only account for the distinction between unique or
primary colours and binary colours by reference to our experience of colour. He begins by
noting that our experiences of colours form a quality space ordered along three dimensions:
hue, saturation and lightness. A structural feature of this quality space is that it contains what
he calls 'psychological primaries' - the unique hues red, green and yellow. He follows Austen
Clark (1993) in defining these hues as qualities whose mixture can match every sensed
quality in the space but each of which cannot be matched by combination of the others. This
is to say that a psychological primary can be matched only by itself. Thompson goes on to
argue that the relations among colour properties in virtue of which they form a colour space
cannot be explained in terms of surface spectral reflectance properties. Thus Thompson has
supplied another argument for the claim I have just made that we cannot eliminate ordinary
talk of colours in favour of the concepts our physical theory of colour supply.
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descriptions of reality. When we say things are 'really' coloured this
statement should be understood as being made from the standpoint of
commonsense, and when we say that colour is 'really' a surface reflectance
property, the resulting claim is made from a scientific standpoint. If we
relativise our claims to the standpoints from which they are made, the conflict
between science and commonsense no longer generates a contradiction.
The conflict will become something with which we can learn to live. This
naturalistic strategy takes both science and common sense to act as guides
to what there is. This is possible because commonsense and science
operate from distinct standpoints. Here is Strawson describing the proposal:
'Looking at photographs in journals of popular science of patches of
human skin, vastly magnified, we say, 'How fantastically uneven and ridgy
it really is.' We study a sample of blood through a microscope and say,
'It's mostly colourless.' But skin can still be smooth and blood be red; for
in another context we shift our standard back. Such shifts do not convict
us of volatility or condemn us to internal conflict. The appearance of both
volatility and conflict vanishes when we acknowledge the relativity of our
'reallys'.' (Strawson, 1979/1988: 110)
This strategy for securing peaceful coexistence fails when our commonsense
and scientific theories both make appeal to distinct properties as the cause
of some event. Commonsense might tell us that what caused a bull to
charge at was its seeing my red scarf. While science might tell us that what
caused the bull to charge was the firing of neurons in a certain part of the
animal's brain. If we disallow causal overdetermination - if we do not allow a
single event to have multiple causes - we must admit that we have here a
case of competing causal explanations. Furthermore, if we concede that
every event has some prior physical cause (or has the chance of its
7
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occurrence determined by some prior physical cause) it looks like we are
obliged to say that all the causal work is already carried out by the property
which figures in our scientific explanation.7 When the causal explanations
our commonsense theory pretends to supply compete with those of science,
it seems that commonsense must give way to science.
Let us agree that commonsense and science operate from distinct
theoretical standpoints. This won't help us to reconcile the claims of
commonsense with those of science when both purport to supply causal
explanations of the same event. As soon as we are presented with two
competing causal explanations we will be back with the question with which
we started. We will be faced once again with the task of explaining how both
our commonsense explanation and our scientific explanation can be true. I
conclude then that peaceful coexistence isn't an option for the naturalist.
This leaves us with assimilation.
Naturalisation by assimilation comes in two forms: reductionist and anti-
reductionist. What they share in common is an ontological claim to the effect
that science is our guide to what there is. A naturalistic theory achieves
assimilation by showing that the properties and entities a commonsense
theory quantifies over are either identical with, or, supervene on, the
properties and entities described by the natural sciences. Anti-reductionists
endorse the supervenience claim in one form or another. Reductionists
endorse the identity claim, though they will do so in a way that enables them
to acknowledge the possibility of a property being multiply realised, as we
shall see.
Anti-reductionism originally arose as a reaction against the idea of a
unified science as it is presented in Oppenheim and Putnam (1958). What
7
Kim has developed this worry at length. See for instance Kim (1993).
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anti-reductionists like Fodor (1974) were reacting against is the idea of
physics supplying the basic laws for all the other sciences. Fodor advanced
instead a view of nature according to which nature can be carved up in lots
of different ways. Each science is relatively autonomous of other sciences,
having its own conceptual apparatus, laws and explanations. In particular
Fodor argued that what he called the "special sciences" couldn't be reduced
to physics. There are special sciences, Fodor tells us, 'because of the way
the world is put together: not all natural kinds (not all the classes of things of
things about which there are important, counterfactual, supporting
generalisations to make) are or correspond to, physical natural kinds.'
(Fodor, 1974/2001: 134)
Now it may be that Fodor is right when he says there is no predicate of
physics lawfully coextensive with the predicate 'is-a-monetary exchange'.
Hence it may be true that there is no reduction of Gresham's law (an
example of Fodor's) to physics. Still we might want to know why the events
that fall under the laws of the special sciences happen also, token by token,
to fall under physical laws. We want to explain why the events that are
describable by the special sciences are token identical with physical events.
Fodor's argument for the autonomy of the special sciences relies on acts of
monetary exchange or feelings of pain being realised by a heterogeneous
class of physical states. No doubt this is true. Still we want to know how the
explanations of some event we find in the special sciences and the
explanation of that event proposed by physics can both be true.
This becomes still more urgent if we suppose that the physical world is
causally closed, so that every event described by the special sciences has
the probability of its occurrence fixed by some physical cause. Given the
causal closure of the physical world, if we don't explain why the relation of
9
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token identity holds between the physical event and the event of my feeling
pain epiphenomenalism will beckon. We will have to say that it is not my
instantiating pain that explains my dropping the red-hot poker, but my being
in a brain state B which is token identical with my experience of pain. The
anti-reductionist needs some explanation in the terms of the lower level
sciences as to why my instantiation of pain was the cause of my behaviour.
Otherwise s/he will be unable to defeat the threat posed by
epiphenomenalism.8
Jaegwon Kim (1998, ch.4) has proposed a reductionist route out of the
problem I have just described. The problem, to recap, is to accommodate
the kind of multiple readability which is a feature of the events described by
the special sciences whilst avoiding falling foul of epiphenomenalism. Kim
proposes that we solve the problem as follows: first we give a functional
specification of some higher-level property M and then we identify a physical
property P which satisfies this specification. Consider the psychological
property, being in pain. We can specify what it is for a creature to
experience pain by identifying this experience with a type of state that stands
in a causal relation to certain kinds of stimuli, and that typically brings about
certain kinds of behaviour. We thereby identify our psychological property M
(the property of experiencing pain) with a second-order property: the property
of having a property that plays a causal role R. Next we look for a property
that fits our causal specification: we look for properties or mechanisms which
might play this causal role. Let us call the property in question a "realiser": it
is a realiser insofar as it realises or instantiates the causal powers in terms of
8
There is an alternative open to the anti-reductionist, he could embrace ontological
emergence. That is to say, he could deny that all physical effects are entirely determined by
their physical causes, and thus deny the causal closure of physics. For a discussion see
Crane (2001: §18). This seems to me an attractive move but to attempt its defence here
would take me to far away from my main concerns in this chapter.
10
The Conflict Between Naturalism and Phenomenology
which we have defined our mental property M. We can say that a property P
is a realiser for pain experiences when it plays the causal role in terms of
which we specify what it is to be in pain. I shall call an explanation which
proceeds in the way just described an "ontological reduction".
Now clearly there is plenty of room in this account for the property we
identify as the realiser of causal role M to vary across and within individuals.
Thus there is nothing in Kim's proposal which flouts the requirement that M
be multiply realised. Nor is this account obviously vulnerable to
epiphenomenalism. An ontological reduction tells us that M is located in
nature by being individuated by causal powers which belong to P, M's
realiser. Since M is nothing over and above P whatever causal powers
belong to P will also belong to M. I am assuming here that M inherits all of
its causal powers from its realiser. Kim (1993 & 1998: 54) labels this
assumption the causal inheritance principle. The causal inheritance principle
says:
"If a second-order property F is realised on any given occasion by a first-
order property H (that is if F is instantiated on a given occasion in virtue of
the fact that one of its realisers H, is instantiated on that occasion), then
the causal powers of this particular instance of F are identical with (or are
a subset of) the causal powers of H (or of this instance of /-/)." (Kim, 1998:
54)
Any theory which rejected the causal inheritance principle would have to
accept the possibility of second-order properties having causal powers which
are not identical to those of its realisers or vice versa. It seems plausible to
me to say that the first-order property couldn't have any causal powers that
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didn't also belong to the second-order property it is realising.9 If this is right
then my experience of pain is no less causally efficacious than its realiser,
since my pain and its realiser share all the same causal powers. Thus Kim
seems to have found a way out of the difficulty the anti-reductionist ran into.
I want to briefly raise a different worry one might have about Kim's account
of realisation which will be relevant to the final position I argue for at the end
of the thesis.10
It is tempting to think of the realisers of my psychological states as
microphysical properties of me. On this understanding the naturalist
pursuing assimilation is committed to identifying neurophysiological
properties sufficient for the functionally specified psychological properties
which they realise. Now it seems to me that the naturalist ought to be
cautious before s/he lends her endorsement to such an assumption. Surely
the nature of a psychological property's realiser should be left as an open
empirical question. Some psychological properties may be realised by
neurophysiological properties of individuals. Others may extend into the
world.
There are two related principles we should bear in mind when thinking
about the realisers of our physical states. The first is Andy Clark's 007
Principle. It says:
'In general, evolved creatures will neither store nor process information in
costly ways when they can use the structure of their environment and their
operations upon it as a convenient stand-in for the information-processing
operations concerned. That, is, know only as much information as you
need to get the job done.' (Clark, 1989: 64)
9
Perhaps a second-order property could have some causal powers it didn't inherit from its
first-order property. To assess this possibility would require some discussion of the
possibility of ontological emergence, see footnote 8, but unfortunately this goes beyond my
remit in this current chapter.
10
The worry derives from Wilson (2004: ch.5 & 6)
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The second principle is Mark Rowlands' Barking Dog Principle'
'If it is necessary for an organism to be able to perform an adaptive task T,
then it is selectively disadvantageous for the organism to develop internal
mechanisms sufficient for the performance of T when it is possible for the
organism to perform T by way of a combination of internal mechanisms
and manipulation of the external environment.' (Rowlands, 2003: 166)
Both these principles suggest that the environment may be used to carry out
information processing tasks. I suggest then that we need a notion of
realisation which registers this possibility.
I will follow Wilson (2004: ch.5) in making a distinction between three
kinds of realisation. The first two are borrowed from Shoemaker (1981).
Shoemaker distinguishes between core realisers and total realisers.
Suppose that c-fibers are indeed the physical realisers of pain. Shoemaker
points out that this cannot be the whole story. C-fibers produce pain only in
conjunction with other parts of the central nervous system which are also
activated when the subject is in pain. C-fiber stimulation can be at best what
Shoemaker calls the "core realiser" of pain. Shoemaker takes the "total
realiser" of pain to be the nociceptive system - the various nociceptors
distributed about the body, and the other parts of the brain that are involved
in sensing pain. Generally we can say the total realiser will include all of the
conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a system to embed a core
realiser. Now it is the total realiser which is sufficient for being in pain; the
core realiser isn't, even though one couldn't be in pain without it. All of the
parts of a total realiser which are not its core realiser I shall follow Wilson in
calling "non-core parts".
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Given the 007 and Barking Dog principles, a naturalist ought to say the
following about the realisers of our psychological properties. S/he ought to
allow for the possibility that the non-core parts of a total realiser may extend
into the world. This is to say that the non-core parts of a total realiser may
contribute to producing or sustaining a psychological property P even though
these non-core parts are not located within the individual to whom P belongs.
With this proviso registered, I tentatively endorse Kim's strategy of
assimilation by ontological reduction. A naturalist pursuing assimilation must
show how a pre-scientific or commonsense theory fits with the theories of the
science by first identifying the properties which are appealed to by
commonsense with second-order properties. It will then set about showing
how this second-order property finds realisation in some physical conditions
which may extend into the world. In the next section I will briefly consider
how a naturalist would approach problems in epistemology, before taking up
the phenomenologist's argument against naturalism.
2. Naturalised Epistemoloqy
Traditionally, epistemology has been conceived of as a normative inquiry.
Among the central questions an epistemologist asks is when a belief should
be accepted as true. This is not simply a factual question: a question about
when in fact beliefs are accepted as true. It is a question that asks about
what we ought to do if we are to believe only what is true. There are
standards of epistemic responsibility we employ in deciding the answer to
this question: standards which tell us what it is reasonable to believe and
which of our beliefs it would be irresponsible to accept as true. Thus, when
Descartes asks which of his beliefs he can know to be true, he is asking
which of his beliefs it would be reasonable for him to continue to accept as
14
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true. At least initially, what he discovers is that they are all equally subject to
doubt, and thus it would be irresponsible of him, at this stage in his enquiry,
to accept any of them.
Naturalistic epistemology seeks to answer the question of when it is
reasonable for us to believe a proposition in non-normative or descriptive
terms11. Any theory that appeals to evaluative or normative notions like
"adequate evidence", or "sufficient grounds" or "good reasons" will fail to
meet this condition.
Some versions of naturalistic epistemology seek to give up altogether on
epistemology conceived of as a normative enterprise. Quine (1969)
exemplifies this attitude.12 There are less radical conceptions of naturalised
epistemology that do not require us to give up altogether on the task of
explaining when it is reasonable to hold a belief. Most versions of externalist
epistemology for instance are naturalistic in spirit, and also accept that our
sensory experiences can act as reasons for our beliefs.13
11 See for instance Goldman (1976/2000: 340).
12
For Quine, naturalistic epistemology is to work from within psychology. Quine's naturalistic
epistemologist asks how we can form representations and theories about the world starting
from observations that radically underdetermine the final result. It is to psychology that we
must look for an answer to this question: it is psychology that can identify the processes by
means of which we transform our observations into theories. Quine's epistemologist is
concerned only with the causal relations between sensory input and cognitive output. S/he
doesn't worry whether our observations give us good evidence for our theories. This is a
normative question involving us as it does in the evaluation of the support our evidence gives
us for a theory. Quine's recommendation seems to be that philosophers should no longer
concern themselves with questions of this kind. See for instance Quine 1969/2000: 297.
Epistemology should become a purely descriptive science.
It is an open question whether a project that ceases to be concerned with justification is
still a project in epistemology. See Kim 1988/2000 for a persuasive argument to this effect.
However, to enter into this worry would take us beyond my current concern, which is to
sketch the commitments of a naturalistic epistemology.
13
Peacocke 1986, ch.9 develops an externalist view which does not seek to explain the
justificatory role our psychological states play in non-normative terms, but nevertheless
allows that whether a belief counts as justified may be something of which the believer is
ignorant. McDowell 1995/2000 argues that hybrid externalist positions like Peacocke's are
unsatisfactory, because they make the attainment of knowledge a matter of luck. Two
thinkers can be in possession of identical reasons for their beliefs, and one of these thinkers
succeed in knowing while the other fails to do so. This can happen because on the hybrid
account of knowledge whether a belief is true or not is taken to be something external to the
reasons one has which support one's beliefs. McDowell's solution is, very roughly, to
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Generally, an externalist epistemology will hold that a beliefs justification
depends (wholly, or partly, depending on the strength of the view) on the
process by which the belief was acquired. Whether or not a belief is justified
is, for the most part, a matter beyond the ken of the believer. A beliefs
justificatory status is dependent on the processes by which it was formed.
Thus Goldman (1986), for instance, has given a detailed account of justified
belief as belief that is generated by a reliable belief-forming process. While
Armstrong holds that a belief is justified when a law-like connection holds
between the state of affairs in which a subject believes that p and the state
of affairs that makes p true, such that given that a subject believes that p, it
must be the case that p.14 On both these views, our explanation of when a
belief is justified is one that is not framed in normative or evaluative terms.
Appeal is instead made to the processes that caused the belief, or to the
law-like connection that holds between a representational state and the state
of affairs that makes this state true. In both cases the result is an account of
justification (a normative notion) framed in non-normative or descriptive
terms.
For the naturalist then, the task of explaining how we get knowledge of the
external world is placed squarely in the domain of psychology and cognitive
science. For the phenomenologist, to locate philosophical problems about
knowledge within the domain of science begs some important questions.
The phenomenologist would object that we cannot appeal to psychology to
explain how our knowledge of the external world is possible. For to do so, is
to already assume that psychology can give us knowledge. We cannot
develop an externalist view of justification which denies that truth is external to the
possession of a reason.
4
See Armstrong (1973: 166).
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assume that knowledge is possible in order to explain how knowledge is
possible without succumbing to the charge of circularity in our reasoning.
'If certain riddles are, generally speaking, inherent in principle to natural
science, then it is self-evident that the solution of these riddles according
to premises and conclusions in principle transcends natural science. To
expect from natural science itself the solution of any one of the problems
inherent in it as such...or even merely to suppose that it could contribute
to the solution of such a problem any premise whatsoever, is to be
involved in a vicious circle.' (Husserl, 1911/1981: 172)
Where Husserl talks of "riddles" we can take him to mean "problems
concerning how thought and experience of an objective world is possible".
These are problems that he thinks will be brought to our attention the
moment we begin to reflect on our knowledge in a philosophical manner.
The problem of knowledge is inherent in any enterprise that purports to
supply us with knowledge, and science is undoubtedly among those
enterprises. Science could give us a solution to the problem of how
knowledge is possible only by assuming the very thing that is in question.
This is a difficulty that did not escape Quine's notice, and unsurprisingly
he isn't particularly moved by it. He suggests that one would only be
bothered by a circularity of this kind, if one aspired to set scientific knowledge
on firm foundations.15 But Quine suggests that no one should believe in
such a project anymore. Hence, we have nothing to fear from the circularity
15
Interestingly enough, the essay in which Husserl makes this charge of circularity against
naturalism is one in which he argues for such a foundationalist project. See Husserl
(1911/1981). So it would seem that Quine's response is quite to the point. I will develop a
different line of attack on the phenomenologist's behalf in what remains of the chapter, which,
if I am right stands behind Husserl's comment here anyway. This line of argument does not
require us to buy into Husserl's foundationalist epistemology. Later phenomenologists were
to reject such a project, though we will see they continued to argue against naturalism.
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that attends any attempt to explain the possibility of knowledge by appealing
to scientific theories which themselves pretend to be knowledge.16
Let us set aside naturalism for now, and consider in more detail why
Husserl might have thought that knowledge presents a problem that
naturalism cannot solve without moving in a circle.
3. Husserl's Philosophical Project
Husserl's phenomenology has as its goal, the description of various
conditions that are necessary and sufficient for an objective world to be
experienced and thought about by us. His phenomenology locates these
conditions within a subject's consciousness. We shall see that Husserl
rejects naturalism because it fails to recognise the constitutive role he thinks
consciousness plays in giving us perceptual experiences of an objective
reality.
When phenomenologists assign a constitutive role to consciousness they
are making a transcendental claim. Here is Kant defining a 'transcendental'
form of enquiry in his Prolegomena:
'...the word "transcendental" ... does not signify something passing
beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but
that is intended simply to make cognition of experience possible'. (Kant,
1977: 373n)
Phenomenology is a transcendental philosophy. Its method is a priori; its
goal is to identify the conditions that make our thought and experience of
objects possible.17 Already we see an important difference between the
16 See Quine, 1969/2000: 294.
17 One important difference between phenomenology and Kant's transcendental project is
that the conditions constitutive of all possible experience that the phenomenologist identifies
are not purely formal conditions. Kant's transcendental enquiry proceeds on the basis of
elaborate transcendental arguments. A transcendental argument begins by identifying some
18
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phenomenologist's project and that of the naturalist. The naturalist is
concerned with demonstrating that empirical answers can be returned to
what s/he takes to be, empirical questions. The phenomenologist thinks
there are questions that arise prior to any merely empirical question. These
are questions concerning the conditions that must be in place if we are to
have any experience of an objective world at all.
It is of course far from obvious that the naturalist has to accept the validity
of the kinds of question phenomenology poses. Thus, part of my goal in the
remainder of this chapter and the next will be to motivate the questions which
phenomenology raises as ones with which the naturalist must engage.
Husserl's phenomenology begins with the setting aside of all beliefs
whose truth we ordinarily take for granted. Husserl aspired to transform
philosophy into a science whose claims, like the claims of the scientist, were
absolutely grounded in evidence and universally accepted. The philosopher
is to take nothing for granted; s/he is to 'put out of action'18 all truths that are
unquestioningly accepted, including the truths of sciences.
Many of the propositions whose truth we ordinarily take for granted will not
satisfy this requirement - they will not be absolutely grounded in evidence.
Some of the propositions we believe will have been accepted by us as true
because this is the most natural attitude to take towards them. This is the
case for many propositions that specify the contents of our sensory
experience or of our memories. Other propositions we believe, will have
been accepted at some point in the past on the basis of testimony. These
feature of our thought or experience which is completely beyond doubt, and then proceeds to
argue that certain conditions must be satisfied if our thought or experience is to possess this
feature. Phenomenologists do not engage in transcendental arguments. Instead they offer
descriptions of our conscious experience as it is experienced by us. What these descriptions
uncover are ways in which our experience must be structured or organised if we are to
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propositions will often be ones whose truth we have accepted on trust
without attempting to verify their truth for ourselves. If phenomenology is to
be a science, as Husserl believed it must be, the phenomenologist must
begin by setting aside all propositions whose truth he has not established for
himself. He must accept no propositions as true that he has not discovered
to be absolutely grounded in evidence.
A proposition is absolutely grounded in evidence, Husserl thinks, when it
is self-evident, which is to say that its falsity is unthinkable. Descartes' cogito
is an example of such a proposition. If one tries to think the negation of the
proposition 'I am thinking' one finds oneself trying to think something
contradictory. We shall see in due course that Husserl thinks many other
propositions qualify as what we might call cogito-thoughts. The first
methodological demand that Husserl makes is that the phenomenologist is to
refrain from making any claim that does not have the status of a cogito-
thought. He is to accept only those propositions which are such that if we try
to conceive of their falsity we find ourselves trying to think something that is
obviously false.
No merely empirical proposition will satisfy this condition. For, no
empirical proposition will be such that we cannot coherently conceive of its
being false. We can, for instance, conceive of everything within
consciousness staying the same but the world we experience proving to be
nothing but "an illusion, a coherent dream".19 The contents of my
experiences leave open the possibility that the object I seem to experience at
any given moment might not exist. Consider a visual experience I undergo
of an apple. I can imagine God destroying the apple I am seeing while
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am looking at this apple. If this is conceivable for one of my experiences, it
is surely conceivable for every experience I have. Thus, I can imagine for
each and every experience I have that the object of my experience doesn't
20
exist, and God just makes it seem to me as if this object exists.
Husserl calls the process of setting aside those of our beliefs whose truth
can be doubted, "the phenomenological epoche". The aim of the epoche is
to effect a change in our attitude to reality. Ordinarily when I encounter an
object in experience, the books in front of me, the computer keyboard, the
tables and chairs distributed about this room, I take these objects to exist.
Husserl will say I "posit" their existence, by which he means I take a positive
stand on the question of the existence of the things my experiences present
to me. I take my experiences at face value unless I have a reason to do
otherwise. The phenomenological epoche begins by my deliberately not
taking a stand on the question of a thing's existence. This I do by attempting
to doubt its existence. "Attempting to doubt" is not at all the same attitude as
"actually doubting"; instead it is a matter of neither accepting nor denying, but
remaining completely neutral on this issue of a things existence. The result
is that we take no position on the issue of a thing's existence but instead put
out of action, exclude or bracket the act of positing that would otherwise form
a part of our experience.
Reality isn't excluded from the phenomenologist's study upon carrying out
the epoche. It continues to form a part of the phenomenologist's inquiry but
only as a correlate of our conscious thoughts and experiences. In effect the
20
J.J. Valberg uses this possibility to illustrate the argument from illusion in his (1992). It
should be noted that this is not the kind of sceptical argument Husserl could employ,
exploiting as it does the relation of dependence that holds between our experiences and their
underlying neurobiology. It is part of Husserl's philosophical method, as we shall see, to
make no use of any empirical truth and that includes claims about the relation between mind
and brain of the kind that the above argument rests upon. Husserl does however make
passing use of the argument from illusion in his (1913/1982: §46).
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change that has taken place having performed the epoche is that we are no
longer concerned with the objects of our thoughts and experiences
considered as elements of the natural world. Instead our concern has
shifted to the contents of our own conscious mind. We are to consider what
our own conscious mind must be like if it is to give us experiences and
thoughts which present us with an objective reality. We would have to say
that reality was excluded following the performance of the epoche if we held
that the contents of our minds didn't depend in any way on the existence of
any element of the natural or social world. There is however nothing in the
idea of the epoche which requires Husserl to endorse such a claim.21
Having performed the epoche and set aside our belief in the natural world,
Husserl thinks that we will discover the role our own consciousness plays in
constituting the reality we experience. We discover that the reality we
ordinarily experience is a prodigious achievement of each of our conscious
minds. Husserl thinks that by careful reflecting on our conscious
experiences and thoughts the phenomenological philosopher can help bring
this achievement to light. What grounds if any does Husserl have for
claiming that the objective reality we experience is an accomplishment of our
conscious minds?
On one natural reading of this claim Husserl is expounding a strong form
of idealism. Many of the statements Husserl makes suggest he thinks a
physical thing is nothing over and above the sense we have of it.22 Husserl
accepts that physical objects have an existence which transcends
consciousness. We have a sense of physical things as sets of actual and
21
For a reading of Husserl which takes him to endorse methodological solipsism, the view
that intentional content doesn't depend on any relation to the world, see Dreyfus (1982). For
arguments against such a reading of Husserl see Zahavi (2004). I shall discuss this issue in
more detail in chapter 4.
22
See for instance his (1913/1982: §47-55). Also see A.D. Smith (2003: ch.4) for a reading
of Husserl which stresses, and indeed defends, Husserl's argument for idealism.
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potential points of view that we have taken up in the past, and could take up
in the future. Husserl will often say things which suggest he thinks this is all
there is to a physical thing's existence:
'...the whole spatiotemporal world...is according to its sense, a merely
intentional being...It is a being posited by consciousness in its
experiences...beyond that it is nothing.' (Husserl, 1913/1982: §49)
I will discuss Husserl's idealism in more detail in the next section when we
consider his critique of naturalism. If Husserl is committed to idealism we
shall see that his version of phenomenology and naturalism are in
irreconcilable conflict.
There is however another way of understanding what the Husserlian
phenomenologist is trying to do that is quite neutral on the issue of idealism.
According to this understanding the Husserlian phenomenologist describes
how we achieve a sense or understanding of an objective reality while
appealing to nothing but the contents of consciousness. On this
understanding of Husserl, he holds that consciousness contains conditions
both necessary and sufficient for a subject to have a sense of an objective
reality.23 It doesn't follow that what it is for a physical thing to exist is nothing
over and above the sense we have of that thing's existence. Metaphysical
questions of this kind can safely be left to one side by the phenomenologist.
Consider the following quote from Husserl which can be given an idealist
reading, but can also be read along the lines just sketched:
The world that exists for me, that always has and always will exist for me,
the only world that ever can exist for me...derives its whole sense and its
23
It should be emphasised that there is no requirement that the understanding originates
from a particular subject. It is quite consistent with this conception of phenomenology to
insist that this understanding can be achieved only by a community of subjects. See Husserl
(1932/1973) Meditation V for such an account.
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existential status, which it has for me, from me myself...' (Husserl
1931/1973, 65)
An idealist reading of this passage would construe it as claiming that physical
objects have an existence which derives entirely from a conscious subject.
On this reading Husserl is claiming that a conscious subject literally produces
the objects of his experience. Without conscious subjects the objects we
experience wouldn't exist.
The alternative reading I am presenting interprets Husserl's locution "the
world that exists for me" as meaning "the world as it is understood by me".
Taken in this way Husserl is claiming that the understanding he has of the
world derives from himself and his own consciousness.24
What is it to have an "understanding" of reality and what does it mean to
say that this understanding derives from a subject's consciousness? To
understand x, I suggest, is to make sense of x. One can make sense of x
only if x means something for us. We cannot for instance make sense of a
sentence in a foreign language we do not speak: because we do not
understand the language the sentence won't mean anything to us. To have
an understanding of reality, reality must mean something for a subject.
In what sense can reality be said to "mean" something for a subject? We
sometimes use "meaning" when we are talking about things of "value" as for
instance we talk about our friends or our careers as meaning something to
us. Certainly we can find the things around us of value and in this sense
imbue them with meaning. However this is not the only sense in which
24
This makes Husserl sound like he endorses individualism: the view that there is no
necessary connection between a person's being in a particular mental state and that person
standing in a relation to her physical and social environment. To attribute such a view to
Husserl is to overlook the many places in which he insists on the role that other subjects play
in giving us a sense of objective reality. For some discussion of this point see Zahavi (1999:
ch.'s 9-11). Also see Husserl's currently untranslated lectures on intersubjectivity published
in 1973 as Volume 13-15 of his collected works.
24
The Conflict Between Naturalism and Phenomenology
"meaning" is used when we say reality has "meaning for" a subject. An
object can also be said to have "meaning for" a subject when the thoughts or
experiences which are about this object have meaning for him.
Our thoughts and experiences are bearers of meaning. They get their
meaning from whatever it is they purport to refer to. I shall say that a thought
or experience has a "meaning for" a subject when the subject knows what it
is that her thoughts and experiences represent. The meaning a thought or
experience has for a subject derives from the distinctive kind of knowledge a
subject has of what this thought or experience represents.
Any account of what it is for a subject to have knowledge of this kind must
answer at least two questions. First it must tell us how it is that a subject's
thoughts and experiences can have representational content. Second it
must tell us under what conditions a subject can be said to have knowledge
of what her thoughts and experiences are about.
Husserl, I am suggesting, may be understood as claiming that both
questions could be answered by putting in brackets or disregarding our
empirical beliefs and studying our various conscious mental state just as they
present themselves to us. He thought that phenomenology could identify the
conditions necessary and sufficient for an experience or thought to possess
a representational content without making reference to any relation a subject
stands in to the natural world. Husserl held that our conscious mental states
have their intentionality intrinsically. A mental state has what I am calling
"intrinsic intentionality" if there is no relation to the natural world, causal or
otherwise, that this mental state depends upon for its intentional
directedness. It is this discovery that consciousness is intrinsically
intentional which I shall take to be the central claim of Husserl's
phenomenology.
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I began this section by attributing to the phenomenologist the view that
consciousness "constitutes" its objects. I shall understand "constitution" to
be the process by which a subject enters into an intentional relation with an
object. The objects which Husserl took consciousness to constitute are, I
suggest, what we would now call "intentional objects".
Brentano introduced the idea of an intentional object to capture the sense
in which an object exists in the mind when it is thought about or
experienced.25 Husserl rejected Brentano's understanding of "intentional
object" as an object that has a peculiar kind of mental inexistence. He
claimed instead that the objects we think about or experience exist in the
objective world, or at least that this is what we ordinarily suppose until we are
shown otherwise. He nevertheless retains a notion of an intentional object.
In the Fifth of his Logical Investigations he calls an intentional object, "the
object as it is intended", which he contrasts with the "object which is
intended".26 It is the object as it is intended which, his phenomenology
claims, the conscious subject constitutes. Husserl needn't say the same
about the object-which-is-intended. Since this object is bracketed he need
make no claim about its metaphysical status.
I have introduced the idea of an intentional object to explain what it is
Husserl's phenomenology studies, having put in brackets all propositions
relating to the natural world. I am claiming that what the Husserlian
phenomenologist studies is the process by which an intentional object is
constituted for a subject. I will take the goal of phenomenology to be the
description of the conditions which must be satisfied if conscious mental
states are to be intrinsically intentional. When the phenomenologist talks of
25
See Brentano (1995: 77-100).
26
Husserl (1913/1970: Vol.2, V, §17)
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consciousness as constituting its "objects" I take this to mean that
consciousness contains the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for
consciousness to be intentionally directed towards an object. Husserl's
phenomenology studies the process by which consciousness constitutes its
intentional objects whilst bracketing or disregarding the objects of our
thoughts and experience.
Thus we see there is a reading of Husserl's phenomenology that allows
for the phenomenologist to remain neutral on the question of idealism. If the
phenomenologist's descriptions of our conscious mental life did entail
idealism, phenomenology would undoubtedly be in conflict with naturalism.
However, the account of Husserl's phenomenology just sketched doesn't
require us to take a stand on the question of idealism one way or another.
Thus it remains possible that despite what Husserl says his account of the
mind needn't be taken to be in opposition with naturalism.
I shall argue in the final section that Husserl's argument against
naturalism rests on a commitment to idealism. We have just seen that his
phenomenological project can be prized apart from any commitment to
idealism. Thus there would seem to be some scope for separating Husserl's
anti-naturalism from his phenomenological project. If I am right, there is
nothing in his phenomenological project that requires one to endorse
idealism. If a Husserlian phenomenologist can remain neutral on the
question of idealism, s/he should also be able to remain neutral on the
question of naturalism. A position of neutrality is all I need for my project of
building a naturalistic account of mind based on insights from
phenomenology to get off the ground.
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4. Husserl's Argument against Naturalism
I shall attribute to Husserl a supervenience thesis which reverses the relation
of dependence the naturalist takes to hold between our minds and the
elements of which the natural world is composed. By reversing this relation
of dependence Husserl will argue there is something naturalistic
explanations must always take for granted. The naturalist will be accused of
taking for granted the role that the conscious subjects plays in constituting,
and thereby giving us experiences of the natural world.
The naturalist, as we saw earlier, takes natural science to tell us which
properties and entities belong to the natural world. Let us call a property to
which an appeal is made by science, a "natural property". I take the
naturalist to be committed to the following supervenience thesis:
Naturalism's Supervenience Thesis (NST): Any world which is a duplicate
of our own with respect to its natural properties is a duplicate simpliciter of
our world.
NST entails the supervenience of psychological properties on natural
properties. In particular it follows that once a world's natural properties have
been fixed all of its intentional properties will also be fixed. NST predicts that
it ought to be possible to give an account of intentional properties in terms of
natural properties. It is this prediction that Husserl's argument against
naturalism will try to challenge.
Husserl holds that the entities and properties which science describes
exist only in relation to us. We constitute these entities and properties
through certain of our intentionally directed mental states. Husserl will claim
that the entities and properties with which our scientific theories populate the
natural world depend for their existence on us, and our intentionally directed
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mental states. I shall take Husserl to hold the following supervenience
thesis:
Husserl's Supervenience Thesis (HST): Any world which is a duplicate of
our own with respect to its intentional properties will be a duplicate of our
own world simpliciter.
Husserl argument against naturalism is, in essence, that we cannot use the
theories of the natural sciences to explain the intentional directedness of our
conscious mental states. For HST tells us that the properties and entities the
theories of the natural sciences identify depend for their existence on
conscious subjects.
An analogy might help to get clearer on Husserl's point.27 Suppose there
is a God and that God created the universe with all of its laws of nature.
Science couldn't explain God's existence by appeal to the laws of nature it
has discovered. It is God that explains the existence of these laws of nature
and not vice versa. Husserl wants to say something analogous about
consciousness. We cannot appeal to the elements of which the natural
world is composed to account for the existence of consciousness. It is
consciousness and the intentional mental states of which it is composed that
explain the existence of the natural world for us and not other the other way
round.
Couldn't a naturalist agree with Husserl that intentional objects depend on
consciousness for their existence because consciousness is intrinsically
intentional, but nevertheless insist that intentional properties supervene on
no
natural properties and not vice versa? Why say that the relation of
27
Denis Walsh suggested this helpful analogy to me.
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In later chapters I will develop a position along these lines. Searle (1992) can also be
understood as defending the position described here.
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dependence between intentional and natural properties holds in the direction
Husserl supposes?
I can find two possible lines of argument in Husserl in support of HST.
Both turn out to rely on a strong form of idealism, one way or another. In his
Ideas 1 Husserl tells us that:
'Reality is not something absolute which becomes tied secondarily to
something else; rather in the absolute sense, it is nothing at all...it has the
essentiality of something which, of necessity, is only intentional, only an
object of consciousness.' (Husserl, 1913/1982: 93-4)
Here Husserl seems to be saying that the natural world only exists in relation
to conscious subjects. Apart from its relation to conscious subjects the
natural world is, as he puts it, "nothing at all" (op. cit.). Husserl's
supervenience thesis (HST) follows very naturally from this strong form of
idealism. If natural properties have no existence except insofar as they are
made the objects of consciousness, of course we will have to say that
natural properties supervene on intentional properties.
If Husserl could show that such a claim is entailed by his
phenomenological descriptions this would indeed spell trouble for the
naturalist. If conscious subjects bring the natural world into existence they
cannot themselves be a part of a natural world anymore than God could be
part of the natural world if God is credited with the creation of the natural
world. I have suggested that there is a way of reading Husserl's
phenomenological project which allows the phenomenologist to remain
neutral on the question of idealism. There is some evidence that Husserl
thought otherwise, but whether he was right to do so, at the very least
remains an open-question.
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Husserl has a second argument available to him against naturalism. Here
I am drawing on the passage quoted at end of my §3 from his (1911) lecture
in which Husserl claims that naturalistic explanations are guilty of some kind
of circularity. As he puts it: To expect from natural science itself the solution
of any one of the problems inherent in it as such...is to be involved in a
vicious circle' (op. cit.).
I have been developing a reading of Husserl's argument according to
which the naturalist might be charged with taking for granted certain
conditions originating with the conscious subject, which explain how a
subject can have a sense of an objective reality. Thus construed, Husserl's
worry would seem to be that the naturalist cannot explain the sense we have
of an objective reality, since our sense of an objective reality is something
s/he must take for granted. His thought seems to be that the naturalist
cannot account for that which her explanations presuppose.
This line of argument depends on two claims:
(1) Naturalism must presuppose the sense we have of an objective
reality.
(2) The presuppositions of naturalism cannot be explained by naturalism.
Let us consider (1) first. Naturalists say that science is our guide to what
there is and what there is not. S/he assumes that there is a world that is
there anyway which is available for study by science. Husserl says we have
a sense of an objective reality only because our thoughts and experiences
are intrinsically intentional. The world the scientist describes is available to
us only because our thoughts and experiences have intrinsic intentionality.
Insofar as the naturalist presupposes that there is a world there anyway that
is available for scientific study, Husserl thinks she must also presuppose the
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conditions which make it possible for our thoughts and experiences to
achieve a relation to such a world.
None of this would be particularly damaging to the naturalist unless an
argument can be made for the second claim. It must be shown that the
naturalist cannot account for the conditions in virtue of which our thoughts
and experience can exhibit intrinsic intentionality. Otherwise the naturalist
can appeal to NST and claim that all of the intentional properties at a world
are fixed by its natural properties.
Though the following argument does not appear explicitly in Husserl's
writings, it nevertheless goes some way towards motivating the second claim
which Husserl needs for his argument against naturalism to go through:
(P1) The intentional directedness of consciousness explains how a natural
property can be made the object of a thought or experience.
(P2) The intentional directedness of consciousness is explained by a set
of conditions (Ci, C2,...Cn) which make it possible for consciousness to
exhibit intrinsic intentionality.
(P3) Explanation is asymmetric: if A explains B, B cannot explain A29.
(CON) The natural properties which we make the objects of our thoughts
and experience cannot be used to explain the set of conditions (C-i,
C2,...Cn) which make it possible for consciousness to exhibit intrinsic
intentionality.
29
Consider by way of illustration, the familiar example of Jones' death by poisoning used by
Aohinstein (1983) in his discussion of Hempel's deductive nomological model of explanation
(pp.168 & 170-1). Jones' eating a pound of arsenic explains his dieing within twenty four
hours, but his dieing within twenty four hours doesn't explain his eating a pound of arsenic.
Perhaps Jones' wanting to die explains his eating the arsenic, but even granting this
possibility the point that explanation is asymmetric stands: Jones' wanting to die and his
actual death are two very different events, and thus two very different causes.
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I have introduced (P3) as a way of making sense of (2), the claim that
naturalism cannot explain what it must presuppose. This move depends for
its success on the relevant presuppositions themselves playing an
explanatory role. In this case the relevant presuppositions are the set of
conditions which make it possible for our conscious mental states to exhibit
intentionality. The presupposed conditions explain how it is possible for a
mental state to have intentionality intrinsically. In particular they explain how
the natural properties which the scientist identifies can be made the object of
our thoughts and experiences.
Suppose that there is a set of conditions (C-i, C2,...Cn) which explain how
natural properties can be made the object of our thoughts and experiences.
Husserl wants to say that we cannot appeal to the natural properties we
make the objects of our thoughts and experiences to explain the set of
conditions (Ci, C2,...Cn). I have suggested that the reason we cannot do so
is because explanation is asymmetric.
Does this argument establish the truth of HST? We have been looking
for an argument that will establish that the complete set of intentional
properties will fix the natural properties at a world, rather than vice versa.
What Husserl needs, if the above line of argument is to secure HST for him,
is the claim that there is no property which is not in some way dependent
upon an intentional property. He needs to establish the falsity of what he
calls "transcendental realism": the view that entities exist "in themselves"
completely independently of becoming, or being able to become, the object
of a conscious thought or experience. However, any argument Husserl could
supply against transcendental realism would be an argument for some form
of idealism. It would be an argument for the conclusion that there is no entity
that exists in itself completely independently of becoming, or being able to
J J
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become, the object of a conscious thought or experience. This is idealism.
So once again we find Husserl's argument against naturalism depending on
his making a case for idealism.
I have considered just two possible arguments against naturalism which I
have been able to find in Husserl's writings. No doubt there are others, but
any argument Husserl can make against naturalism would require him to
defend HST over NST. I cannot see a way for Husserl to do this which
doesn't in some way rely on idealism. I have argued that the
phenomenological project can be pursued without taking a stand on the
question of idealism. If I am right the phenomenologist needn't take a stand
on the question of naturalism either. For any argument the phenomenologist
can make against idealism would require them to defend HST. But an
argument for HST would require the phenomenologist to also argue for
idealism, something which I have claimed goes beyond the remit of
phenomenology.
Later phenomenologists like Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty
rejected Husserl's idealism without giving up on his phenomenological
project. Unfortunately for me, these philosophers were also opposed to
naturalism. Eventually I will argue that the problem phenomenology raises
for naturalism can help us to understand a problem naturalists have
discovered for themselves, a problem that has come to be called the
OQ
"explanatory gap". We will see that the explanatory gap is located just
where phenomenology attacks naturalism. I shall argue that if the gap in the
naturalistic account of mind is to be bridged it will only be by showing how a
naturalist can assimilate the descriptions phenomenologists offer of
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phenomenologist's argument against naturalism, the path won't have been
cleared for such a naturalistic account of mind.
I shall finish by briefly summarising the argument of this chapter. I have
characterised phenomenology as concerned with describing the conditions in
virtue of which our conscious thoughts and experiences exhibit intentional
directedness. We have seen Husserl argue that these conditions originate
from the conscious subject. The conscious subject is assigned responsibility
for constituting the sense we have of an objective reality. I have argued that
Husserl's argument against naturalism depends on endorsing idealism, the
view that the natural world is in some sense dependent on us for its
existence. We have also seen that the phenomenologist need take no stand
on the truth or otherwise of idealism. I have argued on this basis that the
phenomenologist need take no stand on the truth or otherwise of naturalism.
In the next chapter we will see how existential phenomenology mounts an
argument against naturalism that is independent of any commitment to
idealism. In chapter 3 I will connect this argument with a problem that
naturalists have identified for themselves - the problem of the explanatory
gap. There I will argue that a solution to the explanatory gap turns on
making room for the descriptions of consciousness phenomenology supplies.
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Chapter 2
Introduction
Phenomenologists have taken themselves to offer an account of the mind
which refutes naturalism. I will be arguing that phenomenology has important
insights to offer about what it is for a creature to undergo conscious
experiences which any satisfactory naturalist theory of mind must
incorporate. If phenomenologists are right these are insights the naturalist is
precluded from recognising. To accept a phenomenological account of the
mind it would seem is to already abandon naturalism. Thus a naturalistic
account of the mind which takes its lead from phenomenological description
look at best misconceived.
In the previous chapter we saw that Husserl's argument against
naturalism relied upon accepting a commitment to idealism. I offered a
characterisation of the phenomenological project which allowed the
phenomenologist to remain neutral on the issue of idealism. Unfortunately
for me, the phenomenologist's argument against naturalism doesn't depend
on idealism. We shall see in this chapter how existential phenomenologists
rejected Husserl's idealism while nevertheless remaining steadfastly opposed
to naturalism.
Existential phenomenologists agree with Husserl that a naturalistic theory
of mind depends for its truth on certain presuppositions it cannot explain.
However it disagrees with Husserl about the nature of these presuppositions.
The existential phenomenologist takes intentionality to be a defining
characteristic of our existence as conscious subjects. Unlike Husserl's
phenomenology it doesn't begin by bracketing all existence claims. Rather
existential phenomenology takes as its subject matter our own existence in
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the world. It then sets about identifying what it is about our existence that
makes it possible for our thoughts and experiences to exhibit intentionality.
The presuppositions which it is argued naturalism cannot explain relate to
our existence as persons. Heidegger calls our way of existing as persons
'being-in-the-world'. It is being-in-the-world which he and the other existential
phenomenologists will argue explains how intentionality is possible. Our
being-in-the-world is something the existential phenomenologist claims will
always resist assimilation into the naturalist's explanatory framework. My
aim in this chapter will be to reconstruct the existential phenomenologist's
argument for this conclusion.
1. The Departure from Husserl
Existential phenomenologists part company with Husserl over his conception
of subjectivity.1 Husserl's phenomenology, they were to argue, rested on
certain philosophical presuppositions which careful phenomenological
description reveals to be ungrounded. Husserl lent his uncritical
endorsement to a conception of the conscious subject inherited from
Descartes.2 He contrasts the "immanent" existence which he took to be
characteristic of our occurrent conscious mental states, with the
"transcendent" existence which is a feature of any physical or abstract object.
This contrast between "immanence" and "transcendence" forms the basis for
a Cartesian distinction between what is internal to a subject's mind and what
is external. What is internal to a subject's mind is, at the time of its
1
We shall see in due course that this departure from Husserl enabled them to reject his
idealism.
2
For a criticism of Husserl along these lines see Heidegger's comments on Husserl's
Encyclopedia Britannica Article reprinted in Sheehan and Palmer (ed.'s) (1997). For an
excellent discussion of the difference between Husserl and Heidegger see Carman (2003:
ch.2).
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occurrence, known with complete certainty while what is external to a
subject's mind can always be subjected to doubt.
For Heidegger, Husserl's adherence to a Cartesian conception of mind as
an inner, private mental realm was a prejudice that doesn't accord with the
phenomenology of our experiences. Rather than carefully reflecting on our
existence as conscious subjects, Husserl simply accepts without question a
traditional Cartesian understanding of the conscious subject. He does so
because this understanding of subjectivity suits his needs; it fits with his
desire to make philosophy into a science.
'Husserl's primary question is simply not concerned with the character of
the being of consciousness, instead he is led by the following concern:
How can consciousness become the possible object of an absolute
science? The primary concern guiding him is the idea of an absolute
science. The idea that consciousness should be a region of an absolute
science, is not simply invented, rather it is the idea that has occupied
modern philosophy since Descartes. The elaboration of pure
consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived
phenomenologically by going back to the things themselves, but by going
back to the traditional idea of philosophy.' (Heidegger, 1992: 147
(emphases appear in the original text))
The idea that the contents of the conscious mind are immanent is an
ungrounded presupposition which Husserl, by his own phenomenological
standards, ought to have set aside. The kinds of experience we undergo
when we are behaving skillfully, for instance, don't admit of any distinction
between what is internal to a subject's mind and what is external.3 An
3
To put this claim in more familiar contemporary terms, Heidegger is claiming that the type
of perceptual content which accompanies our skillful behaviours is "object-dependent".
Perceptual content can be said to be object-dependent if it includes the entity experienced
as a constituent. See McDowell (1986) for an object-dependent account of perceptual
content. I will have more to say about Heidegger's description of skillful behaviour later in
the chapter (see sections 2 & 4).
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accurate description of perceptual experiences of this kind conflicts with any
conception of the contents of the conscious mind as immanent as opposed to
transcendent. When we are behaving skillfully we are absorbed in what we
are doing, and our experience is taken up with the things in the world with
which we are dealing. Such experiences do not seem to admit of any
distinction between what is inside a subject's mind and known with complete
certainty, and what is outside and known only dubitably. Husserl's failure to
inquire into the ways in which we and the things we experience exist led him
to ignore the fact that many of our experiences do not permit a precise
boundary to be drawn between what lies inside the mind and what lies
outside. It is this failure which we shall see existential phenomenology
sought to remedy.
2. Operative and Cognitive Intentionalitv
Existential phenomenology distinguishes itself from Husserl's project by
inquiring into the nature of intentionality itself, and of the subject and object
that form the relata of any given intentional relation. Like Husserl they
undertake this inquiry by seeking to describe our experiences just as they are
lived by us, free from any philosophical or scientific presuppositions. Among
the presuppositions the phenomenological philosopher must set aside is the
idea of the conscious mind as a self-contained, self-sufficient realm. This is a
philosophical prejudice which should not be accepted without question if we
are to describe our perceptual experiences as they are lived by us.
When we reflect on our existence as conscious subjects, and describe
what we find free of any prejudice, we discover that there are two distinct
ways in which we can represent the world. I shall call these two modes of
representation "reflective" and "operative" respectively. Existential
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phenomenologists describe each of these modes of representation as having
its own distinct variety of intentionality, which I shall call "cognitive" and
"operative" intentionality. They distinguish operative from cognitive
intentionality by describing on the one hand, the different ways in which a
subject exists when she takes up an operative rather than a cognitive relation
to the world and on the other, the different ways in which an object exists
when it is experienced operatively and cognitively.
Contrast the kind of relation to the world we take up when pointing at a
coffee cup, and the relation to the world we take up when taking hold of a
coffee cup and drinking from it. When I point at the coffee cup I experience
it as at a determinate location in space separate from myself. Not so when I
take hold of the coffee cup and drink from it. When I reach for the mug and
grasp hold of it, I experience the mug not as an entity existing apart from me.
Instead I experience the mug in terms of how I must behave if I am to
successfully use it as a coffee-drinking receptacle. In both cases my
experience has an intentional content that literally includes the mug as a
constituent. In the latter case the mug guides the behaviour I direct towards
it. The mug is experienced as something located at a position in egocentric
space the coordinates of which are centred on my body. It is experienced as
something calling for me to direct certain reaching and grasping behaviours
towards it.
Operative intentionality attaches to our skillful behaviours. It is a feature of
these behaviours that they do not seem to be the outcome of any act of
reflection or deliberation on the part of the agent. Think of a skilled musician.
She can use her instrument to perform a piece of music without having to
consider at each moment what she is doing and what she is to do next.
Thoughts of this kind would obstruct the fluidity of her performance. Instead
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repeated and regular practice has brought her to the point where she has an
ability to play without any intellectual effort. The knowledge of how to use her
instrument has become second nature.
It would be a mistake to conceive of our skillful behaviours as mere reflex
responses because they can be exercised without recourse to any act of
reflection or deliberation. Rather skillful behaviours are a category of
behaviour in their own right, falling somewhere in between merely
mechanical bodily movements and reflective or deliberative actions. This can
be seen by contrasting a reflex response with an act of grasping.4 Our acts
of grasping are directed towards their objects in a certain way. It is in this
sense that they can be said to have intentionality, albeit of a different variety
from cognitive processes as we shall see in due course. I move my body in a
certain way in accordance with the object I am attempting to take hold of. My
grasping act can of course fail if the object isn't as I anticipate it to be. The
object might for instance fail to be the size, shape or weight I represent it to
be when I initiate my movements towards it.
Of course reflex behaviours can also be said to succeed or fail; the lower
part of my leg can fail to rise when I am struck just below the kneecap.
However the failure of my reflex behaviour to occur has nothing to do with
me; the relevant muscular contractions are not under my control. The same
is not true of a grasping act. In the latter case it is me that directs my
behaviour in a certain way in accordance with how / am representing the
object, and it is me who succeeds or fails in grasping the object. I am
responsible when my skillful behaviours do not succeed in achieving their
goals in a way that I am not responsible for my body's reflex responses. My
4
Kelly (2000) offers this contrast in illustrating Merleau-Ponty's idea of motor intentionality.
See Merleau-Ponty (1965: 40) for the claim that skillful behaviours form a category of
behaviour in their own right.
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skillful behaviours fail to achieve their goals in part because of the way in
which I direct them.
So skillful behaviours should not be understood as reflex responses, but
nor should they be treated as the outcome of deliberation or cognition. The
agent represents an object in different ways when she experiences an object
cognitively and when she experiences the same object operatively.
Cognitive intentionality is the kind of intentionality that belongs to our
propositional attitudes. By a "propositional attitude" I mean a state of mind
which we can ascribe to a creature using a sentence of the form 'S cp's that P'
where 'S' is the creature, 'cp' is the psychological state and 'P' is a sentence
or proposition which specifies cp's representational content.
Operative intentionality doesn't attach to states of mind. Instead it belongs
to the activities in which a creature engages, in particular to its skilful
activities. These activities still have success conditions. They involve the
creature's directing its behaviour in a goal-directed manner. We cannot
make sense of these behaviours except in terms of the goals which the
creature was acting in-order to bring about.
The existential phenomenologist claims that we would be misdescribing
these activities if we took them to be the outcome of states of mind which
possess what I have called cognitive intentionality. When we represent an
object operatively, we represent the object in a way which makes essential
reference to the use we are making of that thing. The ways in which the
thing is represented make essential reference to our dealings with that thing,
and the goals we have when we are dealing with it.
It is true that some of a creature's propositional attitudes will be assessed
for their truth or falsity by making reference to a creature's dealings with the
world. If I form the belief that I must turn the door handle to the left in order
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to open the door, we will have to make reference to my dealings with the
world in order to assess this belief for truth. This however seems inessential
to states that have cognitive intentionality in a way that it isn't for activities
that exhibit operative intentionality. Many of my propositional attitudes
represent situations that have little or nothing to do with my engagement with
the world. Furthermore those of my propositional attitudes that do concern
my dealings with the world, represent their objects differently from the ways
in which I represent them when I am engaged in some skilful activity. When I
form a belief or some other propositional attitude about the objects of my
dealing, I do not represent the object in terms of which actions will be
appropriate and which inappropriate. I represent the thing as belonging to an
objective world. Whether or not I represent the thing correctly will be decided
by facts about this objective world. My propositional attitudes will be made
true by conditions which in many cases will not require us to make mention of
me and my goals. This is never the case for activities that have operative
intentionality.
I began this section by saying that existential phenomenologists depart
from Husserl by making the existence of the subject and object, the relata of
an intentional relation, the objects of their phenomenological descriptions.
Now that we have some sense of the difference between cognitive and
operative intentionality I want to consider what sense can be made of the
claim that subject and object exist in different ways when a subject
experiences the world operatively and cognitively. This will eventually enable
us to see how existential phenomenology can avoid the charge of idealism.
Having established that existential phenomenology is not guilty of begging
the question against naturalism, as we have seen Husserl was I shall
consider their argument against naturalism.
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3. The Question of Being
In this section and the next I shall propose a reading of the claim that we and
the things we experience exist in different ways when experienced
operatively and when experienced cognitively. I will argue that our cognitive
modes of experience reveal a world that is there anyway whether or not it is
being experienced. While our operative modes of experience, by contrast,
represent entities which are, in a sense to be explained, dependent on us
and our ways of experiencing these entities. Thus the existential
phenomenologist can defend a qualified realism about the objects of our
experience. First we must make sense of the idea that persons and the
objects of their experience exist in different ways depending on whether they
are experienced operatively or cognitively. What do I mean by my talk of
"objects and persons existing in different ways"?
It was Heidegger's (1927/1962) magnum opus Being and Time which was
responsible for ushering in questions about existence into phenomenology.
In this work Heidegger asks what it means for something to be; he asks what
"being" means? There is of course an important sense in which there is
nothing univocal we mean by "being". We use the term "being" in different
ways to talks about identity, as when we say one thing is identical with or
distinct from another thing, or to talk about predication as when we say one
thing is such-and-such, or simply in saying that something is the case. Might
there nevertheless be something that these different uses of "being" share in
common?
I shall follow Carman (2003) and many others in reading Heidegger's
question 'what does "being" mean' as a question about a person's
understanding of "being".5 According to Carman's reading, Heidegger is
5
See Carman (2003, pp. 17-18)
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claiming that these distinct uses of the term "being" all draw upon a common
understanding of being. Heidegger tells us that by "being" he means 'that
which defines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities...are in
each case already understood' (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 8). Carman finds in
Heidegger a description of our understanding of "being" as having two
features. First we understand what an entity is; we know its nature or
essence. Second we understand whether an entity is or not. In the most
general and abstract terms then, Heidegger is claiming that to understand the
meaning of "being" is to "understand what and that (or whether) something is"
(Carman, 2003: 17).
Each of the senses of "being" mentioned above - the "is" of identity,
predication and existence - require one to understand what an entity is and
whether it is. One cannot correctly apply the "is" of prediction in asserting
that the sun is shining for instance, if one doesn't know what it is for the sun
to shine or whether the sun is now shining. Equally one can correctly apply
the "is" of identity to say for instance that 'water is H2O', only if someone in
one's linguistic community knows what "water" and "H20" refer to and if
someone knows whether these two terms pick out one and the same stuff.6
Finally, one can correctly say that the dodo no longer exists only if one knows
what a dodo is and whether there are any in the world. Let us suppose then
that Heidegger is right and there is a univocal understanding of "being"
underlying each of the three senses of "being" mentioned above. Let us
suppose that in order to correctly apply "being" in any of the aforementioned
senses one must understand what an entity is and whether or not it is.
61 express the understanding that is required in these impersonal terms so as to do justice to
the arguments of Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980).
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In line with Carman's reading of Heidegger, I shall take the existential
phenomenologist's talk of an entity's different "ways of existing" to mean
different ways of understanding what an entity is and whether it is. An entity
"is" when we human beings can make sense of this entity as an entity, when
we have an understanding of what it is and whether it is. Thus construed
Heidegger is claiming that being and our understanding of being stand in a
relation of reciprocal dependence. This is to say that without persons who
have an understanding of being, there would be nothing which defines
entities as entities. Equally, in the absence of anything which defines entities
as entities there would be no understanding of being.
Consider our affective states of mind as example of how our
understanding of being might help to constitute a thing's being, in this case
our affective states of mind. When someone asks me how I feel and I give
expression to my feeling, the understanding I arrive at shapes my emotion.7
My feeling is the emotion it is because I understand it to be a particular
emotion, a feeling of shame say rather than pride. The more fine-grained the
discriminations I can make among my feelings, the richer my emotional life.
A person that can only distinguish between feeling good and feeling bad will
clearly enjoy an impoverished emotional life compared with someone who
can make some of the many distinctions there are to be made within these
broad categories. Moreover if my understanding were to change so too
would my emotion. Consider a person who interprets a feeling he is
experiencing as love. Later he realises that the feeling was no such thing
and with this realisation his feeling changes, he no longer feels that he is in
7
See Taylor (1985, essays 2 & 4) for extended discussion of this claim. For a careful
discussion of Taylor's account of self-interpretation see Moran (2001: ch.2).
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love. The change he undergoes in what he feels is the result of a change in
his understanding.
My feelings are always feelings about something8; they are responses to
the situation I find myself in. Feelings of shame for instance, are responses
to situations which are in some way shameful or humiliating. Sartre discusses
at length a case in which a person experiences shame having been caught
looking through a keyhole.9 The shame this person feels is a response to the
situation of being caught and how the other person will see him as a result.
They see him in a way that he does not want to be seen, and this explains
why he feels shamed or humiliated.
A property of a situation like shamefulness is a property defined by our
emotional response to a situation. I have just suggested that a person
comes to feel a particular emotion like shame when he arrives at a particular
understanding of his feelings.10 Suppose that (a) feelings are responses to
the situations they are about, and (b) our feelings are given shape, they are
constituted, through the beliefs or understanding we form about them. It will
follow that there are some properties, for instance the properties we are
responding to when we are emotionally affected by a situation, which are
shaped by the understanding we have of ourselves. For these properties,
8
Searle (1983) offers as examples of states of mind that lack intentional content, undirected
nervousness and anxiety. Taylor (1985: 48) points out that what marks out these states of
mind is "the felt absence of object". The inability on the part of the subject to find an object
which his feeling is about is a feature of the situation a subject is in when he undergoes such
an experience. Instead of thinking of intentionality in terms of direction towards an object,
Taylor suggests we think of intentionality as giving a subject a sense of a situation. This is
something our feelings accomplish whether or not they are directed towards an object.
9 Sartre (1943/2000: pp.'s 259-302).
10
Taylor claims that the beliefs I form and the descriptions I would give of my feelings
articulate, or make explicit, those features of the situation that are of relevance or importance
to me. The person caught in the performance of a voyeuristic act for example feels shame
because he desires that others see him as dignified and he knows that this is not how
voyeurs are viewed. His feeling is a response to the view the other person has of him as
worthless, as deserving of little or no respect.
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there will be no separating the property from our understanding of it: our
emotional response is shaped by our understanding, and the property which
our feeling is about is defined by our emotional response.
Let us see if we might be able to extract from my discussion of affective
states some salient features which might help make sense of Heidegger's
claims that being and our understanding of being stand in a relation of
reciprocal dependence. I have said that:
(1) There are some situations (e.g. shameful situations) which are shaped
or constituted by our affective responses to them, and
(2) Emotions are shaped by the understanding we form of them.
I have inferred from these two claims that there are some situations which
are shaped by our understanding. If Heidegger is to generalise this claim to
being as such - what an entity is and whether it is - he must say the
following:
(1*) Being as such is constituted by our cognitive and non-cognitive
responses to it, and
(2*) The relevant responses are shaped by our understanding.
We have taken this brief excursus into Heidegger's existential
phenomenology in order to make sense of the claim that we and the objects
of our experience have different ways of existing when experienced
cognitively and when experienced operatively. We are now well placed to
make sense of this claim. The idea seems to be that our operative and
cognitive modes of experiences are constituted by different modes of
understanding. The existential phenomenologist wants to claim that these
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different modes of understanding not only shape different experiences, but
also shape or constitute what an entity is and whether it is. Our cognitive and
operative modes of understanding shape the "being" of those entities we
experience cognitively and operatively.
In the next section I will explore the difference between these two modes
of understanding. We shall see how our operative mode of understanding
gives us a sense of ourselves and the objects we experience that is "pre-
objective". We make sense of the objects of our operative modes of
experience in terms of our ways of dealing with them. To make sense of an
entity in terms of one's dealing with it is to represent the entity from the point
of view of a person with particular interests and concerns. In this sense the
contents of our operative experiences can be said to be pre-objective. By
contrast our cognitive mode of understanding gives us a sense of ourselves
as existing apart from the world. It is through our cognitive mode of
understanding that we discover a world that is there anyway apart from our
particular interests and concerns.
4. Two Modes of Understanding
Heidegger's well-known distinction between readiness-to-hand
(.Zuhandenheit) and presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) is introduced to
characterize the sense in which one and the same entity can exist in different
ways. This distinction is intended to pick out two different ways in which we
can understand entities - we can understand an entity as ready-to-hand or
as present-at-hand. We understand an entity as ready-to-hand when
experiencing it operatively. I shall call the understanding in virtue of which
entities can be experienced as ready-to-hand, "operative understanding".
When we experience an entity cognitively we understand it as present-at-
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hand. I shall call this mode of understanding - the mode of understanding
we draw on in experiencing something as present-at-hand - "cognitive
understanding".
An entity is understood as ready-to-hand when a subject knows how the
entity can be used to achieve some end. For recall that operative
intentionality was introduced to characterise the kind of intentionality that
belongs to our skilled behaviours. It is a characteristic of such behaviours
that the agent has mastered the skillful activity to the point where she can
exercise her skill without the need to deliberate on or think about what she is
doing. She can act appropriately in response to the twin demands of the
situation she is in and the activity in which she is engaged. The agent can
exhibit this kind of sensitivity to a situation only if she knows what an entity is
for and how it is to be used.
It is a feature of ready-to-hand entities that they are defined by their
function - the way in which they should be used. Heidegger tells us that it is
not just artifacts which are ready-to-hand. Nature is also ready-to-hand: The
wood is a forest, the mountains a quarry, the river is water power, the wind is
wind 'in the sails'.' (1962: 70) Our understanding of natural entities is also in
an important sense defined by our dealings with those natural entities.
When we have an understanding of an entity as ready-to-hand we
understand how that entity is normally used. A musical instrument such as a
piano is ready-to-hand for a musician who knows how to play it. To say what
a piano is we must describe the way in which pianos are normally used.
An entity like a piano doesn't have a function apart from other entities that
are ready-to-hand for us. A piano has its particular function only in the
context of the activity of playing music, and this is of course a context that
includes a lot more than just pianos. It includes such things such as scored
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sheets of music, musical notation, piano teachers, chairs, rooms, orchestras
etc. A subject must have an understanding of how all of these things are to
be used and relate to each other before he can be said to have an
understanding of a piano. Any entity that is experienced as ready-to-hand
has a place in a network of other entities that are experienced as ready-to-
hand. One can relate to an entity as ready-to-hand only because one has a
broader understanding of the place that this entity occupies in a nexus of
equipment. This is an understanding one has only by knowing how the
entities which compose a nexus of equipment are normally used.
We cannot describe what a ready-to-hand entity is by listing the properties
in virtue of which it occupies a particular position in space and time.
To say what a ready-to-hand entity is we need also to make mention of how it
is normally used. We have just seen how this requires us to also make
mention of the place it has among other entities which are experienced as
ready-to-hand. To use Heidegger's famous example of the hammer: a
hammer is something with which to hammer in nails in order to fasten
together pieces of wood towards the end of constructing a house for-the-sake
of a person's shelter.11
The place the hammer has among other ready-to-hand entities is a place
inhabited by persons. An entity which is experienced as ready-to-hand gets
its identity from our particular concerns and interests. Ready-to-hand entities
are used in the way they are because persons assign to them these uses in
the light of their projects and goals. Our particular interests and concerns are
not projected onto ready-to-hand entities. These entities do not have a




Existential Phenomenology and the Argument Against Naturalism
only for persons like us who relate to them as something to be put to certain
uses.
Thus there is an important sense in which ready-to-hand entities exist in a
way which depends on us. Something is ready-to-hand only because of the
ways in which it is normally used, but an entity's normal use is defined by us
with our particular projects and goals. Ready-to-hand entities fit exactly the
model I set out above when I was accounting for Heidegger's definition of
being in terms of our understanding of being. The being of ready-to-hand
entities is indeed shaped or constituted by our understanding of these
entities. It is our knowing the way in which an entity is normally put to use
which determines what counts as an appropriate response to something
ready-to-hand. A ready-to-hand entity has its particular identity - it occupies
a particular place among other ready-to-hand entities - because of the ways
in which it is normally used. Thus the being of a ready-to-hand entity, what it
is and that it is, is defined by our operative understanding, our understanding
of how this entity along with other entities, is normally put to use.
I have said that it is not only the entities we experience, but also ourselves
that have a different way of existing when undergoing an operative
experience and when undergoing a cognitive experience. This is to say that
we understand ourselves differently when we experience an object
operatively and when we experience an object cognitively. One important
difference is that in the former case we represent the world from our own
particular point of view. The subject doesn't think of his point of view as
distinct from its objects because he doesn't think about his point of view at
all.12 When we are acting non-deliberatively, immersed in what we are doing
12 This is not to say that when experiencing the world operatively, a subject is not self-aware
as Dreyfus (1991: 67) once claimed. Dreyfus says that our operative experiences are
accompanied by "awareness but no self-awareness". I will argue in chapter 5 that this is a
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and all is going to plan we are consciously aware of ourselves only in the
course of directing our actions. We do not distinguish our particular point of
view from the object on which we have taken up a point of view. Instead we
are wholly absorbed in our dealings with the object. We understand the
object wholly in terms of our dealings with it.
The existential phenomenologist makes a further claim about the
understanding we have of ourselves when engaged in a skillful activity. Just
as we understand an entity as ready-to-hand by understanding it in
accordance with the norms that govern its usage, so we also understand
ourselves and our actions according to certain norms. The norms which
govern the use of a piece of equipment like a hammer only make sense in
relation to us, and the tasks in which we are engaged. A task like hammering
in a nail in order to put up a shelf in turn gets its point or purpose from us and
our goals. We make sense of an activity like hammering in terms of our
goals. Heidegger calls these goals in terms of which we make sense of our
activities, "for-the-sake-of-which's". There is some point or purpose standing
behind every one of our activities by reference to which we make sense of
whatever we are doing.
The operative understanding we draw on in acting skillfully includes a
sense of the point or purpose behind our actions. It is important to realise
that this purpose will often not be one we have decided on for ourselves. Just
as there are social norms which determine how to use a piece of equipment
mistake. The subject is aware of himself but he is aware of himself as Sartre says "pre-
reflectively". He is aware of himself as immersed in whatever it is he is doing. When
Dreyfus denies that the subject is self-aware I think what he is meaning to highlight is that
when experiencing the world operatively the subject make no distinction between himself
and world. Dreyfus may have been assuming that to be self-aware a subject must think of
his own point of view as one among others. I shall argue that Sartre shows this is not to be
the case. He identifies a kind of self-awareness which accompanies our operative
experiences and which is such that a subject doesn't conceive of himself as distinct from the
object of his experience.
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so too will the for-the-sake-of-which's that stand behind our actions often be
socially determined. There is a normal way of using equipment, a norm one
expresses by saying what one does with the equipment. Equally there are
normal ways of making sense of an activity, a norm expressed by saying
what one is doing and by expressing the point behind one's actions. Our
skillful behaviours draw on a body of knowledge of how things are normally
done, and in exercising such behaviours we act in ways which conform to
these public norms. More often then not then the for-the-sake-of-which's in
terms of which a person makes sense of her actions are the result of a
person falling in with public norms. A person's understanding of herself when
she is acting operatively is for the most part a public understanding.
We have seen something of how operative understanding can shape the
being of ourselves and the entities we experience. Let us now turn our
attention to cognitive understanding. The existential phenomenologist claims
that we spend most of our lives engaged in skillful activities. Under what
circumstances do we come to experience the world cognitively,
independently of our particular point of view?
When I introduced the idea of cognitive intentionality in section 2, I said
that when we represent the world cognitively we do not necessarily represent
the world in terms of our dealings with it. Heidegger describes a number of
different ways in which we can represent the world cognitively.13 Of
particular interest to us is the account Heidegger gives of scientific
theorising.14
Scientific theorising, like other forms of deliberately attentive activity,
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however importantly different from other forms of deliberation in that it
involves a radical kind of decontextualisation. When we ask what it is for the
hammer to be heavy, we cease to relate to the hammer as something to be
used. We are interested instead in a property that the hammer shares in
common with other particulars that are heavy: the property of having a
weight.15 The scientist might ask, in virtue of what do entities in general have
weight? It is only by decontextualising - by considering this thing and its
properties apart from the context in which we use it - that we become
concerned with entities in general and their properties.
The scientist doesn't just decontextualise; he also recontextualises. In our
capacity as scientists we do not relate to things according to our ordinary
practical concerns, but instead we relate to them in the light of our scientific
theories. We might for instance be interested in the causal properties of
items that have a weight, and note that anything which has a weight can
exert a pressure on things that come into contact with it.16 The scientist
might then ask in virtue of what a thing has a causal power of this kind, and
develop a theory to answer this question. Henceforth, the understanding we
have of "weight" will derive from this theory. Any modifications this
understanding might undergo in the course of scientific practice will take the
form of modifications to this theory.
By first decontextualising - that is to say by setting aside our ordinary
concerns - a subject comes to experience an entity as present-at-hand.
When one relates to an object apart from the context in which it is ordinarily
15
In a passage quoted by Dreyfus (1991: 80) Heidegger tells us that the proposition 'the
hammer is heavy' "can mean that the entity that is before us, which we already know
circumspectively as a hammer, has a weight - that is to say, it has the property of
"heaviness": it exerts a pressure on what lies beneath it, and it falls if this is removed."
(1927/1962: 412) The account of Heidegger on scientific reasoning which I am here
presenting follows closely Dreyfus. See Dreyfus (1991, pp.'s 79-83).
16
See the previous footnote.
55
Existential Phenomenology and the Argument Against Naturalism
encountered one comes to experience it as having context-free properties.
That is one can think about the object in ways that do not depend on one's
particular point of view. The particular point of view one takes on an entity
when relating to it as ready-to-hand depends, as we have seen, on situating
the entity in a context. It depends on our knowing the place that the entity
has in a network of other ready-to-hand entities. As soon as one ceases to
experience an entity as ready-to-hand and relates to it as something present-
at-hand one discloses or reveals that the entity has context-free properties
and features. One comes to experience the entity as having properties and
features independently of the particular point of view one takes on it.
To experience an entity as present-at-hand, as existing independently of a
particular point of view or context, requires one to bring to bear a certain
understanding. One comes to experience an entity as having context-free
properties and features. To experience an entity in this way requires that the
subject understand the entity in a certain way. Thus we see once again how
an entity's being - what it is and that it is - can be constituted by our
understanding of its being.
There is a sense in which this is equally true of the entities our scientific
theories disclose to us. The properties the scientist identifies are ones that
show up for us only once we have taken up the standpoint of the scientist.
These are properties that come into view for us only once we have taken a
ready-to-hand entity out of its ordinary context and resituated it in the context
of our scientific practice. Having done so, we come to understand this entity
according to the scientific theories of the day. This understanding brings to
light properties that would otherwise have not shown up for us.
We have seen how Heidegger thinks that an entity's being is shaped or
constituted by our understanding of being. Moreover it has been claimed that
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one and the same entity can exist in different ways, it can be ready-to-hand
at one time and present-at-hand at another. This is because one and the
same entity can be understood in different ways. Our understanding of being
defines both what an entity is and that it is. Where does this leave Heidegger
on the question of realism?
5. Heidegger's Realism
I shall take realism to be the view that there is a fixed totality of entities which
exist independently of our practices, and our modes of understanding them.
Heidegger's position on realism can be summed up as follows: while being
depends on our understanding of being, entities or beings do not. As he puts
it:
"Entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are
disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the
grasping in which their nature is ascertained." (1927/1962: 228)
This seems an unequivocal statement of realism. However Heidegger goes
on to add the following significant qualification:
"But being 'is' only in the understanding of those entities to whose being
something like an understanding of being belongs." (ibid, 228)
A little later in the text Heidegger considers the question of an entity's
independent existence and has this to say:
'If Dasein does not exist, then, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the
'in-itself. Such a thing is then neither understandable nor not
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understandable...it can be said neither that entities are, nor that they are
not." {ibid: 255)17
In this passage Heidegger is asking us to consider the following
counterfactual scenario:
(IND) If there were no longer any persons (or what Heidegger calls
"Dasein") in existence, entities like hills and mountains, rivers and trees,
would still exist.
Heidegger seems to want to say in response to this counterfactual that we
are not in a position to assess its truth or falsity. This is not for the trivial
reason that in the scenario described persons wouldn't exist so there would
be no one to discover that entities exist independently of us. Nothing would
be understood in such a scenario. No one is going to disagree that if nothing
is understood, entities will not be understood either as independent existents
or as existing in a way that depends on us.
I have said that to understand an entity as existing independently of us is
to understand it as existing apart from any particular point of view we can
take on it. In Heidegger's words, it is to relate to the entity as something
present-at-hand. Now Heidegger's thought seems to be that if we are not
around to understand an entity in this way then there are no present-at-hand
entities. Thus construed isn't Heidegger saying that an entity's independent
existence ultimately depends on our way of understanding it? An entity is
present-at-hand only if it is understood as such. Can an entity truly be said to
exist independently of us if its independence from us is characterised in
terms of our ways of understanding entities?
171 shall follow Carman (2003: 35-43) in reading Heidegger's technical term "Dasein" to refer
to persons.
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In interpreting these passages we need to be careful to distinguish an
epistemological from a metaphysical reading. I take Heidegger to be making
the surely uncontroversial claim that we have no access to an entity apart
from our ways of understanding that entity. Our access to entities comes in
different forms. There is epistemic or cognitive access which can be
understood in terms of our capacity to arrive at knowledge of the world or
form accurate beliefs about the world. There is what we might call semantic
access, which can be understood as our capacity to make meaningful
utterances, and to refer to things by means of our utterances. Finally there is
a practical access to things which we have when we can causally affect
things in such a way as to satisfy our needs and desires.18
I take Heidegger to deny that there is, to borrow Nagel's useful phrase "a
view from nowhere", which we can take up and thereby know entities as they
are apart from our ways of understanding them. It is by means of our
understanding that we gain access to entities in the three senses I have just
set out. We can form true beliefs and arrive at knowledge of entities only by
drawing on our understanding. We can make meaningful utterances and
succeed in referring to entities only by means of our mastery or
understanding of a language. As we have seen in the previous section, we
can use entities so as to achieve our ends only by understanding them as
having a normal use and thus fitting into a network of other things that we
use to accomplish our ends. It is tempting then to read Heidegger as
claiming with Kant that our access to things is limited to that which our
understanding discloses to us. As soon as we try to step outside of the
18
Heidegger distinguishes between these different modes of access using his distinction
between presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. Malpas (1999) offers a useful
reconstruction of Heidegger's distinction in terms of this division between the
epistemic/cognitive, the semantic and the practical.
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bounds of our understanding we make claims that are neither true nor false
but unintelligible.19
It doesn't follow from such a claim that an entity is brought into existence
through our ways of understanding it, so that if we didn't exist nor would
mountains, trees, rivers and the rest of nature. What our understanding
discloses to us is a world that is there anyway, a world that doesn't depend
on our concerns and interests. We discover such a world when we stand
back from our particular point of view and relate to entities as something
present-at-hand. Then we discover the entities and their properties that
underlie our everyday dealings with the world. Nature is revealed as having
been there all along.
(IND) claims that the natural world would continue to exist were persons
not to exist. (IND) was introduced as a way of making sense of Heidegger's
claim that while an entity's being depends on us, the entity itself does not.
What does it mean to say that the natural world and the entities of which it is
composed exist "independently" of us?
191 have been reading Heidegger as claiming that there is a restriction on our understanding
of the counterfactual situation which (IND) describes. Blattner (1994) takes Heidegger to be
defending a kind of transcendental idealism. He takes Heidegger to be saying that when we
consider the situation (IND) describes from a transcendental standpoint it makes no sense to
say either that entities are or that they are not. I do not mean to ally myself with Blattner.
Near the end of his paper Blattner raises an objection (posed to him by Dreyfus) that
Heidegger couldn't have been a transcendental idealist since "Heidegger insists that all
understanding takes place in the context of an involvement with the world, and hence the
detached, uninvolved perspective of the transcendental standpoint is impossible." (Blattner,
1994:196) I am not sure I understand Blattner's response but Dreyfus objection seems to
me a powerful one.
Cerbone (1995) seems to me to have been more successful in pinpointing the restriction
on our understanding Heidegger has in mind. He argues that we cannot make assertions
about the situation (IND) describes, since our assertions get their significance from our
being-in-the-world. A situation in which there are no persons is a situation in which there is
nothing to confer significance on our assertions. Cerbone concludes that it is not entities
that depend on us for their existence, but only "what we say about them", (ibid, 416)
Assertions depend on us for their significance, but it is not us that make our assertions true
or false.
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Unsurprisingly, this is not a question to which I am currently able to return
a definitive answer. I shall settle instead for sketching two possible
answers.20 The first answer claims that our access (in the epistemic,
semantic and practical senses) to an entity necessarily depends on our ways
of understanding an entity but the entity itself only contingently depends on
our ways of understanding it.21 On this understanding to say an entity exists
independently of us is to say it has a "nature" or "essence" that is in no way
dependent on us and our ways of understanding it. Moreover this essence or
nature is something that we can achieve knowledge of through scientific
investigation. Our ordinary, pre-theoretical ways of understanding an entity,
secure access or reference to an entity by picking out certain of its contingent
properties. Through scientific investigation, so the argument goes, we can
discover properties that belong to the entity essentially, properties that it has
at every possible world where it exists.22
This second conception of realism departs from the first by denying that
we have epistemic access to the world independent of our practices. It
denies that we can know a thing's essence or nature if we understand a
thing's essence to be something that is independent of us, and our ways of
understanding an entity. The second view insists on a distinction between on
the one hand the independence of the thing which we take a point of view on
when we understand an entity in a certain way, and the independence of the
point of view from our concerns and interests. It denies that there is any
point of view we can take up which doesn't in some way reflect our concerns
201 am basing the first position on Dreyfus (1991: ch.15, pp's 251-265) & Dreyfus & Spinosa
(1999) and the second on Cerbone (1995) and Malpas (1999). For a defence of Heidegger's
realism that diverges in subtle ways from both these positions see Carman (2003: ch.4).
21
See Dreyfus and Spinosa (1999: 57)
22
Dreyfus and Spinosa cite Kripke, Putnam and Donnellan's pioneering work on rigid
designation in explaining how we come to identity a thing's essence or nature. See Dreyfus
and Spinosa, {ibid, FN 47: 76).
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and interests. It doesn't follow that the existence of the thing which we take a
point of view on is dependent on our mode of understanding. Malpas (1999)
offers the following useful analogy:
'(A) map of some portion of space depends on a particular set of interests
on the part of the mapmaker, and the likely user of the map, as well as on
certain conventional forms of presentation, but this is no way impugns the
capacity of the map to accurately "describe" and thereby to give access to
some portion of objective space', (ibid, 99)
I am not going to attempt to decide between these two ways of construing the
claim that entities exist independent of us. It suffices for my purposes that
there are at least two credible ways in which existential phenomenology can
be read as compatible with realism. I have been looking to the existential
phenomenologist for an argument against naturalism that doesn't beg the
question by presupposing the truth of idealism. I have shown that the
existential phenomenologist isn't committed to idealism and can indeed be
used to defend some version of realism.
Before we can turn to the existential phenomenologist's argument against
naturalism we need to introduce something the existential phenomenologists
call "being-in-the-world". This idea does serious work for the existential
phenomenologist explaining how both operative and cognitive intentionality
are possible. We shall see that it is being-in-the-world which the existential
phenomenologist argues the naturalist must presuppose and so cannot
explain.
6. Beinq-in-the-World
I have said that just like Husserlian phenomenology, existential
phenomenology seeks to describe how it is possible for our thoughts and
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experiences to exhibit intentional directedness. Existential phenomenologists
depart from Husserl in locating the conditions of the possibility for
intentionality (both cognitive and operative) in something they call "being-in-
the-world".
We can get some idea of what existential phenomenologists mean by
"being-in-the-world" by considering how we grasp, or make sense of, the
content of a particular intentional state.23 We have an understanding of our
intentional states as being about particular situations in virtue of their
contents, but how do we come to understand an intentional state's content as
representing one situation rather than another? Any account of intentionality
must answer this question; the answer the existential phenomenologist
returns appeals to our being-in-the-world.
Take my desire for a good cup of coffee. This desire only makes sense to
me given a large number of other beliefs and desires I have, such as beliefs
about what counts as good cup of coffee, where such a thing might be
purchased, what it is to buy coffee, and so on. However, it looks implausible
to say that the grasp I have of my desire's content derives from these various
beliefs. Not only is there an indefinite number of other beliefs that I would
have to mention in order to spell out my understanding of this simple desire.
My understanding of each of these beliefs is likewise dependent on a whole
host of other intentional states. To explain how we grasp an intentional
state's content by appeal to other intentional states seems to land us with a
regress. The same question arises again for each intentional state to which
we appeal in accounting for our understanding - we want to know how we
23
My treatment of this question is indebted to Dreyfus (1991, ch.'s 3-5). For some tweaking
of Dreyfus' account see Wrathall's (2000). Olafson (1994) attacks Dreyfus' interpretation of
Heidegger, but I cannot engage with his arguments here.
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make sense of each of these intentional states as representing one situation
rather than another.
The existential phenomenologists claim that it is by means of our being-in-
the-world that we interpret an intentional state as having one content rather
than another.24 To return to my desire for a good cup of coffee, it is my
familiarity with coffee and cafes that gives me a sense of what it is to desire
good coffee, and what I need to do to satisfy this desire. This familiarity isn't
something I can make fully explicit by writing down everything I know about
coffee and cafes. I know how to find my way about in the world of coffee, this
is just one facet of my being-in-the-world. Much of this knowledge consists in
a sense of what to do, of what is appropriate and what is not given this
desire. I am ready to respond appropriately to whatever my coffee-related
circumstances might present me with. I have a sense of how to respond
24 Searle (1983: ch.5 and 1992: ch.8) appeals to something he calls "the background" to
answer the question I have posed about our understanding of an intentional state's content.
Searle's notion of the background is similar to what I am here calling "being-in-the-world".
He describes the background as a set of "capacities, abilities and general know-how that
enable our mental states to function." (Searle, 1992: 176) The background determines what
Searle calls an intentional state's "conditions of satisfaction", the conditions which we would
state in specifying an intentional state's representational content.
There are however, some significant deficiencies in Searle's account, for an account of
which see Carman (2003: 115-121) and Wrathall (2000, pp.103-114). Carman attacks
Searle for failing to account for the normative status of the skills that constitute the
background. What Searle's account leaves out is "the phenomenon of embodied social skill
as such, which is arguably neither full blown conscious obedience to explicit rules nor mere
blind neurophysiological capacities and dispositions." (Carman, 2003: 121) Carman's
complaint against Searle is that he tries to treat our being-in-the-world as a set of mere
causal capacities when being-in-the-world consists in a variety of knowledge, knowledge of
what one should do in everyday situations.
Wrathall objects to Searle's characterisation of the background as a neuronal capacity.
He argues that such a characterisation ignores the background's temporal structure. The
background doesn't just fix an intentional state's content, it also refers forward to certain
future possibilities for action. The background gives us an orientation to the world not just
now but also in the future, it opens up or discloses a world to us. According to Wrathall,
Searle cannot recognise "the temporally embedded character of human existence" (Wrathall,
2000: 113). He claims this is something which "cannot be explained in terms of
neurophysiological structures" (ibid, 113). Whether he is right about this is something that I
think can be questioned (see Varela (1999) and Van Gelder (1999)). Leaving Wrathall's
objection to one side, it seems to me Carman has raised a significant problem for Searle.
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appropriately because of my familiarity with coffee-drinking situations,
because I know how to find my way about in such situations.
What I have just described with respect to the world of coffee is true of
other worlds too. Consider the art world, for instance. In order to understand
a work of art, a conceptual piece by Joseph Beuys say, one must know how
to find one's way about in this world. One must know quite a lot about the
history of art, so as to decipher whatever references might be being made to
other artists. One must also understand what it is the conceptual artists do,
in order to decipher the signs they use in their work. This knowledge is
knowledge one must acquire before one can understand a work of art as a
work of art. In other words one must know one's way about in the art world in
order to understand an entity which is a work of art as a work of art. What is
a pile of bricks to one person is a work of art to someone who knows how to
find their way about in this world.
I have given a couple of examples of how before we can represent an
entity as an entity we must have what I shall call "a background
understanding". This background understanding is what enables one to
understand an entity as the entity it is. The background is a feature of each
and every world we inhabit as persons. Each of these worlds has its own
background which we draw on in understanding the entities that populate
those worlds as the entities they are. Heidegger will say that the background
forms a part of the structure of being-in-the-world. Recall that being-in-the-
world is our way of existing as persons. It follows then that the background
forms a part of our way of existing as persons. Now it is only in virtue of the
background that we can understand, that is to say represent, an entity as an
entity. Thus it follows that intentionality has as its condition of possibility,
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being-in-the-worid. Let us consider how this is the case for the two modes of
intentionality described above, cognitive and operative intentionality.
When we experience the world operatively, we experience things in terms
of our dealings with them. Being-in-the-world confers on a person,
knowledge of how to deal with a thing competently. To know how to deal
with a thing competently is to have a sense of what counts as an appropriate
response, and what does not. The existential phenomenologist claims that
this sense of appropriateness derives from a person's being-in-the-world,
from her knowing her way about in the world.
When does a response count as appropriate and when does it count as
inappropriate? This all depends on the point of the response; it depends on
the purpose or goal which the agent is acting to bring about. Any piece of
equipment is defined by its normal way of being used, its function.25 A thing's
function will depend on the activity the agent is engaged in when he puts the
thing to use. This activity in turn derives its point from the agent and her self-
understanding. The agent understands herself as engaged in a certain task,
and it is by reference to this understanding that she makes sense of her
actions.
We saw in section 3 that an agent's knowledge of the point of some
activity often derives from her knowing what others do and knowing how to
conform with her community's normal ways of doing things. An agent can be
said to know the point of some activity when she knows what it is to
participate in a communal or social practice. Her knowledge of how to find
25
We saw in section 3 that a piece of equipment doesn't have a function in isolation from
other piece's of equipment: we make sense of something as a hammer, for instance, only in
the context of other pieces of equipment likes nails and pieces of wood. It is only if a person
knows the place a piece of equipment occupies in a network of equipment as a whole that
she can be said to know how a piece of equipment is normally used. This knowledge of how
a piece of equipment is used in conjunction with other items of equipment in pursuit of some
activity forms a part of what a subject must know if she is to know how to respond
appropriately to a situation.
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her way about in the world, her being-in-the-world, is a matter of knowing
how to act in ways that fall in with what others normally do. She makes
sense of things and finds intelligibility where others find it. Someone can
experience something as a piece of equipment only when she knows how to
respond to it as others respond to it, when she knows how this thing would
normally be used. This knowledge is knowledge of how to make her
responses conform to the responses of others.
It is also our being-in-the-world that makes it possible for things to show
up to a person as present-at-hand. To represent an entity as present-at-
hand is to represent this entity cognitively. Even our propositional attitudes
have a kind of intentionality that is dependent on our being-in-the-world. For
the entities and properties we represent cognitively are also understood as
entities. We have seen above that to understand an entity as an entity is
always to draw upon a background understanding relating to the world of
which that entity is a part. Consider as an example the world as it is
described by physics. One can understand an entity as belonging to this
world only because one has acquired a background understanding required
for participating in physics. However we have seen that to be in possession
of a background understanding is a feature of our way of existing as persons;
it forms a part of the structure characteristic of being-in-the-world. Thus our
understanding of entities as present-at-hand no less than our understanding
of entities as ready-to-hand is dependent upon our being-in-the-world.
The latter point that we can experience entities as present-at-hand only
because each of us is a being-in-the-world forms the basis for the existential
phenomenologist's argument against naturalism. The existential
phenomenologist doesn't think of intentionality as the means by which the
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subject escapes the confines of her own mind. He claims instead that
intentionality just is transcendence:
"In directing itself toward something and grasping it, Dasein does not
somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been
encapsulated, rather its primary kind of being is such that it is always
"outside" with entities that it encounters and that belong to an already
discovered world...And furthermore perceiving what is known is not a
matter of returning with one's booty to the "cabinet" of consciousness after
one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining and
preserving, the knowing Dasein, as Dasein, remains outside." (Heidegger,
1962: 62)
It is our being-in-the-world which makes it possible for us to encounter
entities "that belong to an already discovered world." It makes possible both
our cognitive and our operative modes of understanding. We shall see in the
next section how being-in-the-world is something that the existential
phenomenologist will argue must resist naturalistic explanation. Let us finally
turn to the existential phenomenologist's argument against naturalism.
7. The Argument against Naturalism
The naturalist, you will recall from chapter 1, takes science to be the measure
of what is and what is not. The entities the scientist identifies are present-at-
hand entities. They are entities that have been stripped of their ordinary
significance so as to reveal their context free properties and features. It is
these properties and features the scientist then proceeds to describe in the
light of the theories of the day.
The existential phenomenologist argues that we cannot account for our
being-in-the-world by appeal to the kind of context-free properties the
theories of the natural sciences identify. To see why not it will be helpful to
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remind ourselves of Heidegger's claim that being and our understanding of
being stand in a relation of reciprocal dependence. In section 3 I said we
should understood Heidegger's as claiming that:
(1) An entity's being is constituted by our cognitive and non-cognitive
responses to it, and
(2) The relevant responses are shaped by our understanding.
From (1) and (2) it follows that an entity's being is shaped by our
understanding of it. Now according to the existential phenomenologist the
mistake the naturalist makes is to try to understand everything in terms of the
existence an entity has when it is experienced as present-at-hand. Recall
that an entity becomes present-at-hand when we cease relating to it as
something ready-to-hand, when we cease to relate to the entity in terms of
our everyday, pre-theoretical interests and concerns. The naturalist is
accused of giving a false priority to this present-at-hand mode of
understanding. Suppose we grant that an entity's being is shaped by our
modes of understanding in the way that was described in section 3 & 4. If
the naturalist is to give priority to the present-at-hand, she will have to explain
our ready-to-hand mode of understanding in terms of context-free properties
and entities we uncover when we take up a reflective standpoint. This is just
what the existential phenomenologist claims the naturalist cannot do.
The conception of reality that results from prioritising the present-at-hand
will be one in which the meaning we ordinarily and unreflectively find in a
thing has been bleached-out. Once we have abstracted away from our
ordinary concerns with things, it becomes impossible to recover these
ordinary concerns within the context of the scientist's theorising. We cannot
account for the meaning we give to things, making use only of the properties
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and entities we learn of from the theories of the natural sciences. For these
properties and entities have been discovered only by stripping objects of the
meaning we ordinarily give them.26
By prioritising our present-at-hand mode of understanding, the naturalist
ends up treating our ordinary ways of understanding entities as mere
projections of our mind, superimposed onto a world fundamentally lacking the
meaning and value we invest in it. The existential phenomenologist argues
that this gets matters back to front. We discover a thing's context-free
properties they claim only once we have set aside our ordinary, operative
mode of understanding. Things can be encountered as present-at-hand only
because they have first been experienced as ready-to-hand and only once
this ordinary way of understanding things has been set-aside.
It is a mistake to treat the significance we ordinarily find in things as
projections of our minds onto the world. Scientific theorising, the existential
phenomenologist points out, is just one of the modes of our being-in-the-
world. To take the theories of the natural sciences as a guide to what there
is, is to ignore all of the ways in which a thing's existence is shaped by our
non-scientific modes of understanding. It is to treat entities as if their sole
mode of being is that of the present-at-hand. This is what the naturalist is
accused of doing when she gives priority to the present-at-hand and treats
26
Dreyfus (1991) makes this point in discussing Heidegger's critique of naturalism. Once
"we have stripped away all meaningful context", he says "to get the elements of theory,
theory cannot give back meaning. Science cannot reconstruct what has been left out in
arriving at theory; it cannot explain significance." (Dreyfus, 1991: 121)
The existential phenomenologist allows that science might discover laws that further our
understanding of, for instance, an entity's causal powers. However, he also thinks the
explanations of the natural sciences have their limits. They can never explain how we come
to inhabit a world in which things are encountered as significant. For the entities and
properties the scientist makes reference to have been discovered only by abstracting away
from the meaning we ordinarily give to things. The elements of which the naturalist's
ontology is composed are devoid of the meaning we ordinarily find in the world.
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everything else as a merely subjective contribution of our own minds. The
result of understanding all entities in present-at-hand terms is a leveling-off of
the different ways of being that entities have. For there is a variety of other
ways we have of understanding entities in addition to our scientific mode of
understanding. The existential phenomenologist claims that corresponding
to each of these modes of understanding there is a way that entities are.
Nagel (1986) can be construed as echoing the existential
phenomenologist's argument when he worries that an objective conception of
reality must leave something out from its description of what there is. Nagel
tells us:
"(A) succession of objective advances may take us to a new conception of
reality that leaves the personal or merely human perspective further and
further behind. But if what we want is to understand the whole world, we
can't forget about those subjective starting points indefinitely; we and our
personal perspectives belong to the world." (Nagel, 1986: 6)
For Nagel, an objective conception of reality can never find room for what he
calls our "subjective starting points". It has always already left these starting
points behind. The existential phenomenologist makes the very same point
about our non-cognitive modes of understanding. As soon as the natural
scientist proffers her explanations she has abandoned the context in which
her experiences ordinarily take place. The scientist cannot explain what
takes place within this context once she has abandoned it.
It might be reasonably objected that so far no reason has been given for
the priority existential phenomenology gives to our ordinary operative mode
of understanding over the cognitive mode of understanding achieved by the
scientist. The existential phenomenologist's argument as I have presented it
derived some of its force from the claim that we come to experience things as
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present-at-hand only by abstracting away from the significance we ordinarily
give to things when dealing with them operatively. Why not say that things
are fundamentally without the significance we ordinarily invest in them? To
pose this question in the existential phenomenologist's terms, why not
prioritise the present-at-hand over the ready-to-hand in the way that it is
claimed the naturalist does?
The question I am currently raising is why we should grant that we must
first experience something as ready-to-hand before we can experience
something as present-at-hand. Why not say instead that something must be
present-at-hand, it must have the context-free properties identified by the
natural sciences, before it can be experienced as ready-to-hand? Such a
response derives additional force when we consider the fact that a thing can
only function as an item of equipment, as a hammer say, if it has certain
properties that enable it to play this role, properties like mass, solidity, etc.
These are properties the true nature of which is identified and described by
science. Surely then something can be ready-to-hand, it can be used for our
ends, only because it is first present-at-hand.
The existential phenomenologist can concede that the "handiness" of
ready-to-hand things is dependent on the properties that science identifies, in
the way I have just sketched. However he will deny that an entity's being is
exhausted by what science tells us about an entity's nature. Recall that
according to Heidegger an entity's being - what an entity is and whether it is
- is defined by our understanding of being. Our scientific theories reveal to
us a world that is there anyway independent of us. However, this is not the
only way in which entities exist. Entities also have ways of existing that
depend on us and our peculiar concerns and interests. The existential
phenomenologist claims that we can learn about the nature of entities as they
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exist independently of us from the theories of the sciences. What we cannot
learn about from those theories is the various ways in which entities exist
when they are made the object of our non-scientific concerns and interests.
Still the naturalist might ask why some psychological or biological story
couldn't be told about how we come to invest entities with significance? We
have seen the existential phenomenologist claim that the properties which
are the scientist's stock and trade, have been shorn of the significance we
ordinarily give to things. Perhaps this is right. Still the question remains why
we shouldn't treat the significance we give to things as merely subjective
responses to be explained by our psychology and biology?
We are yet to find a reason for agreeing with Heidegger and the existential
phenomenologists that an entity's being is dependent on our modes of
understanding. Until we give some reason for thinking this is true we will only
have established that there is a conflict between the metaphysics of the
existential phenomenologist and that of the naturalist. We will not however
have given any reason to prefer the existential phenomenologist's
metaphysics to the naturalist's. Worse still for me, we will have established
once and for all the incompatibility of naturalism and existential
phenomenology by locating a difference in their respective metaphysics.
Moreover we will have done so in a way that is completely independent of
idealism, since we have seen in section 5 that the existential
phenomenologist isn't committed to idealism. This will leave me unable to
dismiss the conflict between phenomenology and naturalism as the outcome
of a mistaken commitment on the part of the phenomenology to idealism.
Fortunately we need not leave matters there; we haven't yet got to the
bottom of the existential phenomenologist's argument against naturalism. So
far I have argued as though the problem arose from the impossibility of
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describing what it is for something to be ready-to-hand by reference to the
context-free properties the theories of the natural science deal in. In fact the
problem lies with our being-in-the-world. Before anything can show up for us
as ready-to-hand we must know our way about in the world. This is equally
true of our present-at-hand modes of understanding - before we can
understand an entity as present-at-hand we must know how to find our way
about in the world in which this entity exists. This is knowledge we have in
virtue of our being-in-the-world. It is not only an entity's readiness-to-hand
that causes problems for the naturalist then. It is also our being-in-the-world.
It is this which the existential phenomenologist denies the naturalist can
explain.
Why might it be thought that being-in-the-world isn't susceptible to
explanation by the natural sciences? The existential phenomenologist claims
that being-in-the-world accounts for our access to entities, whether they be
understood as ready-to-hand or as present-at-hand. For being-in-the-world
is the condition of the possibility of intentionality conceived of as
transcendence. In particular being-in-the-world explains how we can have
access to the entities and properties the natural sciences describe.
To see how being-in-the-world makes possible our access to the natural
world it will be useful to distinguish scientific understanding from scientific
practice. Scientific understanding aims to identify and describe the nature of
entities independent of us and our peculiar concerns and interests. However
we achieve such an understanding only through certain practices which
constitute scientific method.
The theories and models of the natural sciences can be understood as
tools which must be mastered before one can participate in scientific activity.
When one learns a theory one learns how to apply the theory to various
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situations, and one learns how to perform operations within the models
defined by the theory. The way one learns the theory and its application is
through the use of theory to solve problems.27
Thus while the objective of science is to achieve a disinterested,
disengaged understanding of reality, this can only be achieved through
scientific practices. Like any other activity the scientist must have mastered
certain skills and techniques before he can fully participate in a science.
Before one can participate in a science one must have mastered its
practices. One must have become familiarized with the scientist's way of
doing things. We saw above how being-in-the-world makes possible our
mastery of practical skills by giving us a sense of what is appropriate and
what is not. Scientific understanding is made possible by a person's being-
in-the-world just as much as any other kind of understanding. Being-in-the-
world is just as much a necessary requirement for scientific understanding as
it is a necessary requirement for any other kind of understanding.
The existential phenomenologist's descriptions of being-in-the-world
explain how we can make sense of anything whatsoever including the
entities and properties our scientific theories uncover. Being-in-the-world
isn't something science can explain because being-in-the-world supplies the
conditions for the possibility of doing science.
The substance of the existential phenomenologist's argument against
naturalism is that being-in-the-world makes possible both our operative and
cognitive modes of understanding. I shall argue in the final part of my thesis
that the phenomenon of being-in-the-world is something that cognitive
scientists and neurobiologists are beginning to recognise.28 Thus being-in-
271 am indebted here to Rouse (2000), also see Rouse (1996).
28
See for instance the account of the enactive, embodied approach to the study of cognition
described in Clark (1997) and Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991).
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the-world may well be a phenomenon that can be incorporated within a
naturalistic theory of the mind.
Once we think of being-in-the-world as a naturally occurring phenomenon
however, the existential phenomenologist's argument against naturalism will
have lost its force. We won't need to think of being-in-the-world
transcendentally as Heidegger did.
Carman (2003: 23-30) compares the role that being-in-the-world plays in
existential phenomenology to the role of space, time and the categories in
Kant's epistemology. Space, time and the categories constitute the
conditions for the possibility of knowing in the account Kant gives of
knowledge. Carman presents Heidegger as arguing that being-in-the-world
plays the same role with respect to what I have called our "operative" and
"cognitive" modes of understanding. Being-in-the-world, like Kant's
conditions for knowing, is a universal and necessary condition for
understanding, and that it constitutes such a condition is something which
can be known a priori.
The real ground for the conflict between phenomenology and naturalism
lies in the transcendental nature of the phenomenologist's philosophical
project. I shall argue that there is nothing in the notion of being-in-the-world
which requires us to conceive of it transcendentally. Thus the naturalist can
appeal to being-in-the-world as what accounts for our experiencing an entity
as ready-to-hand.
There is an objection that needs to be overcome first before I can make
such an argument. We saw the existential phenomenologist complain earlier
in this section that the naturalist levels-off the different ways in which entities
exist. The naturalist it was argued can only ever give us an account of a
reality that is there anyway independent of our particular human ways of
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responding to reality. Standing behind this worry is a conception of the
naturalist as forming what Williams (1978) calls an "absolute conception" of
reality. The worry the phenomenologist raises is that there are certain facts
that must be left out from any absolute conception of reality. These are facts
that involve our human perspective on the world, and our particular ways of
responding to the world that are a reflection of this perspective.
In the next chapter I will connect this worry with the problem of the
explanatory gap, the worry that our naturalistic explanations of mind leave
out what is essentially subjective about our experiences. I will argue that the
explanatory gap is genuine, and the reason it exists is that naturalistic
explanations of mind do not seem to make room for the existence of facts
that essentially involve us as conscious subjects.
Now the very same difficulty which the next chapter will argue is
responsible for the existence of an explanatory gap has also been presented
above as an argument against naturalism by the phenomenologist. A
naturalised phenomenology of the kind I wish to develop recognises the
existence of facts that involve an essentially human perspective on the world.
Such an account of the mind can not only help the naturalist to overcome its
difficulties with the explanatory gap. It can also reveal one of the grounds for
the phenomenologist's anti-naturalism to be unfounded.
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Chapter 3
Introduction
In the last two chapters I have been attempting to establish the reasons for
the phenomenologist's avowed opposition to naturalism. My aim in this
chapter will be to connect a difficulty I raised for the naturalist in the previous
chapter with a problem naturalists have identified for themselves. Naturalist
theories of mind have run into what Levine (1993) calls "an explanatory gap".
So far no naturalistic theory of mind has succeeded in securing agreement
as to why we have the kinds of conscious experiences we do, or indeed any
at all. Yet any satisfactory naturalistic theory of consciousness should give
us answers to these two questions. There is then a gap in the naturalist's
account of mind, a gap which must be closed if the naturalist is to lay claim
to having succeeded in locating the mind in the natural world.
I will argue that the appearance of the explanatory gap is due an apparent
failure on the part of naturalistic theories of mind to recognise the existence
of facts of a certain kind. I shall argue drawing on Jackson's knowledge
argument that there is a class of facts that can only be represented from a
subject's point of view. I shall call these facts "subjective facts". It is
subjective facts which appear to be missing from a naturalistic conception of
reality. The arguments of the previous two chapters establish that
phenomenologists are likewise committed to the existence of subjective
facts. One of the arguments that the phenomenologist makes against
naturalism claims that a naturalistic conception of reality must fail to include
subjective facts. Thus it will turn out that the explanatory gap is located at
one of the places where phenomenology attacks naturalism.
Section 1 offers some reasons for believing in the existence of an
explanatory gap. I argue following Levine (2001) that functional and physical
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explanations of consciousness are significantly different from other
successful cases of reductive explanation insofar as these explanations
seem to provide at best what Levine calls "gappy identities". Many
philosophers who are persuaded of the gap's existence have concluded that
functional and physical explanations of mind cannot account for the nature of
consciousness. They have tried to argue that the properties in virtue of
which an experience seems or feels a certain way to a subject and
functional/physical properties must be two distinct kinds of property. In
section 2 I show how the arguments given in support of an explanatory gap
do not support a metaphysical conclusion of this kind. They establish at
most that functional and physical explanations fail to make intelligible to us
the nature of consciousness.
I argue that this failure is an example of a wider failure of naturalistic
explanations to make room for facts that can only be represented from a
subject's point of view. It is facts of this kind that I will call "subjective facts".
The fact that some entity is ready-to-hand (it is experienced as something to
be used) is a subjective fact in this sense. It is a fact that can only be
represented from the point of view of a subject with a particular
understanding and know-how.
Section 3 returns to the arguments of the existential phenomenologists to
fend of an objection to the account of the explanatory gap I have proposed.
The objection claims that my account of the explanatory gap slides from a
claim about different ways of representing facts to the conclusion that there
are different facts represented. This is an objection we will have cause to
return to a number of times in later chapters. I offer an initial response by
appealing to Heidegger's account of being introduced in the previous
chapter. According to Heidegger, our understanding of being literally shapes
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and constitutes the mode of being of the objects of our thoughts and
experiences. If Heidegger is right, it will follow that a difference in
understanding (or what I have been calling "representation") can bring with it
a difference in the facts that are represented.1
By the end of this section I will have presented an account of the
explanatory gap which locates the gap just where existential phenomenology
attacks naturalism. Given this result it will follow that one way to close the
gap I have described would be to show that phenomenology can be
naturalised. It is this project of naturalising phenomenology which I will take
up in the remainder of the thesis. A naturalised phenomenology would not
only show that the existential phenomenologist is mistaken about the limits of
scientific understanding. It will also provide the materials for addressing the
problem of the explanatory gap. For if I am right the explanatory gap is
located just where the phenomenologist attacks naturalism.
I finish up this chapter by considering two further arguments which attempt
to show that the explanatory gap is illusory. I shall argue that both
arguments presuppose the existence of subjective facts. So far from
revealing the gap to be an illusion, these arguments only confirm the
existence of a gap of the kind I describe in this chapter.
1. The Explanatory Gap Introduced
A naturalistic theory of mind must find a place for consciousness in the
natural world. This it will do by explaining how the conscious mind is
constituted by the kinds of entities and properties identified by the theories of
the natural sciences. Yet it remains deeply puzzling to us how these
1
Chapter 4 will explore in more detail how this move works.
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elements could coalesce so as to bring about anything like consciousness.
As Colin McGinn has put it:
'We know that brains are the de facto causal basis of consciousness, but
we have, it seems, no understanding whatever of how this can be so. It
strikes us as miraculous, eerie, even faintly comic. Somehow, we feel, the
water of the physical brain is turned into the wine of consciousness, but
we draw a total blank on the nature of this conversion.' (1991, p1)
When a subject undergoes a sensory experience, and when she suffers a
pain or enjoys a pleasure, there is something it is like for the subject to
undergo this experience. Think of the difference between experiencing a
wine that tastes sweet and experiencing a wine that tastes sour. The two
wines differ in what they are like to experience: one tastes sour, the other
sweet. Many of our experiences also have a qualitative feel to them. What it
is like to undergo such an experience will be determined by what we feel at
the time of the experience's occurrence. When we talk of a sensation being
pleasant, painful or irritating, for instance, we are describing the way the
sensations feels - it feels pleasurable, disturbing, annoying we say.
A naturalistic account of consciousness must account for these
characteristics of conscious experience. It must explain how our
experiences can present the world as seeming a certain way when we
undergo a conscious perceptual experience. It must account for the fact that
the different sensations we undergo each have their own distinctive
qualitative feel. Following convention I will call those properties in virtue of
which our experiences have a qualitative or phenomenal character
"phenomenal properties"2. I will call the type of consciousness in virtue of
2
This chapter will not examine the metaphysics of phenomenal properties. In particular I will
not consider whether phenomenal properties belong to experiences or to the objects of
experience. I will discuss this question at the beginning of chapter 4.
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which there is something it is like to be a subject of an experience
"phenomenal consciousness".
The nature of phenomenal consciousness is an extant problem for
naturalistic philosophy of mind. There is every reason to believe that the
collaborative efforts of cognitive science, psychology and neurobiology will
succeed in making intelligible the nature of the various cognitive capacities
characteristic of conscious mental life. Yet we are long way from
understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness. Why does a
particular sensory experience of mine manifest one set of phenomenal
properties rather than another entirely different set of phenomenal
properties? Why is there something rather than nothing that it is like for a
subject to enjoy conscious experiences? Any naturalistic explanation ought
to give us an answer to these questions, yet there is no widespread
agreement as to how an answer to these questions might go.
Take the first question I have just posed: why do my sensory experiences
seem and feel to me the way they do rather than seeming or feeling entirely
different? We can see that naturalistic accounts of the mind do not seem to
return a satisfying answer to this question by reflecting on the classic
inverted spectrum thought experiments. In these thought experiments we
are asked to conceive of two physically and functionally identical subjects
one of whom sees yellow things like daffodils and autumnal leaves that seem
to her to be coloured yellow, while the other sees yellow things that seem to
him to be coloured blue. The situation these thought experiments describe is
one in which two subjects are physically and functionally identical, but the
two subjects experience yellow things in different ways. Yellow things
systematically seem to be blue to one subject, and yellow to the other. So it
would seem our functional and physical explanations fail to explain a
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difference in the experiences our two subjects enjoy: they fail to explain, for
instance, why yellow things should appear yellow rather than blue. This is a
significant shortcoming in the kind of understanding a functional and physical
explanation of phenomenal consciousness supplies.
More dramatically, many philosophers have claimed to be able to
conceive of a world where "subjects" are functionally and physically identical
to us, but enjoy nothing in the way of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers
(1996) calls worlds of this kind "zombie-worlds". There is nothing at all that is
like for the "subjects" inhabiting such a world to undergo sensory
experiences. Nor does it feel anyway to them when they hurt themselves.
Let us suppose we find the possibility of a zombie-world conceivable; then
we must say that functional and physical explanations of mind leave it an
open question whether phenomenal consciousness is present in a creature.
Again this is something a satisfactory explanation of phenomenal
consciousness ought to render inconceivable. To the extent that we find
zombies conceivable, we will have to say that functional and physical
explanations do not provide a satisfactory explanation of phenomenal
consciousness.
Consider a case of a successful reductive explanation, such as the much
discussed identification of water with H20. Given a rich enough theory of
H20 molecules and their interaction we can understand everything we desire
to understand about water and its behaviour. Moreover it is inconceivable to
us that H20 molecules could behave as our theory describes and not exhibit
the kind of behaviours which we take to be definitive of water. The same
does not seem to be true of phenomenal consciousness. Reductive
explanations of phenomenal properties yield identities of phenomenal
properties with functional or physical properties which leave plenty of room
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for us to wonder why our experiences should present the world as seeming a
certain way, or even why our experiences should present the world as
seeming anyway at all. These are questions that a satisfactory reductive
explanation of consciousness ought to be able to answer. As Levine has
pointed out, a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness should
put us in a position to reason as follows:
'Suppose creature X satisfies physical description P. I understand—from
my physical theory of consciousness—what it is about instantiating P that
is responsible for its being a conscious experience. So how could X
occupy a state with those very features and yet not be having a conscious
experience?' (Levine, 2001: p80)
Functional and physical explanations of phenomenal properties supply what
Levine calls "gappy identity statements". Gappy identities differ from the kind
of identities successful reductive explanations supply because they require
further explanation. In the case of identities like "water = H20", it is
unintelligible for us to ask for explanations of these identities. Our theory of
H20 molecules and the way in which they interact suffices as an explanation
of water and its properties. There are no further facts about water and its
identity with H20 that we do not learn from such a theory. Phenomenal
properties are different. If we were to identify a phenomenal property P with
some physical-functional state Q, it would be perfectly intelligible for us to
ask for some explanation of why P=Q. It is perfectly intelligible for us to ask,
for instance, why a visual experience of a red rose should also instantiate
phenomenal properties of redness rather than some other type of
phenomenal property or none whatsoever. A reductive explanation of
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phenomenal properties to physical-functional properties shouldn't leave room
for such questions.
Why is it that functional and physical explanations of phenomenal
properties differ from successful cases of reductive explanation like the
reduction of water to H20? In the case of water and H20 a reductive
explanation identifies for us the true nature of the stuff we call "water". It is
tempting to say that we do not learn about the true nature of phenomenal
properties from functional and physical explanations of mind because
phenomenal properties and functional/physical properties are distinct kinds
of properties.3 It makes sense for us to ask for some further explanation of
why P=Q should be true because P and Q are properties with distinct
natures.
The arguments I have given so far do not seem to me to license a
metaphysical conclusion along these lines. So far the reasons I have given
in support of the claim that there is an explanatory gap has been based on
our being able to conceive of certain kinds of situations in which two
individuals share the same physical and functional properties but differ in the
kind of consciousness they enjoy. Cases of this kind license at most the
conclusion that our functional-physical explanations of phenomenal
consciousness do not deliver the kind of knowledge of the nature of
phenomenal properties we are seeking. Functional-physical explanations of
phenomenal consciousness leave open possibilities that a satisfying
reductive explanation ought to rule out. It is one thing to agree that our
existing explanatory strategies fail to do what they set out do, and quite
another to conclude from this failure that phenomenal properties are sui
3
This is the conclusion reached by Levine (2001, ch.3, see in particular pp.86-92). It is also
the conclusion that Chalmers (1996, ch.4) and Jackson (1982 & 1986) defend. I will discuss
the arguments of these philosophers later in sections 4 & 5.
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generis. Conceivability arguments of the kind outlined above do not support
the latter conclusion.
Chalmers (1996) has tried to persuade us otherwise. He uses a version
of two-dimensional semantics to argue from the conceivability of zombie
worlds to the metaphysical conclusion that phenomenal properties are
distinct from functional/physical properties.4 I will briefly explain why I take
Chalmers' argument to fail before presenting my own account of the
explanatory gap.
2. Chalmers on Conceivabilitv and Possibility
Two-dimensional semantics as it is understood by Chalmers tells us that
every term has two kinds of meaning. The first kind of meaning Chalmers
calls a term's "primary intension". It can be understood as a function which
determines a term's extension or fixes a term's reference at a world
considered as the actual world. The second kind of meaning Chalmers calls
a term's "secondary intension. It picks out a term's reference at worlds
considered as counterfactual.
Chalmers goes on to argue that when we say a statement s is possible,
the truth of what we have said is a function of s's primary and secondary
intension. Given a description of a world w, knowledge of a statement s's
primary intension will tell us whether s is true at w, when w is considered as
the actual world. In a similar fashion, knowledge of a statement's secondary
intension will tell us whether s is true at a world when w is taken to be a
counterfactual world. Chalmers wants to deny that there are any
conceivable worlds which are impossible. Where we find a description of a
4
The idea behind two-dimensional semantics is implicit in Kripke (1980), and is developed by
Stalnaker (1978); Davies & Humberstone (1980) and Chalmers (1996) among others.
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world which we think is conceivable but which is in fact impossible, we are
merely mistaken about the conceivability of the world, perhaps because we
have misdescribed the world or perhaps because we haven't conceived of
any world whatsoever. For Chalmers then, whenever we can truly conceive
of a world at which a statement is true, the statement in question describes a
situation that is a genuine metaphysical possibility, a situation that could
have obtained.
If Chalmers could establish something to the effect that every situation of
which we can truly conceive is a metaphysically possible situation, he will
have shown that zombie worlds are metaphysically possible. We have seen
above that we seem to be able to conceive of a world where the functional
and physical facts are just like our own world but where subjects enjoy
nothing in the way of conscious experiences. If when we conceive of zombie
worlds we are truly conceiving of such worlds, we can conclude that zombie
worlds are possible. We can conclude that fixing the functional and physical
facts at a world doesn't suffice to fix the phenomenal facts at this world.
The obvious response to Chalmers is to ask how we know that when we
entertain the possibility of zombie worlds we are not mistaken in thinking that
we have truly conceived of a world. Chalmers is likely to reply that knowing a
statement's primary intension enables us to know a priori whether a
statement is true at a world. What we do is take a set of descriptions of a
world and consider whether the statement in question would be true if these
descriptions were descriptions of the actual world. In the case of zombie-
worlds, we suppose that we have a complete functional and physical
description of a world. Then we consider whether such a world could be a
world where it is true that subjects do not enjoy anything in the way of
conscious experiences. Each of us knows what it means to say a subject
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enjoys conscious experiences. So we can use our knowledge of what
statements of this kind mean to determine whether there could be a world
physically and functionally just like our own where subjects are not
phenomenally conscious.
The move Chalmers makes from conceivability to possibility depends on
whether one is willing to concede that knowing a statement s's meaning and
knowing a set of descriptions of a world w will enable one to know a priori
whether s is true at w. One might agree that a statement's primary intension
determines for any given world considered as actual, whether the statement
is true at the world. One might nevertheless deny that a sentence's primary
intension is something to which one has epistemic access. To continue with
the example of the term "water" it might be denied that when one uses the
term "water" to successfully refer to water one must know that "water" refers
to the watery stuff. One might have no such knowledge but still use the term
competently. A speaker might exhibit competence with the term just by
using it to successfully refer to water. On this view of primary intensions a
speaker needn't have epistemic access to a term's primary intension in order
to know a term's meaning. In particular s/he needn't be able to say what a
term T would be used to refer to in hypothetical situations considered as
actual.5
Let us apply this worry to the case of zombie-worlds. We have just seen
how one can be a competent user of a term without knowing the primary
intension for a term. Suppose this is right. Then it will follow that one cannot
know that one has truly conceived of a zombie world just by understanding
the descriptions of such a world and understanding the meaning of a
5
Levine (2001, ch.2) describes a theory of primary intensions along these lines. He refers us
to Dretske (1981) and Fodor (1990) for an account of the external reference determining
relation.
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sentence attributing phenomenally conscious experiences to a subject. One
can understand sentences attributing phenomenally conscious experiences
by knowing what we are referring to when we talk about phenomenally
conscious mental states. Having this kind of understanding will not tell one
whether one is entertaining a genuinely conceivable situation when one
conceives of a zombie world. Yet it is only if one knows that one has truly
conceived of a zombie world that one can say that zombie-worlds are
possible. Since one cannot know that one has truly conceived of a zombie-
world when one entertains statements which describe zombie-worlds, one
cannot know that zombie-worlds are genuinely possible.
Chalmers' move from conceivability to possibility has been shown to be
dependent on a particular take on the question of what it is know the
meaning of a statement. Reject this account of meaning and Chalmers is
deprived of his conclusion that zombie-worlds are genuinely possible. I shall
take conceivability arguments of the kind Chalmers employs to license the
epistemic conclusion that functional and physical explanations do not give us
the right kind of understanding of the nature of consciousness. If they did,
we would not be able to conceive of the kinds of possibilities which we in fact
do seem to be able to conceive of. This account of what we are doing when
we entertain the possibility of zombie-worlds leaves it open that we might
only seem to be conceiving of such worlds, in which case we will have to say
that zombie-worlds are not possible after all. The question of whether or not
we mistakenly think we are conceiving of a world when we entertain a
possibility is one that we cannot answer a priori. The answer to this question
will only emerge through a posteriori investigation.
In the next section I will offer a different explanation for the gap's
existence which doesn't attempt to derive a metaphysical conclusion from
89
Locating The Explanatory Gap
considerations of what we find conceivable. My diagnosis of the gap will
draw on the phenomenologist's critique of naturalism as it was presented in
the previous chapters. Phenomenologists claim that the mode of
understanding the scientist operates with will fail to incorporate our ordinary,
pre-theoretical modes of engaging with the world. I will begin by connecting
this claim with Jackson's much discussed knowledge argument which
purports to show there are some facts which we cannot learn from science. I
will argue that Jackson's argument fails to establish any metaphysical
conclusion to this effect. Where Jackson's argument fails, the argument of
the phenomenologists succeeds. Phenomenologists argue for the same
conclusion as Jackson, but their argument has a potential metaphysical bite
which is missing from the Jackson knowledge argument, or at least so I shall
argue across the next two sections.
3. The Knowledge Argument and Subjective Facts
Jackson's knowledge argument invites us to imagine Mary, a colour scientist
confined to a black and white room for the duration of her life.6 The only
coloured objects Mary has ever seen are things coloured black and white.
Mary has made use of her time to learn all the facts there are to know
concerning the visual apparatus, colour vision and the neurobiology that
supports our colour experiences. Jackson also supposes that Mary has
acquired complete knowledge of the physical facts. Despite being in
possession of all this knowledge still, so the Jackson intuition goes, there is
something she doesn't know. She doesn't know what coloured things look
like to those who have experienced them. We can see this by reflecting on
what would take place in Mary if she were to escape the black-and-white
6
See Jackson (1982 & 1986/1997).
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room. Surely Mary would learn something new when she encountered
colours other than black and white for the first time. She would learn
something she didn't know before even though she knew all the
microphysical facts there are to know. Before her escape she knew a lot that
was not common knowledge: she knew all one could know about colour
vision and its neurobiological realisers. However it seems to be equally true
that many of us knew facts she didn't. What she didn't know was what
coloured things look like to those of us who have experienced them.7 She
couldn't gain this knowledge until she experienced colours for herself.
Jackson used to also hold that the knowledge argument established the
falsity of physicalism.8 Numerous philosophers have since pointed out that
no such conclusion is warranted.9 All the knowledge argument really
establishes is that there are some facts that we cannot know just by knowing
those facts that can be given a microphysical description. It doesn't follow
that those facts which cannot be given a microphysical description are not
microphysical facts. Perhaps there are some microphysical facts that we
cannot learn about by reading books. It wouldn't follow that those facts are
not microphysical facts.10
The conclusion I want to take from the knowledge argument is that some
facts are subjective facts.11 I will call facts which can only be represented
from a particular subject's point of view "subjective facts". By a "fact" I mean
the object of propositional knowledge.12 The claim that some facts are
7 See Jackson 1986/1997: §1 for this characterisation of Mary"s ignorance.
8
He no longer holds this view, see Jackson (1995).
9
For a useful overview of the literature the knowledge argument has spawned, see Van
Gulick (1993)
10
This is the conclusion that Lewis (1990) argues for. I shall discuss Lewis' response to the
knowledge argument at the end of this chapter.
11
Mellor (1992-3 and (1988 essays 1 & 2) disagrees as does Moore (1997, ch.3). I shall
discuss Mellor and Moore's arguments in some detail later in chapter 6.
12
An issue remains about how to individuate facts. Should we individuate facts finely and
claim that corresponding to every representation that counts as knowledge there is a distinct
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subjective facts is the claim that there are some facts which can only be
represented from a particular subject's point of view.
Being sighted for example enables one to represent certain facts,
permanently closed-off to those without sight. There are certain facts that a
sighted person can represent from that a blind person cannot. Almost
certainly the converse also holds. The facts in question are ones that no
amount of knowledge of microphysical facts could impart. They are facts
that can only be known from the point of view of creatures that have, or have
had, certain experiences.13 While Mary remains locked up in the black and
white room she is in the same position as a person suffering from an
extreme variety of colour blindness who can experience only shades of black
and white. There are facts her situation prevents her from representing just
as a person suffering from this extreme form of colour-blindness would be
prevented by his condition from representing certain facts - facts about what
a range of colours look like. Moreover knowledge of these facts cannot be
imparted through a complete physical description of reality, but only by
having experiences of the relevant kind for oneself.
Thus construed the knowledge argument is in agreement with a point we
saw the existential phenomenologist insist upon in the last chapter.
According to the existential phenomenologist the theoretical understanding
of the scientist is just one of many modes of understanding available to
human beings. The existential phenomenologist claims that there are all
fact? Should we individuate facts coarsely at the level of reference and claim that we can
refer to one and the same fact in different ways? Some philosophers have tried to argue
against subjective facts by taking the latter option (e.g Loar (1997); Perry (2001)). These
philosophers argue that there are indeed some facts that can only be represented from a
point of view but these facts are not distinct facts from those that we learn about from
science. I shall return to their arguments later in the chapter.
13
Note, this is a claim only about the epistemic access we have to certain facts. It doesn't
follow that the facts in question are not microphysical facts. At most it follows that they are
not the kinds of facts that can be given a microphysical description.
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kinds of facts in addition to those that science describes. More specifically
there are facts which can only be represented from the point of view of a
subject who understands the world operatively through his dealings with it.
The phenomenologist goes on to argue that naturalists give a false priority
to our scientific mode of understanding. The scientist purports to give us
access to a reality as it is independent of our non-scientific concerns and
interests. The result is that she ignores all the ways in which the reality we
experience depends on us and our subjective and personal concerns and
interests. To the extent that naturalists take their conception of reality from
science, the phenomenologist thinks a naturalistic conception of reality will
also leave out a significant class of facts. The naturalist will fail to account
for the relation we take up to entities when we understand them in terms of
our non-scientific interests and concerns.
The knowledge argument and the argument I have just sketched from
phenomenology both claim that there is something important missing from
scientific explanations of consciousness. What is missing from these
explanations is any account of subjective facts. Arguments for an
explanatory gap normally proceed by attempting to demonstrate that
functional and physical explanations of mind fail to explain why things seem
and the feel the way they do to us. When a subject knows what it is like to
undergo an experience he knows something that can only be represented
from his own point of view. According to the phenomenologist the difficulty
naturalism encounters in explaining phenomenal properties is an instance of
a wider problem endemic to naturalism. We might say that facts about what
it is like to undergo an experience are a species of fact belonging to the
genus of subjective facts. According to the phenomenologist, it is qua
subjective fact that the facts about what it is like to undergo a conscious
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experience cause a problem for naturalism. It is facts that can only be
represented from a subject's point of view which it is claimed a naturalist
must leave out from their conception of reality.
Now it might reasonably be objected that an argument for an explanatory
gap along these lines illegitimately slides from a claim about there being
different ways of representing facts, different modes of understanding, to
claiming that there are different facts which are represented or accessed.
The knowledge argument may give us grounds for believing that there is
knowledge that can be achieved only by undergoing experiences for oneself.
What it doesn't establish is the existence of some properties or entities over
and above those we learn of from science.14 It doesn't establish that the
facts which can only be known by undergoing certain experiences have as
their constituents, elements we do not learn about from science. This
conclusion would only follow if we assume that corresponding to every
distinct way we have of gaining knowledge of the facts there are distinct
properties and entities that are known. But making a distinction between
ways of accessing the facts and the properties and entities we thereby gain
access to, precludes us from having to grant such an assumption.15
The phenomenologist does indeed infer the existence of distinct facts
from a difference in ways of accessing facts, a difference in what I have been
calling "modes of understanding". For according to the existential
phenomenologist being and our understanding of being stand in a relation of
reciprocal dependence: different ways of understanding one and the same
entity entail correspondingly different ways of being for an entity, and
14 Crane (2001) agrees; he tells us that the fact there is knowledge "only available from
certain perspectives does not entail that there are some further non-physical/non-objective
objects and properties involved in these situations" (ibid, 80).
15
Here I am rehearsing a point insisted on variously by Peacocke (1989); Moore (1997:
ch.3); Mellor (1992) and Perry (2001, ch.5). Perry calls the assumption I have just described
"the subject-matter assumption".
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differences in an entity's being entail differences in our understanding of that
entity.
According to the existential phenomenologist, it is the naturalist who is
making a mistake when she fails to recognise that the objects of our
experience have distinct ways of being. What we don't gain access to
through our scientific understanding, he claims, is all of the ways in which an
entity's being is dependent on our non-scientific modes of understanding.
Our scientific modes of understanding give us access to a reality understood
according to our scientific theories but what we cannot learn about from
science is a reality as it is ordinarily experienced by us before we undertake
any scientific explanation. In the next section I will use the latter point to
offer an account of the explanatory gap.
4. Locating the Explanatory Gap
The existential phenomenologist claims that subjective facts are extra facts
over and above those that science gives us knowledge of. They claim that
there are facts which our scientific theories must leave out. The existential
phenomenologist's reasoning can be reconstructed along the following lines:
(1) Science gives us an objective understanding of the world, an
understanding of the world that is independent of any particular subject's
point of view.
(2) There are facts the representation of which essentially involves us and
our peculiarly human and subjective concerns and interests. I have called
this class of facts "subjective facts".
(3) The class of scientific facts - the facts we can learn from science -
doesn't include the class of subjective facts.
(CON) Science doesn't give us knowledge of subjective facts
95
Locating The Explanatory Gap
Since naturalism takes science to be the measure of what there is, it will
follow from this argument that naturalism can make no room for subjective
facts. Phenomenology tells us that there are subjective facts. It follows that
there is a gap in the naturalist's account of the mind; what is missing from a
naturalistic account of mind is any account of how there can be facts that
essentially involve subjects of experience.
In the remainder of this section I will return to existential phenomenology
in order to explain how they are committed to premises (2) and (3). My
objective will be to argue that it is subjective facts as the existential
phenomenologists describe them which are responsible for the existence of
the explanatory gap. It will follow that one way to close the gap would be to
use the descriptions of subjective facts existential phenomenology supplies
as the basis for constructing a scientific account of consciousness. To show
that this is possible would be tantamount to falsifying premises (1) and (3).
Premise (1) would be shown to be false since room would have been made
within science for facts the obtaining of which depend on subjects of
experience. Such a conclusion would also falsify premise (3) by showing
that the class of scientific facts can after all include the class of subjective
facts.
A good deal of work will need to be done before we can achieve either of
these results. First I must show how the explanatory gap is located at a
place where existential phenomenology attacks naturalism. Otherwise the
objection which I sketched at the end of the last section will stand
undefeated, and it will not have been shown that there is a metaphysical gap
in the naturalist's theory of mind. This objection agreed that there are facts
that can only be known by taking up a particular point of view, but denied that
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these are additional facts over and above those that we learn about from
science.
The existential phenomenologist's commitment to subjective facts follows
from the claim that when we are acting skillfully we simply experience what
needs to be done without giving the matter any deliberation. We experience
things we are dealing with as having a significance which points, or directs us
towards certain ways of acting, in much the same way as we experience a
prescriptive utterance as bearing a meaning that calls for a certain course of
action from us. We don't experience the significance that attaches to the
objects of our dealings as something we have projected or superimposed
onto these objects. Rather things are experienced by us as already having
meaning or significance.
The existential phenomenologist will claim that the possibilities for action
that a thing affords us make a contribution towards defining that thing's
identity, making it the entity that it is. In describing what a hammer is, for
instance, we cannot simply mention the materials from which it is made. We
also need to mention how hammers are normally used. To say how
hammers are normally used will require us to make mention of the purposes
for which hammers are employed and the roles of the persons that use
hammers such as carpenters and craftpersons.
Suppose we grant that the possibilities for action that an entity affords
partially define an entity's identity, contributing towards making an entity what
it is. It will follow that what it is for an entity to exist is for it to find a place in
the kind of existence we have as persons. The things we experience which
serve a function for us will on this account have an identity bound up with us,
and the kinds of lives we lead. If we wanted to explain to a visitor from Alpha
Centauri what an entity was, we would have to impart to this visitor
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knowledge of the place the entity has in our lives. We would have to explain
the function the entity serves for us, and this would ultimately require us to
make mention of some of the ways in which we human beings live. This is
something the alien could come to grasp only by coming to understand how
we live and the practices in which we engage.
So the existential phenomenologist is committed to the existence of
subjective facts by taking the entities we experience to have an identity
defined by the possibilities for action they afford us. To make sense of these
possibilities for action we must make reference to persons and their projects,
desires and aspirations. We must understand the purposes for which a
person acts; something that cannot be understood except by making
mention of our particular concerns and interests. There are subjective facts
then because the objects of our experience have as part of their very identity
a meaning or significance which derives from our concerns and interests.
One can know what it is we experience only by coming to share an
understanding of our purposes, desires and aspirations. It is only by coming
to understand our practices and how we live our lives that one will
understand what it is we experience.
I have characterised the claim that there is an explanatory gap as the
claim that a scientific account of the mind will not supply us with knowledge
of subjective facts. I said that there is something we will not learn about from
a complete scientific account of mind. An objection was raised that an
explanatory gap will only exist if there is some entity or property that our
scientific account of the mind is failing to explain. We are in a position now
to see that according to the existential phenomenologist there are indeed
objects and properties that will be missing from a conception of reality
formed from science. These are the objects we ordinarily experience whose
98
Locating The Explanatory Gap
identity is bound up with our existence as persons. Such objects must be
missing from a naturalistic account of reality because science gives us an
account of reality as it is independent of us and our particular concerns and
interests. What our scientific theories seem not explain is a reality as it is
ordinarily experienced by us. Reality as it is ordinarily experienced is, as we
have just seen, dependent on us and the purposes for which we act.
The explanatory gap has traditionally been presented as arising because
naturalism fails to explain why our experiences feel and seem to us the way
they do. It might seem that the problem I have just raised has little or
nothing to do with the problem of the explanatory gap. Such a conclusion
would be a mistake. Phenomenal properties are introduced as properties
which make an experience seem or feel a certain way to its subject. As such
they are properties the instantiation of which are dependent on subjects of
experience. It is their dependence on us and our peculiar ways of
responding to the world which makes it is so difficult to see how room could
be found for such properties in a scientific account of reality. It is difficult to
see how these properties could be integrated into a scientific account of
reality because we think of such an account of reality as describing a world
that is there anyway independent of us and our ways of experiencing it. Yet
phenomenal properties were introduced to characterise the ways in which we
experience reality. Descriptions of how reality is independent of our
experiences look destined to leave out that which we want explained.
There is however something right about this objection that the existential
phenomenologist is no longer talking about the same problem. For the
existential phenomenologist doesn't introduce anything akin to phenomenal
properties to explain why our experiences feel and seem the way they do.
According to the existential phenomenologist our experiences seem and feel
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the way they do because of our self-understanding. The objects of our
experiences have an identity, they claim, that can only be understood by
making reference to the projects, desires and aspirations in terms of which
we make sense of our actions. Our affective responses to the world are
likewise dependent on our self-understanding in the sense that a difference
in the sense a person makes of his feelings can suffice to bring about a
different feeling in a person.16
There is an explanatory gap then, not so much because a naturalistic
theory of the mind fails to find room for phenomenal properties but instead
because naturalistic accounts of the mind have so far failed to admit
subjective facts. The existential phenomenologist describes facts that
essentially involve subjects of experience. Phenomenal properties also
essentially involve subjects of experience. These properties are introduced to
explain what it is like for a subject to be in a sensory or affective state. It is
the subject-involving nature of these properties which I take to account for
the gap's existence.
I shall argue that the existential phenomenologist is right to characterise
the objects we ordinarily experience as dependent on us and our modes of
understanding. Chapters 4 & 5 will develop further the thesis that there are
subjective facts, and that it is these that the naturalist must make room for if
she is to close the explanatory gap. I will finish up the chapter by
16 For further discussion of this point see chapter 2, pp. 11-13 and Taylor (1985, essays 2 &
4). Perhaps it will be objected that pains, itches and tickles and the like aren't dependent in
this way on our understanding. Yet there is of course something it is like for a subject to
experience a pain, an itch or tickle. Phenomenal properties are introduced to capture the
properties in virtue of which an experience is like something for a subject. It is these
properties which we don't seem to learn the nature of from functional-physical explanations.
In chapter 4 I will argue that we don't need to introduce phenomenal properties to explain
what it is like to undergo experiences of this kind. We can explain the sensory qualities of
these experiences in terms of representational properties. Still I think there is an explanatory
gap. There is an explanatory gap, I am arguing, because naturalists have traditionally not
acknowledged the existence of subjective facts.
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considering two deflationary responses to arguments which purport to
establish the existence of an explanatory gap. I have been supposing that
the knowledge argument establishes the existence of subjective facts but
this is just what these two responses deny. I shall argue that far from
showing that subjective facts do not exist, both responses presuppose the
existence of such facts.
5. Deflating the Knowledge Argument
The previous section argued that there is an explanatory gap because
functional-physical explanations of consciousness do not admit the existence
of subjective facts. Most philosophers of mind deny the existence of
subjective facts. Consider for instance the ability hypothesis. In response to
the knowledge argument proponents of the ability hypothesis claim that there
are no new facts that Mary learns when she leaves the black and white
room. What she learns are certain abilities. She can, for instance, now
recognise, remember and imagine experiences of colour. However, these
abilities do not bring with them knowledge of any new facts. To think
otherwise, so it is argued, is to confuse propositional and practical
knowledge or knowledge-how and knowledge-that.17 If there are no new
facts that Mary learns we cannot say that there are some facts that can only
be represented through having certain experiences or by coming to share a
certain self-understanding. We cannot say that there are facts that
essentially involve subjects of experience.
There is no doubt that Mary does acquire these abilities, but I shall argue
these abilities largely consist in knowledge of subjective facts.18 Mary does
17
This response to the knowledge argument has been defended by Lewis (1990), Nemirow
(1990) and Mellor (1992-3).
8
Loar (1997); Papineau (2003, oh.2) and Crane (2001) all agree, though the arguments they
each offer for this conclusion differ from my own.
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acquire the ability to recognise things of a certain colour, an ability she
previously lacked while in the black and white room. But this is an ability she
can acquire only because she now knows what red things look like. In order
to know what red things look like, Mary must represent red things from her
own point of view. The ability to recognise things that look red is an ability
Mary can acquire only if she represents a fact which can only be represented
from her point of view, as happens when she has an experience of a red
thing herself. It follows that Mary can recognise red things only by having
knowledge of a subjective fact.
I will run an argument along the same lines for the other abilities attributed
to Mary. I accept that when Mary sees a thing that is coloured red for the
first time she acquires the ability to remember seeing red things. Once again
I insist she can acquire this ability only because she knows what red things
look like. What she can remember (more or less indistinctly) is what it was
like for her when she saw a red thing. She comes to know what it is like to
experience a red thing only by seeing a red thing for herself. Thus once
again we find that the ability to remember seeing coloured things rests on her
having represented a fact from her own point of view. We have described an
ability which depends on her knowledge of a subjective fact.
I will also willingly concede that once Mary has had a reddish experience
she might be in a position to imagine red things in their absence. Again I will
insist this is an ability she has because she has represented a fact that can
only be represented from a point of view she shares with subjects like her in
certain relevant respects. Each of the cognitive capacities to which the
ability hypothesis appeals, requires Mary to have acquired knowledge of a
subjective fact. Far from establishing that we do not need to believe in the
existence of subjective facts, the ability hypothesis provides us with a further
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reason to insist on the existence of these kinds of facts. It shows us that
what we need to explain is the existence of facts that can only be
represented from a point of view. For each of the abilities to which it appeals
rests on our subject representing a fact that can only be represented from his
or her point of view.
The ability hypothesis might deprive the knowledge argument of the
conclusion that phenomenal properties are metaphysically basic. It might
show that we can explain those properties that make an experience like
something for a subject in terms of cognitive capacities.19 However it
achieves this success at the cost of buying the existence of subjective facts.
If the phenomenologist is right, it is subjective facts that are metaphysically
and explanatorily basic. Thus, the ability hypothesis succeeds in closing one
ontological gap only to open up another.
The second response to the knowledge argument I want to briefly
consider again tries to argue that Mary doesn't learn any new non-physical
facts. It says that she simply learns to think about the same microphysical
facts in a new way. Proponents of this response argue that there are two
kinds of concepts which we might call "material concepts" and "phenomenal
concepts".20 Material concepts are concepts we employ in thinking and
making statements about entities and properties in the natural world.
Phenomenal concepts are concepts we employ in thinking about our
experiences and their qualities. The latter are not concepts we employ in
thinking about entities and properties in the natural world but concepts we
employ when we think about what it is like to have an experience.
19
See Loar (1997: 607-8) and Tye (2000: ch.1) for an argument that the ability hypothesis
fails to achieve even this moderate success.
20
This is Papineau"s distinction, see his (2003, ch.2).
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When Mary is locked up in the room she can think about colour by
employing her material concepts, the concepts she has acquired through her
extensive learning. When she leaves the room and has an experience of
redness for the first time she acquires a new concept, a concept she can use
to think about what it is like to see something red. She can employ this
concept in introspection when she is having an experience of something red.
She can think to herself "Ah, so this is what it is like to see something red".
She can also employ this concept in imagination, as when she brings to mind
the image of something red in its absence. In both cases we are describing
a change that takes place in Mary's understanding. She acquires what
Papineau describes as a 'grasp of the redness of red experiences'
(Papineau, 2003: 53)
Mary, it is claimed, doesn't learn any new facts. All she acquires is the
concepts needed to think about the facts she already knew21 but in a new
way. When we employ a phenomenal concept to think about some
experience, this concept picks out its referent directly. Thus the facts our
phenomenal concepts pick out are the very same facts as our material
concepts pick out. There is no need to introduce any new facts.
Let us concede the last point, and agree that the facts our phenomenal
concepts pick out might be the very same facts as those our material
concepts pick out. Does it follow that the knowledge argument gives us no
reason for believing in the existence of subjective facts? I don't think so.
In chapter 2 it was argued that whenever we represent an entity we are
drawing on a background or operative understanding which enables us to
understand this entity as the entity it is. This claim formed a central part of
21 See Loar (1997: §1) for a defence of this claim, and Levine (2001: 84-6) for an argument
that the mode of presentation for phenomenal concepts may be thicker than Loar had
reckoned.
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the case that was made for what I am calling subjective facts. If every
representation derives its intelligibility from our background understanding,
this will be equally true of the representations we produce of our own minds.
We don't avoid an appeal to subjective facts by arguing that what Mary
acquires is a different way of conceiving of facts she already knew. For we
still need to account for the new way of conceiving of facts she acquires.
Admittedly it is not clear how our phenomenal concepts could derive their
intelligibility from our being-in-the-world. I leave this as a problem to be
resolved another. The point for now is simply that we do not avoid an appeal
to subjective facts by appealing to differences in representational abilities. It
has been argued that any representational ability derives its intentionality
from our ways of existing. Hence whenever we posit a representational
ability we are also admitting into our ontology a realm of irreducibly
subjective facts.
There is another difficulty for theories which try to dissolve the explanatory
gap by appeal to phenomenal concepts. Proponents of these theories argue
that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts.22 The recognitional
concepts in question are not triggered by any amount of knowledge of
microphysical facts. They are triggered only by an occurrence of an
experience with the phenomenal quality one is recognising. Phenomenal
concepts have as their extension subjective facts. Maybe the very same
facts are picked out by our material concepts. The problem the explanatory
gap raises is just how this can be true.
Our material concepts do not make intelligible to us how the facts our
material concepts describe can also be subjective facts. Any explanation of
what Mary learns which tries to explain away her knowledge by appeal to
22
See for instance Loar (1997, §2) and Papineau (2003, ch.4).
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phenomenal concepts will leave us just as much in the dark about subjective
facts as when we started. An account of phenomenal concepts will tell us
about how we think about our experiences in introspection and in
imagination. It won't explain what it is to have experiences or what it is about
an experience that makes it like something to have for a subject. It is the
latter questions which we want an account of subjective facts to explain.
I conclude that two of the most influential responses to the knowledge
argument fail to establish that subjective facts do not exist. An explanatory
gap exists because physical-functional explanations of the conscious mind
do not explain subjective facts. Phenomenologists say that naturalists
cannot explain subjective facts. If the gap is to be closed it will only be by
showing that phenomenologists are mistaken. The gap will be closed by
showing that naturalists do have the ontological resources to account for
subjective facts. The next two chapters will examine in more detail what





The last chapter argued that naturalistic theories of mind face an explanatory
gap with respect to our conscious experiences. Typically it has been
supposed that phenomenal properties are responsible for the gap's
existence. I have argued that phenomenal properties pose a problem for
naturalism only because these properties have a nature that essentially
involves subjects and their points of view. I called facts that can only be
represented from a subject's point of view "subjective facts". It is subjective
facts that I have argued seem to get left out from a naturalistic theory of
mind.
Phenomenologists argue that subjective facts have an explanatory and
metaphysical priority over the facts science describes. They would say that it
is subjective facts naturalists must account for if they are to close the gap.
Yet phenomenologists also argue that naturalism lacks the explanatory
resources to discharge this obligation. It would seem to follow that the
explanatory gap is an insuperable problem for naturalism.
Naturalists could respond to this attack in one of two ways. They could
reject the claim that to close the explanatory gap they must account for
subjective facts or they could rise to the challenge by showing that they can
account for subjective facts. I will be pursuing the latter option. First I must
offer further support for the claim that to close the gap naturalists must make
room for subjective facts.
Section 1 takes up the task of further clarifying the nature of phenomenal
properties. There are two questions an account of phenomenal properties
must answer. The first asks whether phenomenal properties are essentially
subjective, while the second asks whether phenomenal properties are
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representational properties. The phenomenologist returns positive answers
to both these questions. If they are right, it will follow that some
representational properties are essentially subjective.
I will contrast the phenomenologist's position with two other possible
accounts of phenomenal properties. The first takes phenomenal properties
to be essentially subjective and non-representational. I will label this
position, qualia-realism. The second position takes phenomenal properties
to be representational but denies that they are essentially subjective. I will
call this position intentionalism.
The phenomenologist claims that there is a kind of perceptual
intentionality constitutively determined by an experience's phenomenology.
In section 2 I contrast this phenomenological species of intentionality with a
number of naturalistic conceptions of intentionality.
If a case can be made for the claim that there is a species of
phenomenological intentionality it will follow that the contents of experience
are essentially subjective. Sections 3-5 draw on Husserl and the existential
phenomenologists respectively to develop such an account of intentionality in
more detail. I take the kind of perceptual intentionality set out in these two
sections to be just what the naturalist must make room for if s/he is to close
the explanatory gap. Section 6 finishes up by returning to intentionalism.
1. Phenomenal Properties and Representational Properties
Our perceptual experiences have two faces, one which is directed outwards
towards the world and the other which they present to their subjects.1
Perceptual experiences represent things in the world but at the same time as
1
Here I am echoing McGinn when he tells us that: "perceptual experiences are Janus-faced:
they point outward to the external world but they also present a subjective face to their




doing so there is something that the occurrence of a perceptual experience
is like for its subjects. I will call the properties of perceptual experiences in
virtue of which they represent things in a subject's environment
"representational properties". Those properties in virtue of which an
experience is like something for its subject I will follow tradition in calling
"phenomenal properties". The remainder of this section will sketch three
different positions one can take on the relation between phenomenal and
representational properties.
In line with the previous chapter I shall take phenomenal properties to be
those properties in virtue of which perceptual experiences seem a certain
way to a subject, and experiences of pleasure, pain and other affective
states feel a certain way to a subject. Representational properties are those
properties in virtue of which an experience is assessable for truth or falsity.
Our experiences represent the world to be a certain way. My experience as
of a shiny green apple represents the world to be a certain way - it
represents some part of my local environment as containing a shiny green
apple. It is in virtue of its representational properties that my experience
represents the world to be this way.2
Many philosophers have claimed that the way an experience seems or
feels to a subject cannot be exhausted by its representational properties.3
2
Often the ways in which an experience represents the world to be will far outstrip the
concepts a subject has mastered. When this happens the subject will be representing the
world to be a certain way even though she cannot describe what it is her experience is
representing. In order to accommodate this kind of possibility philosophers often make a
distinction between two kinds of representational property which I will label conceptual and
nonconceptual. The terminology of conceptual and nonconceptual properties derives from
Cussins (1990/2000). He characterises a property p as conceptual when p is described by a
theory by means of some concepts and this theory tells us to attribute p to a creature only if
the creature possesses mastery of these concepts. A property p is nonconceptual if it
characterised by a theory by means of some concepts which the creature need not possess
mastery of in order for us to attribute p to this creature.
3
This question has been raised with some force by Block in various places, most recently in
his (2003). Kim (1996: 13); McGinn (1982: 8); Searle (1983: 1) have also voiced concerns
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One way to argue for this conclusion is by constructing cases in which two
experiences share the same representational properties but differ in their
respective phenomenal properties. Another would be to look for cases in
which two experiences share the same phenomenal properties but differ in
their representational properties.
Block's (1990/1997) Inverted Earth is an ingenious version of the latter
scenario. A subject is described as undergoing two experiences, one in
earth and the other on inverted earth. The two experiences the subject
undergoes share the same phenomenal properties but differ in their
representational properties depending on whether the experience is
happening on earth or on inverted earth. Block does not deny that there is
something representational about phenomenal properties, but he does deny
that this exhausts their nature. He thinks that in addition to their
representational properties, experiences have intrinsic, introspectively
accessible properties. Phenomenal properties he tells us are "experiential
properties" distinct from any "cognitive, intentional or functional property"4
Elsewhere he calls phenomenal properties "mental paint".5
When looking at a painting we can attend to what the painting depicts or
we can attend to the paint on the canvas in virtue of which the painting
depicts what it does. Block claims we can do something similar with respect
to our experiences. We can attend to what our experiences represent but
we can also turn our attention to what he calls an experience's mental paint.
Our experiences have intrinsic properties just as the surface of the painting
does. It is these intrinsic properties of experience that Block calls "mental
about the limits of a representational account of phenomenal properties. Boghossian and
Velleman (1989) describe a number of difficult cases for representational theories.
Peacocke (1983, ch.1) provides what is perhaps the classic discussion of counterexamples
to a pure representational account of phenomenal properties.
4
Block (1995/1997:380-1).
5 See Block (1996) & (2003).
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paint". Henceforth I shall refer to any philosopher that takes phenomenal
properties to be either wholly or partially non-representational as a "qualia-
realist". By "qualia" I shall mean the intrinsic, introspectively accessible, non
intentional properties of experience.
Intentionalists deny that our experiences have qualia by denying that our
experiences have any non-intentional properties. Intentionalism comes in
varying degrees of strength. Strong intentionalists claim that the
phenomenal character of our experience is exhausted by the way in which
the world seems to us. Weak intentionalism denies this without reintroducing
qualia. Strong intentionalists argue that phenomenal properties are wholly
determined by an experience's representational properties.6 An experience's
phenomenal character is on this view entirely fixed by the ways in which an
experience represents the subject's external environment. Weak
intentionalists hold that the way the world appears to us is partially
dependent on our sensory constitution. We don't get a full account of
phenomenal properties by making reference to the features of a subject's
external environment that an experience represents. Weak intentionalists
argue that we must also make reference to how those features affect our
senses.7
I am not going to attempt to decide between these two versions of
intentionalism, though it does seem to me that the weaker version of
intentionalism is the more plausible of the two. Nor am I going to allow
myself to get embroiled in the debate between the qualia-realist and the
intentionalist. I will however say this much on the question of the existence
of qualia.
6
Byrne (2001); Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995 & 2000) amongst others have defended strong
intentionalism.
7




It seems to be possible for an experience to differ in phenomenal
character without this difference being explicable in terms of an experience's
representational content. Consider the following example from Peacocke:
suppose I am looking at a wall which is uniformly painted white and this is all
that my experience represents. My experience has a content which
represents the white wall I am looking at. Still some parts of the wall can
appear to be darker than others, because of the way in which the wall is
illuminated. So on the one hand my experience represents a wall that is
uniformly white. On the other hand some parts of this wall look to be darker
to me than others. This difference doesn't have anything to do with the
object my experience represents. As I move my eye from the well-
illuminated part of the wall to the less well-illuminated parts, it is the same
wall that I am representing. Moreover the experiences I undergo of these
different parts of the wall all represent the wall to be the same colour,
uniformly white. I don't represent the less-illuminated parts to be off-white
and the well illuminated parts to be pure white. This difference in my
experience seems to instead be a matter of the way in which this object is
being represented by me. The shadowy appearance which belongs to my
experience of some parts of the wall but not of others modifies my
experience of the wall.
Does a case like this one call for us to introduce qualia? I don't think so;
the difference in my experience as I move my eyes to different parts of the
wall is a representational difference. It is a difference in the way in which the
wall's whiteness is represented by me. However it is not a difference which
can be explained in terms of the objects and properties I am representing.
We don't after all want to say I am representing the wall to have a different
colour when I look at the part of the wall which is less well illuminated.
I 12
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I suggest then that we need to introduce two kinds of representational
properties if we are to adequately capture an experience's phenomenal
character in representational terms. The first kind of representational
properties we may take to determine an experience's representational
content. These properties may well be fully determined by whatever objects
and properties a subject is representing in her external environment.
However in addition to this first class of representational properties we need
to introduce a second kind of representational property. This second class of
representational properties determines the way in which an experience
represents an object.
The way in which an experience represents an object will often be
determined by the context in which a perceptual experience occurs.8 In the
example I have just been discussing it is because of the way in which the
wall is illuminated that it looks to me to be darker in some regions than
others. This difference in illumination conditions can make a difference to
the way in which the wall is represented by me. What this case highlights is
that the way an experience seems to a subject isn't fully exhausted by
whatever the subject is representing. We need also to consider the context
in which a thing is being represented if we are to fully capture an
experience's phenomenal character.
Philosophers have raised a number of other problem cases for views
which attempt to identify phenomenal properties with representational
properties. I am going to assume henceforth that intentionalists can
satisfactorily finesse these problems.9 I want to consider a related but
8
For a further discussion of this point see Kelly (1999 & 2004).
9
Boghossian and Velleman (1989) and Block (1996 & 2003) raise a number of problem
cases for the intentionalist such as blurry vision, afterimages, and variations on the classic
inverted spectra scenarios. Tye (1992 & 2000: ch.4) and Crane (1998 & 2000: 140-50) have
each developed convincing intentionalist responses to these kinds of cases. Since I intend to




Qualia are normally taken to be essentially subjective properties which
can be known only from an introspective or first-person point of view. Part of
the attraction of the position I have labeled strong intentionalism is that it
seems to allow us to avoid characterising phenomenal properties as
essentially subjective. We can simply point to the objects and properties in
the public world in characterising what it is for an experience to seem or feel
a particular way to a subject. We don't need to invoke any properties which
belong to a subject's experience and can only be known from a first-person
point of view.
Phenomenologists have something in common with intentionalists in this
regard. They agree that an experience seems a certain way to a subject in
virtue of the objects and properties it purports to represent.
Phenomenologists are nevertheless committed to there being something
essentially subjective about our experience. Even though they would follow
intentionalists in taking an experience's phenomenal character to be fully
explained by an experience's representational properties, they still think of
experiences as essentially subjective. The debate I wish to focus on for what
remains of this chapter takes place between strong intentionalists and
phenomenologists. Strong intentionalists deny that there is anything
essentially subjective about experience, arguing that we can fully account for
phenomenal properties in terms of the objects and properties an experience
represents in the subject's external environment. Phenomenologists agree
with this characterisation of phenomenal properties but they hold that there is
still something essentially subjective about conscious experience.




"subject-dependent property". A property that is not essentially subjective I
will call "subject-independent". A property is essentially subjective I shall say
when its instantiation essentially involves a subject of experience.
Secondary qualities will qualify as essentially subjective on this
characterisation. What it is for an object to be coloured on views which take
colour to be a secondary quality, will be partly determined by a subject's
responses to coloured things. We cannot say what it is for a thing to be
coloured without making reference to our responses to coloured things. This
makes colour a subject-dependent property.
We can now distinguish two questions that arise when we begin to think
about the nature of phenomenal properties. The first question asks whether
phenomenal properties are representational properties, and the second asks
whether phenomenal properties are subject-dependent properties. It follows
that there is a four-way partition between the different positions one can take
on the nature of phenomenal properties detailed in the following table:







I have characterised weak intentionalists as sharing with phenomenologists the claim that
phenomenal properties are subject dependent. This is because weak intentionalists like
Shoemaker say that phenomenal properties are relational properties. On this view two
subjects could respond differently to redness, one seeing a flower that seems to be red and
the other seeing a flower that seems to be green. The flower in this case has both the
property of seeming to be red and the property of seeming to be green. This view allows us
to say that there can be no difference in an experience's phenomenal properties without
some difference in this experience's representational properties. However it also allow that
which representational properties an experience has can depend on how the subject




Subject-Independent Strong Intentionalists Eliminativists11
The debate I will focus on for the remainder of the chapter is carried out
between intentionalists who hold that phenomenal properties are subject-
independent and phenomenologists who disagree. Thus I will be assuming
that the issue of whether phenomenal properties can be characterised in
representational terms has been settled in the intentionalist's favour. Once
we set aside the question of the existence of qualia, the issue of the nature
of phenomenal properties shifts to become an issue about how best to
account for an experience's representational properties. The debate
becomes one about how experiences get their intentional contents. Strong
intentionalists hold that our experiences get their representational properties
in ways that do not essentially involve subjects of experience.
Phenomenologists disagree.
Part of my aim in what follows will be to introduce the account of
intentionality one finds in phenomenology. I shall argue that this account of
intentionality is to be preferred to that endorsed by the strong intentionalist.
However the account of intentionality we find in phenomenology has the
implication that phenomenal properties must be understood as subject-
dependent. Hence if we are to close the explanatory gap, it will only be by
making room for properties and entities that are subject-dependent.
11
While plenty of philosophers have been eliminativists about qualia, I suspect that it is only
the Churchlands who would propose the wholesale elimination of phenomenal properties.
Perhaps Dennett's eliminativism about qualia can also be taken to apply to phenomenal
properties more generally. Dennett seeks to explain away phenomenal properties in terms of
a subject's evaluative responses to his/her experiences. Dennett's heterophenomenological
approach seems to have as a consequence that it is our evaluative responses that science
must seek to account for, since we don't really have any independent handle on our
experience's phenomenology apart from the evaluative judgements we make about them.
For a discussion of Dennett's heterophenomenology and its difference from phenomenology
proper, see my introduction.
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2. Intentionalitv and Phenomenology
Phenomenologists hold that perceptual intentionality is constitutively
determined by phenomenology. This is to say that an experience has the
representational properties it does in virtue of the way the experience
presents the world as appearing to its subject. This claim gives us a
straightforward argument for the conclusion that phenomenal properties are
subject-dependent. The argument runs as follows:
(P1) Phenomenal properties are identical with representational properties.
(P2) An experience has its representational properties in virtue of the way
it presents the world as appearing to a subject.
(P3) An experience's representational properties are essentially
subjective. We must characterise them in terms of the ways in which they
present the world as appearing to a subject.
(CON) An experience's phenomenal properties are essentially subjective.
The crucial premise in this argument is (P2). Phenomenologists take (P2) to
be motivated by an uncontroversial feature of intentional states that they can
purport to refer to an object whether or not that object exists. It is, I take it,
uncontroversial that there is a conceptual connection between intentional
directedness and the property of purporting to refer. It is part of what we
mean by "intentionality" that a state can exhibit intentional directedness but
fail to refer to anything.12 Phenomenologists claim that not only is there a
conceptual connection between intentionality and the property of purporting
to refer; there is in addition a constitutive or metaphysical connection. They
12
The possibility of reference failure together with the failure of substitution of coreferential
terms are commonly cited as the defining features of intentionality. These are among the
criteria Chisholm (1957) offers as the distinguishing mark of "intentional" sentences.
Searle (1983: 22-5) argues that the criteria Chisholm identifies are really just features of
the sentences we use to ascribe intentional states but are not features of the intentional
states themselves. Crane (1998) agrees. But neither Searle nor Crane will deny that
whenever there is representation there is the possibility of misrepresentation or worse still
empty representation, and this is all my current argument needs.
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take intentional directedness to be identical with the property of purporting to
refer.
The phenomenologist claims that an experience purports to refer to
something in virtue of its phenomenology. An experience can purport to
refer to something just by presenting the world as seeming a certain way. I
can undergo an experience the content of which purports to refer to a lemon
say, just by undergoing an experience that presents to me something that
seems to be a lemon. If we suppose that to exhibit intentionality is to purport
to refer, it is natural to think that an experience could exhibit intentionality just
by presenting the world as seeming a certain way.
We can get an initial hold on what the phenomenologist has in mind by
comparing the account of intentionality as I have sketched it thus far with the
more familiar accounts proposed by contemporary naturalist philosophers of
mind. The phenomenologists, I have said, take intentional directedness to
be identical with the property of purporting to refer. On this conception of
intentionality, an experience doesn't get its content from the relation, causal
or otherwise, in which a subject stands to the world. The experience already
has an intentional content in virtue of its phenomenology - the ways in which
it presents the world as appearing. An experience's intentional content can
either be confirmed or disconfirmed by the world the subject is representing.
The question of whether an experience accomplishes its goal of referring is
quite independent of an experience's possession of a particular content.
The naturalist will of course admit that a subject can represent an object
whether or not this object exists. All parties are agreed that this is definitive
of intentionality. However the naturalist will argue that there is always some
other relation that the subject stands in to the world which explains why an
experience has a particular content. This, I shall claim, is the central
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difference between their respective accounts of intentionality.
Phenomenologists hold that intentional directedness is a nonrelational
property of representational states, a property an experience has whether or
not a subject enters into any relation with the world. Naturalists have
however supposed that there must be some relation between the bearer of
an intentional state and the world which accounts for intentional
directedness.
On the causal covariation theory for instance the relation in question is
one of tracking objects and properties under ideal or optimal conditions. If
we want to know why an experience has particular correctness conditions,
we can appeal to the relation of causal covariation under optimal
conditions.13 How will the causal covariation theory handle cases of
reference-failure? The causal covariation theory will say that our senses can
represent an object that doesn't exist because sometimes the conditions for
reliable tracking are not satisfied. When the conditions for reliable tracking
are not satisfied a creature can represent what does not exist. What is it that
an experience represents in such cases? The causal covariation theory
claims that non-veridical experiences represent whatever they would causally
covary with under ideal conditions.
For the causal covariation theory, successful reference has an explanatory
priority over the property I have described as "purporting to refer". Intentional
directedness is defined in terms of reference, where "reference" is
understood as causal covariation under ideal conditions. We are to
understand the property an experience has when it purports to refer always
in terms of the conditions that would hold if the experience succeeded in
13
See Stampe (1977) for the classic defence of this position. Tye (1995: ch.4, pp.'s 100-5)




Phenomenologists would argue that the causal covariation theory can
succeed only by changing the subject. By giving priority to cases of
successful reference they find they cannot make room for anything like a
non-relational property of purporting to refer. Instead they must try to explain
away the property of purporting to refer in terms of some other relation the
bearer of an intentional state stands in to the world. Phenomenologists will
insist that the property of purporting to refer is metaphysically more basic
than the property of referring. Any attempt to explain the property of
purporting to refer in terms of the relation that would hold when an intentional
state succeeds in referring will fail to explain the true phenomenon. It will fail
to explain how mental states can have a representational content prior to a
subject taking up any relation to the world.
Do teleological theories of content fare any better? By the
phenomenologist's standards we will have to conclude they do not.
Teleological theories add to the causal covariation account, an explanation
of which conditions are optimal. Consider first Dretske's spin on the causal
covariation story. Dretske advances a theory of perceptual intentionality
according to which "a system S, represents a property F, if and only if S has
the function of indicating (providing information about) the F of a certain
domain of objects." (Dretske, 1995: 2) What Dretske calls "indication" is
another way of describing the relation of causal covariation: to indicate or
carry information about F is to track F. Flowever Dretske points out that
indication on its own won't suffice to account for representation. Indication is
a relation of lawful dependence which doesn't allow room for
misrepresentation.14 So Dretske is led to invoke a representational system's
14
For an argument to this effect see Dretske (1986/1994: 158-159)
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function. A representational system S has the function of representing F if
the detection of F by S enables the organism to meet its needs. Of course
this doesn't quite work either because there is always more than one way to
specify a representation producing system's function. Thus Dretske's final
move is to invoke the learning history of an organism. A representational
system S has the function of representing F if representations which indicate
the presence of F have been recruited by the organism as the cause of some
behaviour M which enables the organism to cope in its environment.
What will the teleological theory say about cases of reference-failure?
Dretske's teleological theory will attempt to explain the contents of my
experience in these cases by reference to a creature's learning history.
According to the story he tells, a creature that can misrepresent has learned
that the various stimuli which cause it to be in a representational state R
indicate the presence of some feature F which is in some way relevant to its
needs. Flowever occasionally something may go wrong and the creature
may find itself in representational state R in the absence of any F's. Why
when this happens does the state the creature is in nevertheless represent
the presence of F? R represents F because this is its function.
Thus Dretske will explain the phenomenologist's property of purporting to
refer by reference to the conditions that obtain when a sensory system isn't
functioning properly. A sensory system S fails to function properly when the
stimulus which causes S to go into state R is a stimulus which normally
indicates the presence of F but on this occasion fails to do so. Thus the
sensory system is led to malfunction. Notice that like the causal covariation
theory, Dretske accounts for the property of purporting to refer in terms of a
relation between the sensory system and the world. What he adds to the
story is an appeal to learning. It is a creature's having learning to associate
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its being in a state R with the presence of some feature F relevant to its
meeting its needs which explains why R represents the presence of F. Thus
Dretske's teleological theory attempts to redescribe the property of
purporting to refer in relational terms. From where the phenomenologist
stands, this move amounts to denying the phenomenon.
Millikan (1984) has proposed a teleological account that is very different
from Dretske's. According to her account, content is not individuated by any
causal or informational relation, and thus at first glance it looks to be a good
deal more promising than the other theories we have considered. Can her
theory make room for the phenomenologist's conception of intentional
directedness?
Millikan assigns proper functions to the systems that use or consume
representations and not to the systems that produce them. The beaver's
splash means danger because when it corresponds to danger, the response
on the part of other beavers serves a purpose. The bee dance serves a
purpose when other bees can make use of it to collect nectar, and this they
can do only when the location of the nectar corresponds correctly to the
dance.
For Millikan we determine a representation's content by asking what the
consumers of representations need in order to do their jobs. Millikan goes on
to argue that the consumers of a representation need a certain relation to
hold between a representation and what is represented. Just like Dretske a
representation's content turns out to be individuated by a relation between a
bearer of a representation and the world, the relation that must hold if a
consumer of representations is to function properly.15 Once again we have
15
Matters are not quite as straightforward as I make them seem here. Millikan makes an
important distinction between direct and derived proper functions (see for instance Millikan
(1986)). She introduces the distinction to get around the problem of how to account for the
function of novel, one-off intentional states or intentional states whose job is to bring about
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a theory of intentionality which attempts to analyse the non-relational
property of purporting to refer in terms of some relational property.
Phenomenologists think that thoughts and experience can exhibit
intentional directedness just by purporting to refer. An experience or thought
doesn't get its intentionality from the relation a subject stands in to the world.
The accounts of intentionality I have just sketched challenge this conclusion.
One and all they argue that a representation's content is individuated by a
relation, either causal or historical, that a subject stands in to the world. It is
beyond the scope of this chapter to assess which party in this debate gets
the last word. My aim in what remains of the chapter will be instead to
outline in more detail what a rival non-relational account of intentional
directedness might look like. According to this rival account the kind of
intentional directedness that attaches to perceptual experiences is wholly
determined by an experience's phenomenology. The idea is that an
experience can by virtue of its phenomenology alone purport to refer to
something. This is to say that an experience can, just by presenting the
world as seeming a certain way, purport to refer to something.
An example might make this proposal clearer. Suppose that my
experience presents me with what seems to be an apple. The
phenomenologist claims that it is by presenting to me something that seems
to be an apple that my experience purports to refer to an apple. The
phenomenology of my experience - its presenting me with something that
seems to be an apple - is constitutive of my experience purporting to refer to
an apple. From this theory the conclusion that phenomenal properties are
states of affairs disadvantageous to the well-being of an organism. A derived proper function
is a function which derives from the function of some device which produces some effect. A
novel bee dance for instance, a particular waggle that has never been performed in the past,




both representational and subject-dependent will immediately follow. My
experience purports to refer to something in virtue of its representational
properties. The fact that my experience presents me with something that
seems to be an apple is a subject-dependent property of my experience. It
is to me that my experience presents something that seems to be an apple.
An experience could not present something as seeming to be a certain way
without there being some subject to whom things are so-presented. If we
say that my experiences do purport to refer solely in virtue of their
phenomenology, it will follow that phenomenal properties are both
representational and subject-dependent. It is this conclusion that is
important for my current project. If correct it will show that an intentionalist
response to the explanatory gap must make room for subjective facts.
3. Phenomenal Intentionalitv
I have attributed to the phenomenologist the view that an experience has its
representational content in virtue of its phenomenology. It is this view which
I shall be developing in its Husserlian and existential guises across the next
two sections. I am using "phenomenology" here to refer to the way an
experience presents something as seeming to its subject. I will continue to
think of representational content as specifiable by a set of correctness
conditions, the conditions which must hold if the bearer of representational
content is to represent something true. The claim I will be developing says
that it is an experience's phenomenology - the ways in which an experience
presents the world as seeming to its subject - which makes it the case that
an experience has the correctness conditions it does.
Let us call the thesis that phenomenology fixes intentional content, "the
Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis" (or PIT for short). There is a strong and
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weak reading of PIT. We can formalise the two readings as follows where 'x'
stands for an intentional state, 'R' for a relation to the world, 'y' f°r an object,
and 'P' for the property of representing y.
(1) Strong Reading: ~Vx 3R 3y (Px=>Rxy)16
(2) Weak Reading: ~3R 3yVx (Px 3 Rxy)17
The strong reading holds that a psychological state's phenomenology
doesn't depend on the existence of any individual other that the subject to
whom the psychological state belongs.18 According to PIT phenomenology
determines intentional content. Thus a proponent of the strong reading must
show that there is a type of intentional content whose individuation
conditions do not refer to any individual other that the subject to whom the
psychological state belongs.19
The strong reading is committed to the following possibility. Imagine a
phenomenological duplicate of me such that whenever I undergo an
experience with a particular phenomenology so does my duplicate. Now
further imagine that this individual is a brain-in-a-vat, his external reality is
16
More informally the strong reading says: no intentional state x is such that there is a
relation R and an object y such that necessarily if x represents y then x bears R to y.
17
The weak reading claims: it is not the case that there exists a relation R and an object y
such that for all experiences x if x represents y then x bears relation R to y.
18
Putnam (1975) borrows Carnap's label "methodological solipsism" to describe this position.
19
A proponent of the strong reading needn't deny that there is a type of intentional content
the individuation of which does require us to make reference to entities in the subject's
external environment. Consider two individuals that are looking at phenomenologically
indistinguishable paintings one of which is a forgery. The strong reading will say that there is
a sense in which both individuals enjoy experiences with the same truth conditions. The truth
conditions are that each must be presented with a painting with a certain arrangement of
form and colour. There is however also a sense in which their respective experiences differ
in content. If one of the individuals was to point to the painting in front of him and say 'this is
the original painting' his utterance would be made true by the painting he had pointed to. If
the other individual was to point to the painting in front of him and say 'this is the genuine
painting' his utterance would be made true by the painting he had pointed to. What makes
each of their utterances true or false is a different painting. Hence there is also a sense in
which each of them enjoys an experience with different truth conditions.
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fundamentally different from the one he experiences, containing only a
supercomputer feeding his brain information about a virtual reality. The
strong reading must say that my phenomenological duplicate and I enjoy
experiences with the very same representational contents because an
experience's correctness conditions are determined by phenomenology
alone. Since my duplicate and I have phenomenologically identical
experiences, my duplicate and I must share experiences with the very same
20
correctness conditions.
The weaker reading of PIT agrees with the strong that an experience's
phenomenology, the way it seems or feels to its subject, determines
intentional content. Unlike the strong reading it allows that an experience's
phenomenology requires a subject to stand in some relation to the world. At
first glance it would seem the weak reading is committed to the view that an
experience's intentional content must be individuated by a relation a subject
stands into the world. If phenomenology requires a subject to stand in some
relation to the world, and phenomenology determines intentional content,
doesn't it follow that it is a subject's standing in a particular relation to the
world that explains an experience's having a particular intentional content?
A proponent of the weak reading denies this consequence. He claims that
a thought or experience has its intentional content before a subject takes up
any relation to the world. It may be true that an experience's
phenomenology requires a subject to stand in some relation to the world. It
doesn't follow that intentional content is individuated by the relation a subject
stands in to the world. An experience's phenomenology - the determinant of
20
Loar (2003) and Horgan and Tienson (2002) have both defended this consequence of the
strong reading. Horgan and Tienson defend the claim that you and your phenomenological
duplicate share experiences with the same correctness conditions by arguing that what you




its intentional content - might not be individuated by a particular relation a
subject stands in to the world, but in some other manner. Indeed I shall
argue for precisely that claim in the final sections of this chapter.
The weak reading has one noteworthy implication which I will register
before considering how these respective readings of PIT find an articulation
in Husserlian and existential phenomenology. I have said that the weak
reading of PIT allows that an experience's phenomenology might in some
sense "involve" extra-mental items. Suppose a case can be made for what
we might call "wide phenomenology". It will follow that it is not possible for
there to exist a phenomenological duplicate of me which is a brain-in-a-vat.
If phenomenology is wide, a phenomenological duplicate of you or I must
enjoy experiences that involve just the same extra-mental items as our
experiences involve. A brain-in-a-vat exists in an environment that contains
none of the same extra-mental items that our environment contains. If he
experiences anything that can be considered an extra-mental item, it is at
best an item that has a virtual existence, and I am presuming this is not true
of all, or even many, of the items we experience. It follows that a
phenomenological duplicate of me cannot be a brain-in-a-vat. Sceptical
arguments are usually mounted by imagining a phenomenological duplicate
embedded in a radically different environment from our own. A weak-reading
of PIT would provide significant machinery for mounting a response to this
variety of sceptical argument.21
21
I will not however pursue this possibility here.
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4. Husserl's Theory of Intentionalitv
Some commentators take Husserl to hold the stronger reading of PIT.22
Recall that Husserlian phenomenology begins by setting aside all
propositions whose truth can be doubted. This leaves the Husserlian
phenomenologist only with propositions about his own consciousness
considered in complete abstraction from the natural world. All propositions
about the natural world are subject to doubt in a way that some propositions
describing a subject's occurrent mental states are not. Thus construed it
certainly seems like the Husserlian phenomenologist is committed to the
claim that a psychological state's content doesn't depend on the existence of
any individual apart from its bearer.
I shall argue that if Husserl did hold the strong thesis he faces a problem
which is the mirror image of the problem I described for the naturalist in the
previous section. The naturalist seeks to explain the property a state has
when it purports to refer by appeal to the relation of reference. S/he has the
difficulty of explaining how intentional states can seem to exhibit
directedness independent of any particular relation to the world once s/he
has taken reference to be metaphysically basic. Husserl gives priority to the
property of purporting to refer over that of reference in his account of
intentional directedness. This leaves him facing the difficulty of explaining
how our perceptual experience can succeed in making contact with objects if
the contents of our experiences do not require the existence of anything
other than the subject to whom they belong.
Husserl took it to be a phenomenological datum that our perceptual
experiences seem to present us with extra-mental items in their full "bodily
22 See for instance Dreyfus (1982) and Mclntyre (1982). For an argument that Husserl held
the weaker thesis see Zahavi (2004).
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presence".23 He denies that the objects of our experience have an existence
in consciousness, claiming instead that the objects given to us in experience
seem to have a transcendent existence.24 The central problem of his
phenomenology is to explain how it is possible for our experiences to give us
access to a world whose existence transcends consciousness.25 Husserl
must explain how a state whose content is in no way dependent on a relation
to the world can nevertheless sometimes succeed in making contact with
extra-mental items.
Existential phenomenologists we shall see can avoid both the naturalist's
problem and Husserl's problem. They endorse a weak reading of PIT and
this is what enables them to steer a middle course between (the
methodological solipsist reading of) Husserl's phenomenology and
naturalism. Before we can grasp the existential phenomenologist's proposal
we need to understand the problems Husserl encounters which their account
of intentionality was designed to address. This will be my aim in the
remainder of this section.
Husserl made a three-way distinction along the lines of Frege's distinction
between idea, sense and reference. What Frege referred to as "ideas"
Husserl calls "act of consciousness". He shares with Frege an
23 "The object stands before us in perception as bodily present, as, to put it more precisely
yet, actually present, as given in propria persona in the actual present." (Husserl 1907/1997:
§4, 14) Also see Husserl (1913/1970: §136).
4
This is a departure from his teacher Brentano who assigns to objects a peculiar kind of
mental inexistence. Brentano claimed that every mental phenomenon includes an object
within itself, though not in the same way: "in presentation something is presented, in
judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love something is loved, in hate something is
hated, in desire desired etc." This landed him with the difficulty of explaining the difference
between intentional states directed towards objects that exist and intentional states that take
as their objects fictional or imaginary entities. Husserl avoids this problem by distinguishing
an intentional state's content from its object. Every intentional state has content but not every
intentional state has an object. For further discussion of the difference between Brentano
and Husserl's conception of intentionality see Husserl (1913/1970: V, §10-11) & Follesdal
(1969).
5
There are countless places where Husserl poses this question but see for instance the fifth
investigation in his (1913/1970) and the second of his Meditations in his (1931/1973).
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understanding of acts of consciousness as subjective. They are subjective in
the sense that they are temporal events confined to a particular person's
stream of consciousness.26
While an act of consciousness is something subjective, its sense is not.
Two subjects cannot share one and the same token act, each will have his
own act of consciousness. Different subjects can however share one and
the same thought or experience. This they can do by each tokening an act
with the same intentional content or sense. According to one influential
interpretation Husserl thinks of sense in much the same way as Frege did as
something ideal or abstract that different acts can share in common.27
Distinct acts of consciousness can exemplify or instantiate one and the same
sense just as different objects can share one and the same property.
Husserl claims that every act of consciousness has as its correlate a
sense. This enables him to explain how every act of consciousness can
seem to place a subject in relation to an object whether or not that object
exists. Husserl denies that an act's sense and its object are one and the
same. It is for this reason that an act can have a sense but no referent.
While Husserl's theory is designed to make room for the possibility that an
26 See for instance Husserl (1913/1982: §88 & §97)
27
This is the interpretation advanced by Follesdal (1969) and developed at length by
Woodruff-Smith & Mclntyre (1982). In recent years there has emerged a significant rival
interpretation according to which the sense that belongs to an act of perception isn't
something that mediates reference. A Husserlian "sense" on this interpretation is the object
of experience or thought just as it is experienced or thought of by a subject. This
interpretation stresses the continuity between Husserl and his existential successors.
Drummond (1990) and Sokolowski (1987) both defend versions of this interpretation. For a
more recent discussion which takes the side of the latter interpretation against Follesdal see
Zahavi (2004).
The Drummond/Sokolowski interpretation presents Husserl as an exponent of direct
realism. While I find the position they describe attractive it fails to come to terms with the
many places in which Husserl makes declarations which sound very much like those of an
idealist. A.D. Smith (2003, ch.4) quotes the following passages from Husserl's unpublished
manuscripts: "If there were no consciousness with appearances, there would also be no
physical things." (ibid, 180) Unequivocal statements of idealism like this one do not accord
well with the reading of Husserl as an exponent of direct-realism. I will return to this issue at
the end of this section.
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act can have a sense but no object, he denies the converse is possible. It is
not possible, he claims, for an act to have an object but no sense. Every act
purports to refer to an object by means of its sense. It is by virtue of an act's
sense that a subject comes to stand in a relation to an object.
We see then that Husserl conceives of directedness as a property an
intentional state exhibits because every act has as its correlate a sense or
intentional content. How does he think an act can by means of its sense
succeed in referring to an object?
Husserl describes a perceptual act's sense as being composed of two
parts. The first I will call a "signifying intention".28 The signifying intention
presents an object as having certain features. Some of these features will
be sensibly presented. Others will be features that are not currently sensibly
presented but which the subject nevertheless takes to be features that could
potentially be experienced by taking up a different point of view on the object.
Husserl describes the features which are sensibly presented as "filled
intentions" and the features which are not sensibly presented as "emptily
intended".29 An experience's signifying intention is at any given moment a
conjunction of filled and empty intentions.
A signifying intention determines how an object is represented, but not
which object is represented. It is only if Husserl can explain how at least
sometimes an experience succeeds in singling out a particular object that he
will have given us an answer to the problem we raised for him at the
28
I have borrowed this piece of terminology from Dreyfus (1982).
29
The distinction between empty and filled intentions is discussed in Husserl (1913/1982:
§135) and (1907/1997: §18). A word about Husserl's use of "intending": Husserl talks of an
experience as "intending" an object in order to capture the sense in which an experience
aims at or has its target some object whether or not it succeeds in referring to anything. We
think of an agent as forming an intention to cp when s/he resolves to do what is necessary for
cp-ing. If we understand the resolution an agent forms as the agent's goal we can see what
Husserl might have meant by "intending". An experience intends an object by having as its
goal reference to a particular object.
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beginning of this section. There I attributed to Husserl the opposite problem
to that of the naturalist. Husserl must explain how an experience can
succeed in referring to an object when an experience has its representational
properties independently of any relation to the world.
Husserl's answer to this problem is to claim that every perceptual act has
as part of its sense what he calls a "determinable X", which he tells us,
presents an object in abstraction from all predicates.30 I shall call it the "X-
component". The X-component is that part of an experience's content that
purports to refer to a particular individual. What is intended in any given
perceptual act isn't simply a bundle of unrelated properties. Rather these
properties are represented as properties that belong to one and the same
object. One of the roles the X-component plays is that of combining and
unifying these properties so that an experience can represent them as
properties of one and the same object. Another role the X-component plays
is that of tracking a particular object across a series of experiences.
As we move around a sculpture, for instance, experiencing it from different
sides we take up a series of distinct points of view on one and the same
object. It is by means of the X-component that these distinct points of view
are combined so that what we experience is an identical thing, the sculpture.
The X-component plays the role of binding together these distinct points of
view so that the series of experiences the subject undergoes are all directed
towards one and the same object.
The X-component is being asked to do a lot of work by Husserl, but just
how does he think it achieves these tasks? Woodruff-Smith and Mclntyre
(1982: 200-4) propose that we construe the X-component as functioning like
a demonstrative expression. On their proposal a perceptual act is related to
30
Husserl introduces the determinable X-component in his (1913/1982: §131).
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a particular object in much the same way as a demonstrative expression is
related to its referent. Interpreting the X-component as a demonstrative
helps to make sense of Husserl's claim that the X-component presents an
object in abstraction from its predicates. It is a feature of demonstratives that
they refer directly, which is to say, without the mediation of any descriptions.
The X-component represents an object without making reference to any of its
properties in just the same way as a demonstrative expression purports to
refer to a particular without the help of any identifying descriptions.
There is little doubt that Husserl needs the X-component to function in
something like the manner of a demonstrative. What is not so clear is that
the strong reading of PIT allows Husserl to introduce anything like a
demonstrative into the contents of experience.31 What a demonstrative
expression such as 'this' takes as its referent will vary from occasion to
occasion depending on the context in which it is employed. An interlocutor
will determine which object a particular utterance of 'this' has as its referent
by making use of the context in which the utterance was made.
Husserl cannot make use of the context in which a perceptual experience
takes place to determine which object, if any, the X-component takes as its
referent. His account of the phenomenological reduction seems to require
him to say that there is no relation to the world that a perceptual experience
depends upon for its representational properties. The X-component is
described by him as a kind of representational property that all experiences
have in common. Thus he must hold that there is no relation to the world
that the X-component depends upon in order to single out a particular object.
Husserl is well aware of the context-dependent nature of demonstratives;
he tells us in his (1913/1970) that: "'This' is an essentially occasional
31
Dreyfus (1982) and Mclntyre (1982) both raise this problem for Husserl.
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expression which only becomes fully meaningful when we have regard to the
circumstances of utterance..." (VI, §5, 682) Instead of appealing to the
context in which the perceptual experience takes place to single out an
object, he has the subject enter into the relation of direct and immediate
perception to an object that he calls "intuition" (Anschauung). I take it his
proposal is that the X-component singles out the object that the subject is
intuiting, where "intuition" is understood as a kind of direct and immediate
presentation of the object in its bodily presence.
Does the appeal to intuition really help him avoid introducing a relation to
the world that runs contrary to the strong reading of PIT? It looks like any
appeal to intuition will require Husserl to appeal to the existence of an object
which the subject is directly and immediately presented with. Yet his
methodological strictures call for him to refrain from making any existence
claims. Thus the introduction of the X-component into his account of
perceptual sense would seem to be in serious conflict with his views on
phenomenological method.
There is an obvious way out of this difficulty for the Husserlian
phenomenologist. It could be objected that the whole thrust of the above
argument rests upon a false understanding of phenomenological method.32
So far I have been assuming that the phenomenological epoche commits
Husserl to a kind of methodological solipsism. It's possible to understand the
"epoche" in such a way that the world isn't excluded from the
phenomenologist's inquiry. On this reading the epoche doesn't require the
subject to study his subjective psychological states in abstraction from the
world. Rather the epoche simply affects a change of attitude. Instead of
relating to objects as we ordinarily do pre-reflectively we are to study the
32
Zahavi (2004, pp.60-1) makes an argument to this effect.
134
Consciousness and Intentionality
objects of our thoughts and experiences as they are intended or represented
by us. The phenomenologist is to study the perceived object as it is
perceived, the recollected episode as it is recollected, the imaginary object
as it is imagined etc.
Here is not the place to assess the plausibility of this proposal as an
interpretation of Husserl. Suffice it to say that if it can be defended it would
establish that Husserl was not a methodological solipsist. This reading
attributes to Husserl the view that at least sometimes our perceptual
experiences can contain their objects as constituents: the perceptual act
contains the perceived object as it is perceived; a memory contains the
recollected episode as it is recalled. If this is right then a perceptual
experience's content does depend on the existence of some individual other
than its subject. Husserl can allow that context plays the role it is ordinarily
thought to play in fixing the content of a demonstrative, and his theory of
intentionality will be rescued.
Let us set aside the strong reading of PIT then. We have seen that
Husserl's account of perceptual content incorporates a demonstrative
component, and that this aspect of his theory is in serious tension with any
reading which takes him to endorse the strong reading of PIT. Perhaps
Husserl's theory can be rescued, but only by allowing that perceptual content
requires a subject to stand in some relation to the world. Since this is
something the strong reading of PIT denies a Husserlian phenomenologist
has little choice but to abandon such a thesis.
135
Consciousness and Intentionality
5. The Existential Phenomenoloqist's Theory of Intentionalitv
We have seen that a strong reading of PIT encounters insuperable
difficulties when it comes to explaining how our thoughts and experiences
can secure reference to their objects. Existential phenomenology rejects a
conception of intentionality as a relation between a subject's states of mind
and their object because they reject a conception of the subject as standing
apart from the world. Thus they can avoid the problems Husserl faces in
explaining successful cases of reference. McCulloch (2003) finds in
Descartes a distinction he tags "the ontological real distinction". According to
McCulloch, Descartes didn't just distinguish a person's mind from his body,
arguing that mind and body are distinct substances. Descartes went further
endorsing a dualism that extended to mind and world.33 It is this dualism of
mind and world that the existential phenomenologist repudiates. It is only if
we conceive of subjects as capable of a distinct existence from the world that
a view of intentionality as a relation between mind and world makes sense.
If we think of a subject as existing apart from the world, it is natural to think of
intentionality as the means by which the distance between mind and world is
bridged. Once a dualism of mind and world is rejected it no longer makes
sense to think of intentionality as a relation between a subject's states of
mind and the world.
We are, for the most part, involved with the world dealing with things in
exercising some skillful activity. We can of course take up a detached
33
Descartes can conceive of the possible non-existence of a reality external to the mind
precisely because he accepts that mind and world have a different kind of being. In the first
of his Meditations Descartes invites us to imagine that we might be the victims of a massive
deception so that pretty much everything we believe is false. This is a possibility we can
grant Descartes only if we suppose that the contents of our minds, our thoughts and
experiences, are self-contained with respect to the world. Only if our minds are wholly self-
contained, only if our thoughts and experiences can have the contents they do completely




standpoint whereby we stand back from our ordinary engagement with the
world, and conceive of the world from no particular point of view. This is not
how we live our lives for the most part. Most of our life is spent dealing with
situations without needing to give the situation any thought. We know how to
find our way about in the world. This know-how is made possible by our
being-in-the-world.
Existential phenomenology is committed to a weak reading of PIT. It
holds that the contents of our experience require us to stand in some relation
to the world. This follows from their conception of the existence of persons
as being-in-the-world. They deny that it is a subject's relation to the world
that accounts for an experience or thought having a particular intentional
content. For as we have just seen, they reject any conception of a subject
existing apart from the world. In the remainder of this section I will explore
the sense in which our experiences can be said to have their intentional
contents prior to a subject entering into a relation with the world.34 I will
argue that existential phenomenology make sense of this claim in a way that
reflects their rejection of Husserl's idealism. First we must make explicit what
there is in the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences to motivate
such a claim.
In fact we have already encountered the answer to this question in our
discussion of Flusserl. Recall that Husserl makes a distinction between two
aspects of an experience's intentional content which he calls "empty" and
"filled intentions". This distinction is introduced to capture the sense in which
34
There is an important sense in which this way of putting things is incoherent from the
perspective of existential phenomenology. A subject doesn't exist before it takes up a
relation to the world. Thus it doesn't make sense to talk of 'a subject's experiences having
intentional content before a subject takes up a relation to the world' as I have just done. This




what we sensibly perceive of an object at any given moment is a single
perspective or point of view on it. Some features of the object are sensibly
presented to us, while others are not. The features of the object we perceive
are those that are presented to us from our current point of view. The
features of the object that are not currently perceived, we can perceive by
taking up a different point of view on the object. An experience's intentional
content is thus a conjunction of actual and possible points of view. The point
of view an object currently presents to us corresponds to that part of an
experience's content which Husserl calls a "filled intention". While the other
points of view an object affords which are not currently presented to us
Husserl says are "emptily intended".
Husserl claims that the points of view on an object that are not currently
presented to us form a part of the content of an experience as much as
those parts that are seen. We do not perceive facades of things but three-
dimensional entities whose features go beyond those presented to us. How
do I come to represent an object as having features beyond those that I
currently perceive? Husserl's answer to this question is to claim that I form
an interpretation or hypothesis about what I would see if I were to take up a
different point of view on an object. This interpretation or hypothesis takes
as its evidence the properties of the thing that are sensibly presented to
me.35 Every perceptual act is composed of parts that are sensory and
interpretative.36 Husserl calls the interpretative part of the perceptual act, the
"noesis", the Greek word for intelligence or understanding. The sensory part
of an act he refers to variously as "hyletic data", "sense data" and sometimes
35
Here I am following an interpretation of Husserl defended by Kelly (2003). Kelly cites
passages from Husserl's (1907) lectures in support of his interpretation.
6
Husserl doesn't think of perception as the outcome of two distinct acts, a purely sensory
act and an act of interpretation or judgement, as do sense-datum theorists. (See for instance,
Broad (1923) and Maund (2003)) Instead he will describe various acts of interpretation or
sense-bestowal that take place within the perceptual act itself.
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simply as "hyle". The fundamental role assigned to the noesis is that of
giving meaning (Sinngebung) to those properties of the object that are
sensibly presented to a subject.37
Sensations supply the subject with evidence about the structural and
qualitative aspects of the thing s/he perceives. This evidence constrains the
subsequent perceptual acts of interpretation. Consider in this light what I see
when I see an object moving away from me. The change that takes place in
my visual field acts as evidence for the interpretation I give my experience.
To perceive that the object is moving away from me is, for instance, to
anticipate that it will continue to shrink in size as it gets further away. This
expectation I have about how the size of the object will appear to me to
continue to change forms a part of the representational content of my
experience. Husserl claims that I come to experience the movement of this
object in the way I do because there is this change in my sensory field which
I interpret as the movement of an object. Moreover a part of the
interpretation I bestow on my experience involves an expectation about how
the appearance of the object's size will continue to change with its
movements.38
We should by now be getting a sense of how Husserl makes sense of the
claim that our experiences have their intentional content before we take up
any relation to the world. I take the object of my experience to have certain
features that are not currently perceived by me. These are features I take
the object to have in advance of taking up a relation to them and as it were
37 See Husserl (1913/1982: §85). It should be noted that a significant change took place in
Husserl's work towards the end of his career. He became increasingly concerned with the
genesis of the various items we find in consciousness. (See for instance Husserl
(1932/1973)) An important aspect of this shift in Husserl's thinking was a rejection of the
distinction between sensation and intentional content I have just introduced, so we shouldn't
place too much importance on the latter distinction.5)8
See Husserl (1913/1982: §85)
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perceiving them for myself. They are represented in the form of hypotheses
about what further exploration of the object would reveal of the object.
The initial interpretation a subject gives the sensory part of its experience
together with the anticipations a subject forms about the possible
experiences it could have of the same object fix an experience's correctness
conditions. In both cases the correctness conditions that are assigned to an
experience is something which is decided by the way an experience seems
to its subject. On the basis of the sensory part of an experience the subject
takes an object to have certain sensory properties like a colour, shape, size,
and texture. The hypotheses the subject forms, fill out further conditions that
must obtain if the experience is to correctly represent the world.
While Husserl characterises our perceptual experiences as representing
features that are hypothesised in their absence, Merleau-Ponty (who I shall
have speak on behalf of the existential phenomenologists) describes those
features as present in our perceptual experience but indeterminately.39 It is
here that the difference between Husserl's idealism and Merleau-Ponty's
realism is at its most pronounced. While for Husserl the object is the sum of
the possible points of view we can take on it40, this is not the case for
Merleau-Ponty. This is why he can speak of the features of the objects that
are not sensibly presented to us as nevertheless being there in some
positive sense.41 They are "there" not just as possible points of view we
could represent. Rather these are features the object is perceived to have
positively, albeit in an indeterminate manner. Unlike Husserl, Merleau-Ponty
39
Kelly (forthcoming) discusses this difference at length.
40
Husserl says for instance: "Something objective is nothing other than the synthetic unity of
actual and potential intentionality..." (Husserl, 1969: 242)
41 See Merleau-Ponty (1962: 6) where he says that phenomenology must recognise "the
indeterminate as a positive phenomenon". By the "indeterminate" I take him to mean
features of the object that are experienced but not as determinate features of the object. For
further discussion of Merleau-Ponty on perceptual indeterminacy see Kelly (2004) and my
discussion in chapter 7 section 4 and 5.
140
Consciousness and Intentionality
thinks of the parts of an object that are hidden from us as in a real sense
perceived. They are not just hypothesised. Merleau-Ponty must explain in
what sense a thing's hidden aspects are perceived when they are not
sensibly presented to a subject.
Merleau-Ponty claims that anything we perceive is perceived as having a
place within a perceptual field. According to Merleau-Ponty the simplest
units of experience are not sensations of, for instance, colour or smell, size
or shape. Rather what we perceive is a fully formed figure appearing against
a background. I can at the moment perceive my laptop surrounded by
books, papers, pens and other assorted paraphernalia that furnish my desk.
The screen of my laptop constitutes the figure in my current experience,
while the other items on my desk form the background to this experience.
The items that make up the background form a part of what I perceive but I
perceive them in a different way to the screen of my laptop. The things that
surround my laptop are present in my perceptual experience but not
determinately. Merleau-Ponty will say the same about an object's hidden
aspects - those features of an object which are not currently sensibly
presented to me. An object's hidden aspects form a part of the background
- they are present in my experience but not determinately so.
To grasp the difference between a determinate and indeterminate
presentation think of the difference between being told the measurement of a
room and seeing the size of a room for oneself.42 Measurements are of
course determinate representations. They are context independent
representations in the sense that one does not need to know anything about
context in order to know what size a room is when one is given its
42
I borrow this example from Kelly (2003). Peacocke (1989b) uses a similar example in
explaining the difference between analog and digital representation. Kelly wants to make




dimensions. Merleau-Ponty will claim that the same is not true of seeing a
room's size. The experience one has in this case is context dependent.
One perceives the size of the room in this case not in terms of determinate
dimensions but in terms of what one can do within the space. One might
perceive for instance the arrangement of the furniture in the space and get a
sense of how one could arrange one's own furniture.
The difference between a determinate and indeterminate representation
can be characterised in terms of context-dependence. A determinate
representation is context-independent, in that one doesn't need to know
anything about context to know what is represented. An indeterminate
representation is however context-dependent, in the sense that one does
need to know the context to know what is represented.
We have seen something of how Merleau-Ponty draws a distinction
between what is presented determinately and what is presented
indeterminately. What does he mean when he says that items in the
background are presented in perception including an object's hidden aspects
even if they are not sensibly presented? I take him to mean that an object's
hidden aspects are represented in perception because the object itself forms
a part of a perceptual experience's content. An object forms a part of an
experience's content by for instance, shaping the ways in which we direct our
behaviour towards it. Think of reaching for a cup at the side of one's bed.
One directs one's movements towards the place where the cup is standing
and shapes one hand according to the shape of the cup. The subject uses
the cup that is present in her perceptual experience to guide her reaching
and grasping behaviour. But of course she isn't seeing all of the cup but only
a side of it that is presented to her. Still the other sides are present in her
perceptual experience guiding her movements. We are positively aware of
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an object's hidden aspects by being prepared to deal with it. One of the
ways in which we manifest this preparedness is by moving our body in ways
that may or may not accord with the object's hidden properties. The object
reveals itself to me through the behaviours I direct towards it.
For the existential phenomenologist then our intentional states have their
contents before we take up a relation to the world through our knowing how
to deal with things. Merleau-Ponty has illustrated one way in which this case
by describing the way in which when reaching to take hold of an object our
body is prepared to deal with a thing of a certain shape, size and so on.
These properties are not represented as determinate quantities, but are
represented instead in terms of how we should direct our movements if we
are to succeed in reaching and grasping the thing we are directing our
behaviour towards. For the existential phenomenologists then it is a mistake
to think of intentionality in terms of a relation between a subject and the
world because intentional directedness is made possible by a certain kind of
understanding. In the case just described it is an understanding of space
which is manifested in our knowing how we should direct our movements if
we are to succeed in our goal-directed behaviours. We could just as well
have spoken of the understanding which Heidegger describes a subject as
having when he knows how to deal with things that are ready-to-hand or
available to be used as pieces of equipment.
By now the reader might be wondering what all this has to do with
consciousness. We started out discussing phenomenal properties, those
properties in virtue of which an experience seems or feels a certain way to its
subject. We have finished up discussing the understanding a subject has
which enables her to direct her behaviour successfully. It will be objected
that the existential phenomenologist is describing such a radically different
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concept of the subject and its place in the world as to leave entirely
untouched the problems with which we started. I have a short answer to this
objection and a longer answer which I will present in the next chapter.
The short answer is to say that the problem of phenomenal consciousness
is really a problem about intentionality. Phenomenal properties just are
representational properties, but the representational properties in question
are peculiar: they are representational properties that are constituted by the
way an experience presents the world as seeming or feeling to a subject.
Existential phenomenology claims that the phenomenology of our everyday
experiences manifests a certain kind of understanding, an understanding we
have when we know how to find our way about in the world. An experience
represents what it does in virtue of this understanding.
There is however something right about the objection that we seemed to
have simply changed the subject. There is a question philosophers ask
about consciousness which has been left untouched by my discussion of
intentionality in the latter half of this chapter. The question asks why there is
something rather than nothing it is like to have experiences. The account of
intentionality I have been outlining tells us why our experiences seem or feel
the way they do. It has turned out that our experiences seem or feel the way
they do because of the understanding a person has of himself and the world
he inhabits along with other persons. This doesn't tell us why our
experiences should present the world as seeming, or should themselves feel
like anything at all. Phenomenologists do have an answer to this question.
Their answer, as we shall see in the next chapter, depends on the
controversial claim that every conscious experience is also self-conscious.
Before I explore how this claim can help explain why our experiences
should have any phenomenal character whatsoever, I will briefly return to the
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intentionalist thesis which claims that phenomenal properties are subject-
independent. I have presented the phenomenologist's case for thinking of
our experiences as having representational properties that are subject-
dependent. I will finish up by assessing the intentionalist claim that our
experiences have the phenomenal properties they do by representing
entities and properties that are subject-independent.
6. The Intentionalist Argument for Subject-Independence
Intentionalists argue for the subject-independence of phenomenal properties
in two stages. The first stage in their argument aims to establish that while
some concepts are experience dependent no properties are subject-
dependent. A property is subject-dependent if its identity depends on a
subject and its point of view. A concept is experience-dependent if to
possess the concept a subject has to have had certain experiences. The
intentionalist allows that phenomenal concepts - the concepts we employ in
introspective reflection - are in this sense experience-dependent but he
denies that phenomenal properties are subject-dependent.
Tye (2000, ch.2) for instance has argued that to possess a phenomenal
concept C one must have had experiences of a certain type E for oneself. A
phenomenal concept is a concept one employs when one introspects on an
experience and forms a conception of what it is like to undergo this
experience. One can form a conception of what it is like to undergo an
experience only by having the experience for oneself.43 Thus there are good
43
Tye supports this claim by arguing that no amount of description of pain, theoretical or
otherwise, could convey knowledge of pain to our subject. For Tye takes phenomenal
concepts to be what he calls "directly recognitional concepts". It is a part of the functional
role that phenomenal concepts play that they enable a subject to recognise a phenomenal
property directly just by introspecting on his experience. Phenomenal concepts do not pick
out their referents via descriptions. Hence no amount of description will confer on one,
mastery of a phenomenal concept. One can acquire mastery of a phenomenal concept only
by having the kind of experience the phenomenal concept has as its referent.
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reasons for thinking that phenomenal concepts must be experience
dependent.
The intentionalist goes on to argue that those philosophers who take
phenomenal properties to be essentially subjective have been misled by this
feature of phenomenal concepts. There is a gap that separates our
theoretical from our phenomenal concepts: mastery of theoretical concepts
doesn't suffice to confer on a subject mastery of phenomenal concepts. It
doesn't follow that the properties that phenomenal concepts pick out are
distinct properties from those picked out by our theoretical concepts. Nor
does it follow that phenomenal properties are likewise experience-
dependent. In fact nothing about the nature of phenomenal properties
follows from the nature of phenomenal concepts. Philosophers have been
misled by the role that experience plays in possession of phenomenal
concepts into thinking that phenomenal properties must also be subject-
dependent. There are no subject-dependent properties; at most all that is
true is that some of our concepts are experience-dependent.44
The second stage in the intentionalist argument purports to show that
phenomenal properties are properties belonging to a subject's external
environment, which can when all goes well, enter into the contents of our
experience. It is this second thesis that carries the weight in the intentionalist
argument for subject-independence. The intentionalist claims that
experiences get their representational content from the relation a subject
stands in to features of his external environment. I can stand in the very
same relation as you have stood in and thereby have the same experiences
as you. Thus it follows that phenomenal properties are not subject-
44
Tye, Papineau and Loar have all run arguments along these lines. Peacocke (1989a) also
worries that any argument for subjective facts might rest on a sense-reference conflation.
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dependent. There is nothing about phenomenal properties that essentially
involves a subject and its point of view.
Such an argument is to be found in Dretske (1995: ch.3). He imagines a
scientist called Mary who wants to know what it is like to experience electric
fields. Mary has complete knowledge of electromagnetic phenomena, but
she doesn't have an electromagnetic sense so she cannot experience
electromagnetic fields for herself. Does this mean there is something about
electric fields Mary doesn't know, namely what it is like to experience them?
Dretske thinks not. Dogfish sense their environments by means of an
electromagnetic sense. Dretske claims that Mary can know what the
experiences of the dogfish are like. Thus she can know what it is like to
experience electric fields:
"If the dogfish's electromagnetic sense is functioning normally, then it is
representing patterns in the electric field...Mary, who knows all about
electric fields and how fish, rocks and plants deform them, could draw an
exact picture of the field. What she draws (describes, represents or
knows) about the electric field is what the fish senses about the electric
field in which it finds itself. What she draws...is what the fish
senses...Mary draws, describes, represents and knows what it is like to be
a dogfish (vertically) sensing that kind of field." (Dretske, 1995: 84-5)
Dretske's reasoning seems to be that once Mary knows what the dogfish is
sensing when it is sensing vertically, she can represent the very same thing.
This will give her knowledge of what the experiences of the dogfish are like.
If Dretske is right, one need not have the distinctively dogfish-like way of
experiencing the wort in order to know what dogfish-experiences are like.
There is nothing essentially dogfish-like about dogfish experiences. The
radically different sensory constitution of dogfish doesn't even hinder our
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knowledge of what dogfish experiences are like. All we need to know to
acquire the latter kind of knowledge is what dogfish represent when their
electromagnetic sense is functioning normally. Knowing what dogfish
normally represent when they are using their electromagnetic sense will tell
us what dogfish-experiences are like.
The crucial premise in this argument claims that phenomenal properties
are "the properties the object being perceived has when the perception is
veridical" (Dretske, 1995: 84). By establishing which properties the dogfish
represents when its perceptual experiences are veridical we can know what
its experiences are like.
Tye holds a similar position. He proposes a version of the causal
covariation theory of representational content. On this view of
representational content, an experience represents a phenomenal property
by tracking this property under normal or optimal conditions. Tye offers the
following analysis of a representational state S with the content that P:
"If optimal conditions were to obtain, S would be tokened in c iff P were
the case; moreover, in these circumstances, S would be tokened in c
because P is the case." (Tye, 2000: 136)
Suppose that P is the pleasing to the ear sound a saxophone makes when it
is being played well. Tye has it that an experience S would represent P iff
when optimal conditions obtain there is indeed a saxophone being played
well. On this account of representational content, phenomenal properties
belong to the things which an experience would causally covary with under
optimal conditions. Again we can know what a creature's experience is like




The intentionalist's argument doesn't establish the subject-independence
of phenomenal properties. Phenomenologists could agree that we can know
what an experience is like just by knowing what it is an experience
represents. They can nevertheless hold that what our experiences represent
is, in general, something subject-dependent. Both Husserlian and existential
phenomenologists take intentionality to derive in some way from a conscious
subject. We have seen how Husserl takes intentionality to originate with the
conscious subject conceived of as a self-sufficient, self-contained entity
capable of existence independently, apart from the world. For the existential
phenomenologist intentionality has its origins in our existence as persons
who know how to find their way about in the world. The phenomenologist
can agree that an experience has its phenomenal properties in virtue of what
this experience represents. However they also hold that what our
experiences represent is something subject-dependent.45
So the claim that an experience seems or feels a certain way in virtue of
what it represents does nothing to establish the subject-independence of
phenomenal properties. Certainly the above line of argument would, if
successful, undercut the claim of the qualia-realist that phenomenal
properties belong to experiences intrinsically. It doesn't however establish
the conclusion that phenomenal properties are subject-independent. These
45
This last point is somewhat complicated by the existential phenomenologist's realism
argued for in chapter 2. There it was argued that entities exist independently of our
understanding of them. The claim that "entities exist independently of us" was understood as
the claim that space and time do not depend on us for their existence. What existential
phenomenology doesn't allow is the possibility of experiencing entities independently of our
understanding. It is true that one of the recurrent themes in the writings of Heidegger, Sartre
and Merleau-Ponty is the experience of nature as radically indifferent to us and our projects.
When Heidegger notoriously claimed "the nothing noths" in his essay 'What is Metaphysics?'
he was attempting to describe this type of experience. Such experiences do not show that
we can experience entities independent of our understanding of them. On the contrary to
experience something as indifferent to us is precisely to understand it in a certain way. Thus
existential phenomenologists are no less committed to the subject-dependence of the objects




are distinct questions, and the above line of argument does not establish the
latter conclusion.
The dispute between the phenomenologist and the intentionalist will only
be resolved once we have an adequate account of intentionality. The
phenomenologist claims that no naturalistic account of intentionality will
succeed that fails to recognise the property of purporting to refer as
explanatorily basic. I suspect they are right about this, but this is not
something I can argue for here.
This section has shown the intentionalist argument for subject-
independence is at best inconclusive. The remainder of the chapter has
made a positive argument for the subject-dependence of phenomenal
properties while at the same time agreeing with the intentionalist that
phenomenal properties are representational properties. I have sought to
show how representational properties can be subject-dependent. In the next
chapter I will explore how this account can be further developed to explain
why it is that there is something our experiences seem or feel like to us.
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Chapter 5
Introduction
I have been arguing that phenomenology can help us to diagnose why
naturalistic accounts of the conscious mind run into an explanatory gap. My
aim is to argue for the possibility of a naturalised phenomenology which can
help the naturalist to close this gap. At the end of the last chapter a worry
was raised that the phenomenological account of why things feel and seem
as they do leaves untouched a central question that naturalists have
addressed when thinking about the explanatory gap. The ideas I have
introduced from phenomenology do not explain why there should be
something rather than nothing it is like for a subject to undergo a conscious
experience. This chapter will be concerned with introducing the
phenomenologist's answer to this question.
I shall describe experiences that seem or feel a certain way to their
subjects as experiences that have "phenomenal character". The question
this chapter has as its concern asks what it is for an experience to have a
phenomenal character. In section 1 I propose an answer to this question.
There I will argue that an experience seems or feels a certain way to a
subject when a subject can have knowledge of an experience he is
undergoing from the inside without having recourse to observation or
inference. I shall call knowledge of this kind "first-person knowledge". A
subject can have first-person knowledge of his experiences I shall claim
because they seem or feel a certain way to him. Thus an answer to the
question of what it is for an experience to have a phenomenal character, I
will suggest, lies with an explanation of how we can have first-person
knowledge of our experiences.
In section 2 I set out two conceptions of phenomenal character both of
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which are agreed that phenomenal properties are nothing over and above
representational properties. The first claims that phenomenal character is
something of which a subject is conscious. The second denies that
phenomenal character is something of which the subject is conscious,
claiming instead that it is something with which the subject is conscious. We
shall see that the first conception of phenomenal character marries up with
higher-order theories of consciousness which claim that an experience is
phenomenally conscious only if the subject represents that she is undergoing
this experience.1 The second conception of phenomenal character fits with
an intentionalist account of phenomenal consciousness. I shall argue that
standard intentionalist accounts of consciousness do not give us a satisfying
answer to the question of how we can know our experiences from the inside.
I look to an account of Brentano to see if he succeeds in finessing the
problem. However I find his account wanting.
In section 3 I introduce an intentionalist account of phenomenal
consciousness which originates in Husserl, and was developed in greater
depth by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. It claims that every conscious
experience has built into it a variety of self-consciousness. Sartre calls the
kind of self-consciousness in question "pre-reflective self-consciousness" to
distinguish it from self-consciousness that is the outcome of introspective
reflection. It is this second proposal which I will argue supplies the
intentionalist with an account of phenomenal character. On this view an
experience has phenomenal character when it is pre-reflectively self-
conscious.
By section 4 we will have two distinct accounts of phenomenal character
1
Higher-order theories come in different forms. Lycan (1996) defends a version of higher-
order perception theory. Rosenthal (1986; 1990/1997 & 1993) and Carruthers (2000) defend
different versions of higher-order thought theory.
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before us. The first proposal defended by higher-order theories of
consciousness says an experience has phenomenal character when a
subject represents herself having this experience. The second says an
experience has phenomenal character when this experience has built into it
pre-reflective self-consciousness. Section 4 presents an argument from
Sartre for the conclusion that conscious experiences are also pre-reflectively
self-conscious. If successful this argument will serve to further motivate the
phenomenologist's account of phenomenal character over the rival proposal
of the higher-order theorist. We will see that Sartre's argument succeeds
against higher-order theories of consciousness only by assuming that there
are no unconscious mental states. This is of course an assumption that
higher-order theories reject.
In section 5 I offer an alternative argument against higher-order theories
based on Sartre's argument. Sartre's argument is directed at theories which
equate self-consciousness with self-knowledge. I argue that higher-order
theories fit this description, and that there are certain features of self-
consciousness which theories of this kind cannot accommodate. I conclude
by showing how the account of phenomenal character I have proposed helps
us to clarify the charge that naturalists cannot admit the existence of
subjective facts.
1. Pinpointing the Problem
The question that will occupy us in this chapter is why it should be that there
is something rather than nothing it is like for a subject to undergo a
conscious experience. The difference between experiences there is
something it is like to have, and experiences there is nothing it is like to have,
turns on the presence or absence of a certain kind of consciousness I have
153
Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and First-Person Knowledge
been calling "phenomenal consciousness". I shall begin by considering how
to draw the contrast between those states that are phenomenally conscious
and those that are not.
This problem is particularly urgent for any intentionalist account of
phenomenal properties which says that an experience seems or feels a
certain way for a subject in virtue of its representational properties. All kinds
of systems and devices represent the world as being a certain way that lack
phenomenal consciousness. My homeostatic system represents the level of
glucose in my blood, but the representations it produces will not be ones
which make me conscious of anything. What distinguishes cases of
representation like this from the kinds of representational states that do
make me conscious of something? By endorsing intentionalism I have
denied that there is anything over and above an experience's
representational properties that gives an experience its phenomenal
character. This leaves me needing to explain what differentiates those
representational properties that give a representational state its phenomenal
character from those that do not. The objection raised at the end of the last
chapter was that so far, the phenomenologically-inspired version of
intentionalism I have proposed hasn't given us an answer to this question.
I believe an answer to our question lies in the peculiar kind of first-person
knowledge a subject can have of his phenomenally conscious mental states.
A subject can know what it is like to undergo an experience from the inside,
which is to say that a subject can know what an experience is like just by
having that experience. If an experience doesn't have any phenomenal
character, a subject cannot know the experience from the inside - he cannot
know the experience just by having it. Perhaps we can say that the
difference between representational states that make a creature conscious
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of something and those that do not lies in the epistemic access we have to
the former but not the latter. We can say that there is something it is like for
a creature to be in a representational state R when a creature is in a position
to know that it is in R "from the inside", just by tokening R. There is nothing it
is like for a creature to be in a representational state R when a creature
cannot have this kind of first-person knowledge of R.2
I shall say that a creature can have first person knowledge of a
representational state R if R meets the following two, closely related,
conditions:
(1) A creature X can have direct knowledge that it is in R without first
having to form observations either of itself, or of anything else, and
(2) A creature X can have immediate knowledge that it is in R, which is to
say that X can know that it is in R without performing any conscious act of
inference.
First-person knowledge is introspective knowledge: the kind of knowledge a
subject can achieve by deliberately reflecting on or paying attention to a
thought or experience he is having at the time.3 When we focus on an itch,
tingle or pain we thereby make the sensation we are undergoing into the
2
Some might complain that this proposal ignores Block's (1995/1997) distinction between
"access" consciousness and "phenomenal consciousness". A state is access conscious for
Block if 'it is poised for free use in reasoning and for direct "rational control" of speech and
action', (ibid, 382) I have stipulated that something akin to this condition must be met if an
experience is to have phenomenal character. The only way I can see to defend Block's
distinction is to accept the existence of what Block calls "p-conscious properties" which are
distinct from any cognitive, intentional or functional property (see Block, 1995/1997: 381). In
chapter 4 I proposed a version of intentionalism which denies that p-conscious properties are
distinct from intentional properties. Thus I reject Block's distinction because it seems to
require a commitment to phenomenal properties conceived of as something over and above
an experience's intentional properties.
3
Whether this act of reflection is best understood as a kind of inner-perception is a question I
shall ignore for now. For a defence of an understanding of introspection along these lines
see Armstrong (1968) and for some trenchant and to my mind persuasive criticism see
Shoemaker (1994/1996, lecture 2). I will postpone discussion of this question till later in
section 5.
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object of our reflection. Normally, we will in this way arrive at knowledge of
what we feel: we will come to know that we are undergoing a particular
sensory experience. In a similar fashion we can make a belief the object of
an act of reflection: I might consider for instance whether I believe that Tony
Blair can be trusted. By considering my attitude to this proposition I come to
know something about myself, I come to know whether this is something I
believe.
It is only my own experiences which I can know in the first-person: no
other subject can know my experiences from the inside, and nor can I know
of another subject's experiences in this way.4 The difference between first-
person knowledge and what I shall call "third-person knowledge" can be
traced to a difference in the warrant I have for these respective types of
knowledge-claims. The warrant I have for my first-person knowledge-claims
derives from my experience's phenomenal character, from the way my
experiences present the world as seeming to me. What I know directly and
immediately is the way an experience presents the world as seeming. The
warrant I have for the claims I make about the experiences of another
person, come from the observations I form of that person and the inferences
I make based on those observations. I can know I am feeling silk just by
having an experience of the feel of the silk, but I cannot know that another
person is feeling silk except by seeing them pick it up and feel it or by having
them tell me this is what they are experiencing. I cannot know the
experiences of another person from the inside; only they can know their
experiences in this way. Hence the claims we make about another's persons
4
This is certainly not to deny that I can have knowledge of another subject's experiences.
What I cannot have is first-person knowledge of their experiences. I will call the knowledge I
can of another person's mind, "third-person knowledge". We shall see later that third-person
knowledge is distinguished from first-person knowledge by the kind of warrant I have for
assertions made in the first-person.
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experiences do not derive their warrant from an experience's phenomenal
character in the way that the claims we make about our own experiences do.
I have proposed that we use the first-person knowledge a subject can
have of his experiences as an initial way of distinguishing those
representational states that have a phenomenal character from those that do
not. We can now see how this might work. The states which I can know
directly and immediately are states which I can know from the inside just by
having them. I can know of these states just by having them because these
states have phenomenal character. It is because there is a way these states
seem or feel to me that I can know them from the inside just by having them.
If there is no way a state seems or feels to me when it occurs I will not be
able to know it in this way, just by having it.
If we combine this suggestion with the intentionalist thesis that the way an
object seems to a subject is fully determined by its representational
properties what results is the following thesis:
(KREP) A thought or experience R presents the world as seeming a
certain way when a subject can have first-person knowledge of R's
representational properties.
(KREP) claims we can know what it is like to undergo an experience from the
inside, and this is surely right: we do for the most part know what it is like to
undergo our own experiences just by having them. It strikes us as far¬
fetched to raise doubts about my sincere claim that "I am currently in pain".5
5
Wittgenstein (1953: 246) famously goes as far as to claim that it is for this reason a mistake
to talk of a subject's knowing he is in pain at all. We talk of knowledge only where there is
room for doubt, but since there is little or no room for doubt in cases like this one, it makes no
sense to talk of a subject's knowing he is in pain. If Wittgenstein is right (KREP) looks
misconceived: (KREP) talks of us having knowledge of our experiences but Wittgenstein tells
us such talk is at best misplaced.
Utterances of the form "I know I am experiencing x" seem to me to be meaningful and to
carry information that isn't carried simply by saying "I am experiencing x". I take our talk of
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This, I take it, is because we have a warrant for such assertions that derives
from the consciousness that attaches to them. To doubt a sincere utterance
of "I am currently in pain" is to question whether a person does indeed have
warrant for making such an utterance. This is something it doesn't occur to
us to do because a person that says sincerely that they are in pain is a
person that is conscious of being in pain. Just by consciously experiencing
pain such a person has warrant for saying they are in pain.
(KREP) doesn't attribute infallibility to a subject: it allows that a subject
may well be mistaken when he says he is feeling something painful. The
subject may for instance be hypnotised so that he believes that lemons taste
sweet. We wouldn't say that such a subject knows that the lemon he has
just eaten tastes sweet to him, since beliefs formed as a result of hypnotism
have not been formed in the right way to count as knowledge. (KREP)
doesn't require us to say that this subject knows that when he tastes a
lemon, the experience he has just had is of something that tastes sweet.
(KREP) claims only that a subject could know this in a direct and immediate
way. Saying that a subject could have first-person knowledge of his
experiences is quite consistent with allowing that a subject may on occasion
fail to achieve such knowledge.
One difficulty for (KREP) is that it seems to conflict with the transparency
of experience which the intentionalist is so keen to stress.6 It suggests that
first-person knowledge to be significant because it communicates something of the distinctive
kind of warrant that attaches to first-person knowledge as contrasted with third-person
knowledge - knowledge of another person's experiences. For a further discussion of
Wittgenstein on first-person knowledge with which I am in full agreement see Siewert (1998:
pp.27-33).
For the use that intentionalists make of transparency, see Harman (1990/1997) and Tye
(1992). Martin (2003) uses transparency type considerations to raise difficulties for an
intentionalist account of conscious experience. It should be noted that Tye isn't as careful as
he might have been in his discussion of transparency. In a much quoted passage Tye tells
us that when he found himself transfixed by the blue of the Pacific Ocean what he was
enjoying was "an aspect of the content of his experience" {ibid, 160). If our experiences have
the contents they do in virtue of their representational properties, it follows that what Tye was
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when a subject gains introspective knowledge of her experiences she comes
to know the representational properties of her experience. The intentionalist
will object that when one introspects, one doesn't find anything like an
experience and its representational properties. Instead one finds items
belonging to the public world and their properties. This suggests that the
knowledge we gain of our experiences through introspection isn't knowledge
of an experience's representational properties, but is rather knowledge of
whatever is represented.7
I take it that accommodating something like this worry is the motivation for
Dretske's (1995: ch.2) accounts of introspection as "displaced perception".
He says that we come to know what an experience is like through the
awareness we have the objects of our experience in much the same way as
we come to know of our weight by means of bathroom scales.8 We do not
come to know what an experience is like by coming to know of its
representational properties, but only by coming to know what an experience
represents.
If (KREP) is to be made compatible with transparency we must modify its
enjoying was the representational properties of his experience.
I shall argue that if we are to do full justice to the claim that experiences are transparent
we must think of introspection as making us aware of whatever it is our experience
represents. Dretske offers an account of introspection which acknowledges this point. I take
Dretske to be committed to denying that "what is immediately accessible to consciousness"
to borrow Tye's words, is an experience's content, though I have not managed to find
anywhere where he says as much. In any case, I shall say that it is not an experience's
representational properties that are immediately accessible to me when I introspect. An
experience's representational properties are properties of the experience qua
representational vehicle, and I have no access to those properties. Rather what is made
accessible to me when I introspect is whatever it is, if anything, that my experience
represents at the time. This will mean revising the formulation of KREP somewhat as we
shall see in due course.
7
This characterisation of introspective knowledge doesn't require us to deny that there is any
difference between first-person and third-person knowledge. It can allow that we know our
own experiences directly and immediately whereas we know the experiences of others only
via observations. For an account of introspection along the line just sketched which
nevertheless recognises the distinction between first-person and third-person knowledge, see
Evans (1982, ch.7, §7.4) and Dretske (1995, ch.2, pp.51-4).
8 Dretske (1995: 41)
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formulation to allow that what a subject knows in the first-person isn't an
experience's representational properties, but is rather whatever the
experience represents by means of those properties. I propose then that we
revise (KREP) as follows:
(KREP*): An experience E seems or feels a certain way iff a subject can
have first-person knowledge of whatever E represents.
We should now have a better sense of the question this chapter will address
and the strategy I will employ for answering it. The question asks: what is
the difference between representational states that make a subject
conscious of something and those that do not? I have said that a
representational state makes a subject conscious of something - it presents
the world as seeming or feeling some way - when it can be known from the
inside just by being in it. My strategy for answering our question is to
establish just how it is that the representational states which make us
conscious of something can be known from the inside. How is it that a
subject can know he is in a particular representational state just by being in
that representational state? Answering this question will tell us what it is for
a representational state to have phenomenal character.
In the next section we shall see that there are two possible answers to this
question. The first appeals to something extrinsic to a representational state
to explain how it gets its phenomenal character. The second answer makes
phenomenal character something intrinsic to a representational state. The
first task we face then will be to decide between these two possibilities.
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2. Two Conceptions of Phenomenal Character
(KREP) in both of its formulations is consistent with two distinct ways of
thinking about an experience's phenomenal character.9 We can think of
phenomenal character as something of which the subject is consciously
aware. Alternatively we can think of it as something with which a subject is
consciously aware of the world. Any answer to our question of why there is
something rather than nothing an experience is like must decide between
these two conceptions of phenomenal character.
To get a better fix on these two conceptions consider by way of illustration
the experience one has when tasting honey. The first conception of
phenomenal character has it that the sweet taste is something of which the
subject is conscious. The sweetness the subject experiences is itself
something of which the subject is conscious.10 On the second conception of
phenomenal character, the sweetness is something the subject experiences
in virtue of his sensory experience's intentional content. As such it is
something with which the subject is conscious of the honey. The conscious
experience is understood as that by means of which a subject's
consciousness is directed towards a particular object, in this case the honey.
The first conception of phenomenal character is naturally combined with
9
I am indebted here to Rowlands (2001, ch.6). Rowlands notes that "Consciousness can be
both object and act of experience. Metaphorically speaking, consciousness can be both the
directing of awareness and that upon which experience is directed. Consciousness can
include both experiential features of which we are aware, and experiential features with which
we are aware." (op cit, 122 ) While Rowlands recognises that there are these two distinct
ways of conceiving of consciousness he argues against what he calls an "objectualist"
conception of phenomenal character as something of which the subject is aware.
10
A proponent of the first conception of phenomenology isn't committed to the existence of
irreducibly phenomenal properties of the kind discussed in chapter 3. He could say that
when a subject is conscious of an experience's phenomenology he brings to bear certain
recognitional capacities. He might be recognising for instance the property in virtue of which
something is experienced as tasting sweet. On this view an experience seems or feels a
certain way by being made available to certain recognitional capacities in virtue of which a
creature can discriminate among an experience's representational contents. For an account
along these lines see Carruthers (2001).
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higher-order theories of consciousness. Higher-order theories claim that a
mental state has phenomenal character only if a subject is conscious of
being in that mental state. A perceptual experience won't seem or feel any
way to a subject unless the subject is conscious of having this experience. A
perceptual experience might well represent a creature's local environment as
being a certain way; it may for instance represent some object as coloured.
The experience the subject is having of a coloured object won't seem a
certain way to the creature unless it is conscious of having this experience.
On this account of consciousness, phenomenal character makes a subject
conscious of things in her environment only if she is first conscious of having
an experience of those things. It is only if a subject is conscious of having
this experience that she will enjoy an experience that seems or feels a
certain way.
The second conception fits with the intentionalist account of
consciousness, according to which phenomenal character is something with
which the subject is conscious of things in its environment, but is not
something of which the subject is conscious. The intentionalist claims that
conscious experiences are nothing but vehicles for making a subject
conscious of things in its local environment. The experience isn't itself
something of which the subject is conscious until the subject turns his gaze
inward, and in the process makes an experience the explicit object of his
attention. Otherwise his attention is with whatever he is experiencing.
However the intentionalist still owes us an account of how a
representational state can be known from the inside. Tye (1995) gives us
what looks like an answer to this question. He tells us that an experience
has phenomenal character when its content is Poised Abstract
Nonconceptual Intentional Content, which he abbreviates as PANIC.
162
Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and First-Person Knowledge
Representations that differ in their PANICs differ in their phenomenal
character. A representation has a content that is poised when it 'stands
ready and in position to make an impact on the belief/desire system.' (Tye,
1995: 138)
Flowever to account for knowability from the inside in terms of poise is to
presuppose what one sets out to explain. If am right an experience exhibits
what Tye calls "poise" only because it has phenomenal character. Appealing
to poise cannot explain what it is for a state to possess phenomenal
character. Poise has built into it the property it is supposed to explain. At
least this will follow if we accept (KREP*) - the claim that what it is for an
experience to present the world as seeming a certain way is for that
experience to be knowable from the inside.
Higher-order theories are designed to answer the question of what makes
a state knowable from the inside. They say a state is like something for a
subject when a creature is either disposed to produce, or actually produces,
a higher-order representation of a thought or experience he is having. In this
respect, higher-order theories of consciousness look to have an advantage
over intentionalism. We shall see however that this advantage is only
superficial. Although Tye's account is unsatisfactory, I will suggest that the
phenomenologists succeed where he fails. Thus it will turn out that we have
two rival accounts of what it is for a state to have phenomenal character.
The story begins with Brentano. Following the famous chapter on
intentionality in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano set
about defining what it is for a thought or experience to be conscious.11 Our
conscious thoughts and experience he argues are directed towards two
11
Brentano's own view is introduced in §7 of Chapter 2 entitled 'A Presentation and the
Presentation of that Presentation are Given in One and the Same Act.'
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objects. First we are conscious of what Brentano calls a "primary object".
We can call this kind of consciousness "outer consciousness" since it is
consciousness that is directed outwards to something extra-mental in the
world. The primary object is the intentional object which a thought or
experience is directed towards. Drawing on Husserl I suggested in the
previous chapter that we think of the intentional object as an object the
thought or experience purports to represent, where "object" is to be
construed in a broad sense as including a thing, event, process, condition or
state of affairs.
Brentano claims that in addition to being directed towards a primary object
conscious experiences can also be directed upon themselves. Consider the
experience of hearing a sound. The sound is the primary object, and the
experience of hearing the sound is a secondary object. An experience
represents a primary object (the sound) by purporting to refer to a sound
originating from something in the subject's local environment. At the same
time it represents a secondary object, its own occurrence, by being directed
upon itself. The consciousness a subject has of an experience she is having
we can call "inner consciousness". Brentano's claim is that a single
representational state can instantiate both inner and outer consciousness.
Does this Brentanian account of consciousness supply the intentionalist
with an account of phenomenal character? Let us consider first how
Brentano might have understood phenomenal character. When an
experience represents its own occurrence, a subject thereby has epistemic
access to this experience from the inside; she can know that she is the
subject of this experience just by having it. I said earlier that a subject has
this kind of epistemic access only if her experiences manifest a phenomenal
character. Brentano might have concluded then that an experience has a
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phenomenal character only when it represents its own occurrence. An
experience that doesn't represent its own occurrence won't seem or feel
anyway to the subject undergoing this experience.12
Consider by way of illustration, my experience of hearing a blast of sound
from a trumpet. A Brentanian account of consciousness would claim that at
the same time as I hear the trumpet my act of hearing is directed upon itself.
By being directed upon itself my experience makes me conscious of its
occurrence. Brentano might have said that it is the consciousness I have of
an experience's occurrence that makes an experience's occurrence like
something for me. When I am not conscious of my experience's occurrence,
I can hear a trumpet without it seeming or feeling any particular way to me.
Does an account of phenomenal character along these lines provide the
intentionalist with an answer to the question of when a representational state
instantiates a phenomenal character? Recall that the intentionalist
conceives of phenomenology as something with which, but not of which the
subject is conscious. Is the Brentanian view of phenomenal character just
sketched consistent with intentionalism?
Suppose we think of phenomenal character as something of which a
subject is conscious. Then it will be natural to think that it is only by means
of an additional representational state that an experience could possibly
have phenomenal character. For it is only by means of an additional
representational state that a subject could be conscious of an experience's
phenomenal character. Brentano denies that a subject's experience needs
to be accompanied by a higher-order representation in order to have a
phenomenal character. Fie claims that a single representational state can be
directed at something in a creature's environment, and at the same time also
12 For a recent defence of such a view see Kriegel (forthcoming)
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be directed upon itself. It might be thought that because Brentano rejects a
higher-order account of phenomenal character he must instead hold an
intentionalist view of phenomenal character.
A moment's reflection will suffice to show that such a conclusion is
mistaken. The Brentanian account of phenomenal character sketched
above is in important respects different from that proposed by higher-order
theories,13 but Brentano shares with these theories a view of phenomenal
character as something ofwhich a subject is conscious. Brentano's theory of
consciousness and higher-order theories both agree that a representational
state has phenomenal character only if a subject is conscious of being in that
representational state. Brentano claims that when an experience represents
its own occurrence the result is that the subject becomes conscious of
having this experience: a subject becomes conscious of the experience as a
secondary object. The experience becomes an object (a secondary object)
for the subject in addition to whatever extra-mental object the experience is
representing at the time. Thus Brentano would appear to be committed to
the claim that (pace intentionalism) a subject is conscious of his experience's
phenomenal character.
The intentionalist claims that conscious experiences are something of
which a subject is conscious only when the subject engages in an act of
13
Higher-order theories conceive of consciousness as a relational property which is
instantiated when an appropriate relation holds between a first-order representational state
and a higher-order representation. Consciousness is conceived of as a higher-order
monitoring of lower level states and processes. Brentano is committed to a one-level
account of consciousness which makes consciousness into an intrinsic property of at least
some mental states. According to his account a mental state is conscious when it is directed
upon itself at the same time as it is directed at something in the world: a representational
state needn't actually or potentially stand in a relation to any other mental state in order to
instantiate consciousness and phenomenal character. It should be noted that Brentano
argued that consciousness was a property of all mental states. In other words he denied that
there are any unconscious mental states. Kriegel (2003, pp114-116) argues that Brentano
might have said all occurrent mental states are conscious, making the claim less susceptible
to obvious counterexamples.
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introspection. Otherwise the subject is conscious of whatever his experience
represents. Thus the intentionalist wants to combine the following seemingly
incompatible theses:
(1) Mental states that present the world as seeming a certain way can be
known in the first person.
(2) It is possible for a mental state M to be conscious, although a creature
is not conscious of itself being in M.
Theses (1) and (2) seem to conflict; a mental state that can be known in the
first-person must be one to which the subject has epistemic access; it must
somehow present itself to a subject from the inside. How can a subject have
epistemic access to a mental state without the subject also being conscious
of itself in this mental state?
I will suggest in the next section that phenomenologists may have found a
solution to this problem, thereby supplying the intentionalist with an account
of when a representational state can be said to have phenomenal character.
This will still leave us needing to choose between the two accounts of
phenomenal character introduced in this section. In section 4 I will offer
further arguments against the first conception of phenomenal character by
arguing against higher-order and Brentanian theories of consciousness both
of which subscribe to this view of phenomenal character.
3. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
Phenomenologists claim that every conscious experience has built into it a
variety of self-consciousness. We saw in chapter 4 that the
phenomenologist claims our experiences are intentional before a subject
takes up any relation to the world. The phenomenologist says something
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analogous about being self-conscious.14 He denies that a subject's
experiences are made self-conscious by a subject reflecting on his
experiences, but equally he will reject a theory along Brentanian lines which
says that our experiences are made self-conscious when a mental state is
directed upon itself. More generally this theory denies that self-
consciousness can be understood as any kind of relation between a subject
and her mental states. If it is a mistake to conceive of self-consciousness as
a relation between a subject and her mental states, it is equally a mistake to
view self-consciousness as a relation between a representational state and
itself. Our experiences are already self-conscious before the subject takes
up any relation to them.15 Sartre has explained the idea as follows: "This
self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as
the only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of
something." (Sartre, 1943/2000: xxx)
The phenomenologist makes an important distinction between pre-
reflective and reflective self-consciousness. It is reflective self-
consciousness that philosophers commonly discuss when they are
concerned with self-consciousness.16 Reflective self-consciousness is the
consciousness a subject has of herself through introspective reflection.
When a subject introspects she forms a belief that she is herself in a mental
state M. I will have more to say about what this involves in a moment.
Suffice it to say that the phenomenologist is not claiming that conscious
14
I will support my claims primarily by reference to Sartre, but it should be noted that there
are similar ideas to be found in Husserl as Zahavi (1999) has persuasively argued. I will
discuss the views of the other phenomenologists in chapter 7 where I develop a naturalistic
account of phenomenal character.
15
This doesn't mean that the phenomenologist thinks of self-consciousness as primitive and
unanalysable: we shall see in section 5 that the phenomenologists have plenty to say about
what it is for a mental state to be intrinsically self-conscious.
16
Recently pre-reflective self-consciousness has received some attention under the heading
of non-conceptual self-consciousness, see for instance Bermudez (1998: ch.5-8) and Hurley
(1998: ch.4).
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experiences have built into them reflective self-consciousness. Fie claims
that a subject can be conscious of herself as being in a mental state M only
because M is already accompanied by a kind of self-consciousness. I shall
call the kind of self-consciousness in question "pre-reflective self-
consciousness". It is pre-reflective self-consciousness which it is claimed
forms a part of every conscious experience. Before I consider the
phenomenologist's argument for this claim we need to get a firmer grip on
the difference between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness. This
will be my aim in the remainder of this section.
Reflective self-consciousness attaches to the judgement a subject makes
when she self-ascribes some thought or experience she is having. When a
subject self-ascribes a conscious state or activity M she judges that she
herself is in a mental state M. I have spoken of the subject judging that "she
herself is in M to capture the fact that the judgement the subject makes is
one she would express in the first-person. It is a judgement which if I were
making I would express by saying "I am in M". I will follow Castaneda by
putting an asterisk beside a pronoun to signal cases of first-person
reference. Thus I will henceforth abbreviate "she herself as "she*" and "he
himself as "he*". When a subject self-ascribes a mental state M she judges
that she* is in M.
To see that a subject must be reflectively self-conscious when a subject
judges that she* is in M, notice that the content of S's judgement is not <1 am
S and S is in M>. When S self-ascribes a mental state M she doesn't need
to first identify an individual S and then establish that it is S that is in M.17 S
17
To borrow terminology from Evans (1982), S's judgement that she* is in M is "identification
free". Evans applies the term to knowledge that is arrived at in a certain way but I do not
think I am distorting the concept by taking it to apply to judgements. According to Evans
knowledge is identification free if "(1) it is not identification dependent and (2) it is based on a
way of gaining information from objects" (Evans, 1982: 181). While knowledge of a
proposition that 'x is M' is identification dependent if it is inferred from the propositions that 'y
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doesn't need to take this complicated route because when she thinks about
herself in the first-person (as she does when she judges that she* is in M)
she cannot fail to realise that she is thinking about herself.18 It doesn't make
sense for her to think that 'she* is in M' and to also think 'someone is in M
but is it myself that is in M?'19 This is because when a subject thinks of
herself by means of "I" she is self-conscious. The kind of self-consciousness
that accompanies first-person thoughts of this kind (thoughts the subject has
in the course of self-ascribing a mental or bodily state) is what I am calling
"reflective self-consciousness".
Let us henceforth conceive of "reflective self-consciousness" as the self-
consciousness that accompanies a person's thought that she* is in a mental
state M, in virtue of which a person cannot fail to realise that she is thinking
about herself. I shall henceforth call thoughts that are reflectively self-
conscious "l-thoughts". Modifying Rosenthal's (1990/1997) terminology
somewhat we can characterise reflective self-consciousness as a transitive
form of self-consciousness. When a subject makes a judgement that she* is
having an experience M she predicates a property of herself, the property of
having M. Reflective self-consciousness is consciousness that one is
oneself the subject to whom this predicate pertains.
I have said above that the phenomenologists deny that pre-reflective self-
consciousness is a relation between a subject and some mental state she is
is M' and 'x = y'. Knowledge is identification free then, if the subject can know that x is M
without first establishing that 'y is M' and 'x = y'.
18
To use an example from Castaheda (1966), there is a difference between thinking that the
Editor of Soul is a millionaire and thinking I am a millionaire even when one is the Editor of
Soul. One can fail to know that when one thinks of the Editor of Soul one is thinking about
oneself, but this is not true when one thinks of oneself by means of "I". One cannot fail to
realise that it is oneself that one is thinking of when one entertains a thought in the first-
person. I will suggest that this is because such thoughts are had self-consciously.
Shoemaker (1968) describes this semantic phenomenon as "immunity to error through
misidentification relative to the first person pronoun" ("IEM"). I shall follow Shoemaker in
taking IEM to be a feature peculiar to self-consciousness. I shall return to IEM in more detail
in section 4.
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in at the time. They deny then that pre-reflective self-consciousness is a
transitive form of self-consciousness. If pre-reflective self-consciousness
isn't a transitive form of self-consciousness might we instead characterise it
is as an intransitive form of self-consciousness?
Kriegel (2004) argues for the existence of something he calls "intransitive
state self-consciousness". Rosenthal (1990/1997) introduced the notion of
"intransitive state consciousness" to characterise our use of the term
"conscious" when we say that a token thought or experience has the property
20
of being a conscious thought or experience. Kriegel argues that a subject
can instantiate this property only if she is in a mental state that is intransitive
state self-conscious. Substitute "intransitive state self-consciousness" for
"pre-reflective self-consciousness", and we get the thesis I have attributed to
the phenomenologists that a mental state can be conscious only if it is pre-
reflectively self-conscious. Let us consider then whether Kriegel's notion of
"intransitive state self-consciousness" might give us an initial handle on pre-
reflective self-consciousness.
Kriegel introduces the notion of intransitive state self-consciousness by
asking us to consider the difference between the following two sentences
attributing self-consciousness to a subject:
(1) Smith is self-conscious of thinking that her car is new.
(2) Smith is self-consciously thinking that her car is new.
The first sentence attributes to Smith what I have called "reflective self-
consciousness". I have argued that a subject can be reflective self-
conscious only by being in a distinct mental state M2 which makes her
20
Rosenthal goes on to argue that it is a relational property which is instantiated when a
mental state is simultaneously accompanied by a higher-order thought. I will have more to
say about this later in section 4.
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conscious of herself being in a mental state Mi. Thus (1) describes a case
of transitive creature self-consciousness. The second sentence attributes to
a subject intransitive state self-consciousness. The self-consciousness
which (2) reports, isn't brought about through a distinct act of reflection. The
state in virtue of which Smith is self-conscious is one and the same as the
state which is her thinking about her new car. We can say that the thought
about her new car is a first-order property of Smith, and the self-
consciousness is a second-order property of Smith which "modifies", to
borrow Kriegel's term, Smith's thinking.
What is it to think or experience self-consciously? It is to be conscious of
oneself having a thought or experience. This is not to say that one is
conscious of oneself having a thought or experience in the same way as one
is conscious of the object of one's thought or experience. The self-
consciousness that (2) attributes isn't the result of a distinct act of reflection
whereby a subject makes a mental state she is undergoing into the object of
her thought. Rather the state in virtue of which Smith is self-conscious is the
same state that makes her conscious of her new car. Smith's being self-
conscious is a matter of the way in which she has this thought. Her self-
consciousness modifies the way in which this thought occurs to her,
distinguishing it from a thought that is not had self-consciously.
Kriegel has suggested that the kind of self-consciousness (2) describes is
best thought of as an "implicit" or "peripheral" consciousness one has of
oneself having a conscious thought or experience. When one undergoes a
conscious experience one is aware of oneself having this experience. To be
aware of oneself having an experience is to be aware of oneself qua subject
of experience. It is subjects that have or own experiences. The awareness
one has of oneself qua subject isn't explicit. It would only become explicit if
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one could somehow token a thought which targeted the awareness one has
of oneself having an experience.21 We have already seen that intransitive
state self-consciousness involves no such act of reflection. Instead the very
same experience one is undergoing is such that one is conscious of oneself
having it at the same time as one is made conscious of its object. It is this
implicit or peripheral consciousness one has of oneself qua subject of a
thought or experience which Kriegel calls "intransitive state self-
consciousness".
Did the phenomenologists have something similar in mind when they
talked of pre-reflective self-consciousness? Sartre will often talk of
"consciousness being conscious of itself as consciousness of an object."22
Where Sartre talks of "consciousness" I shall instead talk of "subjects of
consciousness". The proposal I am considering takes Sartre to be saying
that when a subject is conscious of an object there are two properties
instantiated. The first is the property in virtue of which the subject is
conscious of an object. I shall call this property "Pi". The second is the
property in virtue of which the subject is conscious of itself as conscious of
an object. Call this second property "P2". The proposal I am considering
characterises "P2" as a second-order property, a property of P-i. P2
characterises the way in which a subject is conscious of an object. It is a
property of Pi which modifies a subject's consciousness of an object, making
the subject conscious of himself having a particular thought or experience.
21 It is far from clear that this is something we can do. When Hume worries (to paraphrase)
that he can not catch himself without a perception and never can observe anything but
perception, it might be thought that what he has noticed is that one can never become aware
of himself as the subject of his experiences. As soon as he tries to observe himself having
an experience, he becomes the person doing the observing and all he discovers are the
mental states that he is undergoing. What Hume cannot observe is himself as the subject
that is undergoing those mental states. I will return to this worry at the end of section 5.
22 This is a formulation that recurs repeatedly in his (1943/2000), see for instance Section 3
of the Introduction titled The Pre-Reflective Cogito and the Being of the Percipere'.
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When Sartre says the subject is conscious of himself, he is not saying the
subject is himself among the objects he experiences when he has a
conscious experience. In fact it is central to Sartre's philosophy to deny that
the subject is ever aware of himself as an object. For Sartre consciousness
is empty: it is always directed towards something that is not itself. We find
here an echo of the intentionalist's claim that phenomenal character is that
with which, but not of which the subject is conscious. Sartre generalises this
conclusion to claim that there is literally nothing in the mind of which we are
conscious. Even when a subject engages in reflection a subject's thinking is
directed towards something that is not itself. Introspective reflection issues
in knowledge, and knowledge is characterised by a duality of knower and
that which is known. When the subject knows itself through introspection
"the reflected on must necessarily be the object for the reflected; and this
necessarily involves a separation of being" (Sartre, 2000: 151 ).23
In what sense then is a subject conscious of herself when she has an
experience self-consciously? When one perceives an object one is able to
identify that object, singling it out from other objects with which one is
simultaneously presented. I take Sartre (and indeed phenomenologists
more generally) to be committed to the view that we can single out an object
only if we know the object's location in relation to oneself. To know where an
object is in relation to oneself one must be conscious of the position of one's
body in relation to this object. I also take Sartre to be committed to the view
that when I identify an object's position in relation to my body I do not have to
identify a body as my own body. The knowledge I have of my own position
23 I take Sartre's point to be similar to one that Ryle (1949) makes when he notes that trying
to make oneself into the object of one's thought is like trying to jump on one's own shadow.
Every time you make the leap your shadow moves away from you, and the same is true of
the self. Every time I try to observe myself by engaging in an act of reflection, I myself move
out of view as the subject that is doing the observing. Sartre's point seems to be that no
person can simultaneously occupy the position of observer and that which is observed.
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in space is "identification free" to borrow a term from Evans (1982).24 I know
directly and immediately without having to form any observations of my body
its location relative to the object that I perceive. This is because at the same
time as I am conscious of an object I am conscious of myself. The
consciousness I have of myself is also a consciousness of my body and the
way in which the world is presented to it. This consciousness makes it
possible for me to know where an object is in relation to me without my first
needing to identify my own location.25
What I have said so far suffices for us to see that the suggestion from
Kriegel that we view pre-reflective self-consciousness as an implicit or
peripheral consciousness of self seems to be along the right lines. It is the
implicit consciousness a subject has of herself as the subject of an
experience which enables her to identify the location of objects relative to her
own position in space without first having to identify her own location in
space.
I suggest we construe the distinction between reflective and pre-reflective
self-consciousness as follows. I have endorsed the intentionalist view that to
be conscious is to be in a certain kind of representational state. Expanding
on this proposal I suggest we draw the following distinction between types of
conscious representational state.
(1) A subject is reflectively self-conscious when she explicitly represents
that she is the subject of some thought or experience.
(2) A subject is pre-reflectively self-conscious when she implicitly
represents to herself that she is the subject of some bodily or mental
state.
24 See footnote 19 for a definition of identification free knowledge.
251 discuss this line of reasoning in more detail later in chapter 7.
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A subject explicitly represents herself when she represents herself as the
subject undergoing a conscious state or activity. She explicitly represents
herself only by deliberately attending to her conscious states thereby thinking
of herself as the subject of some conscious state or activity. What is it for a
subject to implicitly represent herself? This is a question which will be
discussed briefly in chapters 6 & 7, but we are already in a position however
to sketch the beginning of an answer to this question. First of all when a
subject is implicitly represented she does not figure among the things she
represents. I said above that we should understand pre-reflective self-
consciousness as modifying the consciousness a subject has of an object. I
suggested we think of a subject's being conscious of an object as a first-
order property of the subject, and pre-reflective self-consciousness as a
second-order property of the subject. Thus implicit representation is a
property which somehow modifies a representational state which makes a
subject conscious of an object.
One possible way to think about a subject's implicitly representing herself
is to say that a conscious state isn't just a representation of an object but is a
representation of the object as standing in a relation to the subject. I have
said that a representational state is somehow modified when it implicitly
represents the subject that is in it. The current suggestion is that it is
modified in such a way that a subject represents an object as standing in a
relation to herself. By representing an object in a relation to herself she is
implicitly aware of herself at the same time as she is explicitly aware of the
object. Thus we can say that every conscious state has a content of the
following form R<l, f>, where T stands for the subject of this conscious state,
'f for an object the state represents and R for a relation the state represents
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as holding between I and f.
How does this distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-
consciousness help us with our question of what it is for an experience to
have phenomenal character? I have said that the phenomenologist takes
reflective self-consciousness to depend upon pre-reflective self-
consciousness. This is to say that one can become reflectively self-
conscious only because one is already pre-reflectively self-conscious. On
this theory a subject can judge that she* is in a mental state M only because
the mental state M she self-ascribes is already pre-reflectively self-
conscious. The judgement the subject makes in self-ascribing a mental state
will normally yield first-person knowledge. I have said in section 1 that a
subject can have first-person knowledge of a mental state only if that mental
state has phenomenal character - if it seems or feels a certain way to its
subject. We have just seen that the phenomenologist holds a mental state
can be known in the first-person only if it is already pre-reflectively self-
conscious. I take this thesis to form the basis for a proposal about what it is
for an experience to have phenomenal character. According to this proposal
an experience has phenomenal character only if it is pre-reflectively self-
conscious. It is only if the subject implicitly represents herself having an
experience that the experience she has will seem or feel a certain way.
Such a proposal is consistent with intentionalism: it allows that
phenomenal character is something with which we are conscious but not
something of which we are conscious. For recall that pre-reflective self-
consciousness is not transitive self-consciousness: when an experience is
had self-consciously the subject is not explicitly conscious of herself, she is
not conscious of herself as the subject having an experience. The subject
only becomes explicitly conscious of herself as the subject of an experience
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when she makes an experience the object of her attention, through
introspection. Recall that this is just what the intentionalist claims about
phenomenal character in defending the idea that conscious experiences are
not experiences of which the subject is conscious.
The claim that conscious states are pre-reflectively self-conscious
explains how a conscious state can seem or feel a certain way without the
subject being conscious of this state. The state can seem or feel a certain
way because it is had by a subject in such a way that the subject is
conscious that she stands in a relation to whatever the state represents.
When the subject represents an object as standing in a relation to herself,
the state needn't figure among the things of which she is conscious. She
can be aware of nothing but the object she represents so long as she is
aware of this object as standing in a relation to herself. By representing an
object in relation to herself, she becomes aware of being in a particular
representational state. She is aware of herself as being conscious of an
object, but she is aware of being in this state without actually representing
that she is in this state.
We now have two genuinely alternative proposals corresponding to our
two conceptions of phenomenal character.
Proposal 1: An experience E seems or feels a certain way to me iff E is
accompanied by a higher-order representation that I am having E.
Proposal 2: An experience E seems or feels a certain way to me iff E is
pre-reflectively self-conscious.
In the next section we will see that to defend proposal 2 over proposal 1 it
must be shown that reflective self-consciousness depends on pre-reflective
self-consciousness. When the phenomenologist claims that reflective self-
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consciousness depends on pre-reflective self-consciousness she is saying
that a subject couldn't be reflectively self-conscious - she couldn't self-
ascribe a mental or bodily state of hers - unless the mental state she was
self-ascribing was itself already pre-reflectively self-conscious. I shall call
this "the dependence thesis". The dependence thesis has been asked to do
a lot of work in the account of phenomenal character I have just attributed to
the phenomenologist. I have said that a state is knowable in the first person
when it has phenomenal character. The dependence thesis says that a state
is knowable in the first person only if it is pre-reflectively conscious. From
these two theses I derived the phenomenologist's account of phenomenal
character which says that a state has phenomenal character only if it is had
self-consciously (that is to say only if the mental state is pre-reflectively self-
conscious).
Proponents of a higher-order theory of consciousness would reject the
dependence thesis. They would claim that a subject becomes self-
conscious through an act of reflection. Thus a subject doesn't need to
already be pre-reflectively self-conscious in order to achieve reflective self-
consciousness. If the dependence thesis can be defended this will serve to
motivate the phenomenologist's account of phenomenal character over the
higher-order theorist (and the Brentanian for that matter). We will have
shown that we can account for reflective self-consciousness only by granting
that the subject is already pre-reflectively self-consciousness. This amounts
to conceding that an experience can only be known in the first person if it is
pre-reflectively self-conscious. Recall that this is just what the
phenomenologist claims when she says that an intentional state has
phenomenal character only if it is pre-reflectively self-conscious. Thus by
defending the dependence thesis we get an argument for the
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phenomenologist's account of phenomenal character. The next section will
consider how phenomenologists argue for the dependence thesis.
4, The Dependence Thesis
I shall begin by sketching an outline of an argument for the dependence
thesis. The argument proceeds by attempting to show that reflection by a
subject on his mental states couldn't possibly make a subject self-
conscious.26 By "reflection" I mean the ability a subject has to introspect,
where introspection can be understood either as a form of perception or
"internal sense" as it was by Locke or as thought about one's own mental
states as it is by Rosenthal (2004).27 I shall call theories which take self-
consciousness to have its origins in reflection "reflection theories". The
phenomenologist will argue that self-consciousness cannot originate from a
subject observing or thinking about his own mental states. Yet we have seen
that when a subject introspects and self-ascribes a mental state he thinks
about himself self-consciously. Since this self-consciousness isn't brought
about through an act of reflection, the phenomenologist infers that the
subject must already be in a mental state that is self-conscious before he
introspects. It is this self-consciousness that they call "pre-reflective self-
consciousness".
There are a number of points at which this sketch of an argument can be
challenged. First the phenomenologist must show that reflection cannot
26 I must stress that the following argument doesn't appear anywhere in the
phenomenologist's writing, so far as I am aware. I am constructing this argument on the
phenomenologist's behalf based on the priority that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty give to the
notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness and the treatment these philosophers have been
given in secondary literature. See in particular the excellent studies by Wider (1997) and
Zahavi (1999).
27 These are two very different conceptions of introspection but I won't attempt to decide
between them at this stage. We shall see that the first conception of introspection is
defended by higher-order perception theorists and the second conception of introspection is
defended by higher-order thought theories. Both are not without problems as we shall see.
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yield self-consciousness. This means showing that self-consciousness
cannot come about either by a subject observing her own mental states or by
a subject thinking about her own mental states. We shall see that higher-
order perception theories challenge the first disjunct: they might claim that a
subject can become self-conscious by perceiving her conscious mental
po
states. Higher-order thought theories challenge the second disjunct: they
claim that a subject can become self-conscious by thinking about her own
conscious mental states.
Let us suppose that the phenomenologist can justify the claim that self-
consciousness doesn't have its origins in reflection. Still someone might be
unwilling to concede to the phenomenologist, the conclusion that our mental
states are intrinsically self-consciousness. He might worry that the
phenomenologist's argument assumes that the only two options are to claim
that self-consciousness comes about through reflection or to accept that
some mental states are intrinsically self-conscious, but why suppose that
these two options are jointly exhaustive of the possible positions one might
take on this question?
This second objection is the easiest to deal with, so I shall start my
defence here. First of all we should note that the phenomenologist is
treating the question of how a subject comes to be self-conscious as a
question that is to be given a personal-level answer. By a "personal level
explanation" I mean an explanation that makes ineliminable reference to
pq
persons and their mental states. Of course there is another possibility the
phenomenologist doesn't consider which is that the question can be
281 confess that I have been unable to find such a theory explicitly asserted by proponents of
higher-order perception theories (e.g. Lycan and Armstrong). I have arrived at such a theory
based on the account they give of introspective knowledge.
29
For the distinction between "personal level" explanation and "sub-personal level"
explanation see Dennett (1969). The distinction is discussed and put to work by Hornsby in
her (1997, ch.7 & 10)
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answered by appeal to theories that invokes sub-personal mechanisms. We
have seen earlier that the phenomenologist rejects the possibility of
explaining consciousness in sub-personal terms. I shall return to the
argument they give for this conclusion towards the end of this section. In
barest outline the worry they have is that such an explanation of self-
consciousness will leave something out. It will treat the subject as one
material thing among others, but in the process fail to account for the sense
we have of ourselves as subjects when we are pre-reflectively self-
conscious. We have already encountered this objection in chapters 2 and 3,
but we will see that it can be made more precise by relating it to the
phenomenon of pre-reflective self-consciousness.
Let us set aside for now, the objection that the phenomenologist has
ignored the possibility of giving a sub-personal explanation of self-
consciousness. Is the phenomenologist nevertheless right to think that the
only possible personal level explanations treat self-consciousness either as
the outcome of reflection or as something intrinsic to our conscious mental
states? We can pose this challenge as a question about whether reflective
self-consciousness is the only form that self-consciousness can take. To
answer this question we must ask what it is for a person to be self-conscious.
This is a huge question but one way of answering it would be to determine
whether self-consciousness should be understood as a relational property of
a person or as an intrinsic property of a person. If the property of being self-
conscious is understood as a relational property it might be thought that this
property is instantiated when a certain relation holds between her mental
states. Perhaps the relation in question holds when her conscious mental
states are accompanied by higher-order representations of some kind which
target a conscious mental state the person is in at the time. Alternatively
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some of her mental states might be directed upon themselves in the way that
Brentano describes. We shall see in a moment that the phenomenologist
argues against both of these options. In doing so he rejects the conclusion
that self-consciousness is a relational property concluding instead that it
must belong to certain mental states intrinsically. The soundness of the
phenomenologist's reasoning here once again depends on the claim that a
subject cannot become self-conscious through reflection. Let us examine
then how the phenomenologist argues for this claim.
The argument I shall develop is based on a passage in the Introduction to
Being and Nothingness, where Sartre considers whether self-consciousness
on
might be identified with self-knowledge. By "self-knowledge" I mean
knowledge of propositions of the form "I am F", where "F" picks out some
conscious state or activity of a subject and "I" refers to the subject that is
thinking she instantiates F. Sartre is considering theories which take self-
consciousness to be a variety of propositional knowledge, where the objects
of this knowledge are propositions of the form I am in F. Self-knowledge
needn't be conceived of as the outcome of a subject self-ascribing a
conscious state or activity. If there are conscious states of the kind Brentano
describes - states which are simultaneously directed upon themselves and
at some state of affairs in the world - these states of mind will also qualify as
instances of self-knowledge. These will be states of mind which are such
that when they occur the subject will have knowledge of their occurrence.31 I
shall take the target of Sartre's argument to be any account which treats self-
consciousness as a relational property. Both Brentanian theories and
30 Sartre (2000, xxviii-xxx)
31
Hossack (2002) defends a Brentanian account of consciousness according to which a
mental state M is conscious if the subject has knowledge of M's occurrence. According to
Hossack's theory every conscious mental state (or as Hossack puts it "every experience and
every action") counts as an instance of self-knowledge: a mental state is conscious only if the
subject knows of its instantiation.
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higher-order theories of consciousness fit this description. Sartre is offering
an argument for the conclusion that self-consciousness couldn't possibly
come about through a subject taking up a relation to his own mental states.
Hence self-consciousness shouldn't be conceived of as a relational property
but should instead be taken to be an intrinsic property of our conscious
mental states.
Sartre's argument bears an uncanny resemblance to an argument that
can be found in Aristotle. In De Anima 3.2, Aristotle notes that we can
perceive that we perceive, and wonders how this is so.32 He goes on to
argue that either we perceive that we perceive by one and the same
perceptual act or we do so by means of a distinct act of perception. Aristotle
argues that if we perceive that we perceive by means of distinct act then we
must posit a further act to explain how we perceive the first act. Once we
have posited a further act we will need yet another perceptual act to explain
how this further act is perceived. Thus we have the beginning of a regress.
To end the regress we must posit a perceptual act that perceives itself.
Once we concede that some act can perceive itself, we might as well say this
from the outset, thus avoiding the threat of the regress.
Sartre takes a similar argument and applies it to views which seek to
identify self-consciousness with self-knowledge:
32
De Anima (425b12-25). There is some disagreement among commentators about whether
Aristotle thought there was a capacity responsible for a subject's perceiving that she
perceives or whether Aristotle should be read as claiming that there is an activity in virtue of
which we perceive that we perceive. For discussion and a defence of the latter reading see
Caston (2002). I shall follow Caston in reading Aristotle as discussing the activity of
perceiving because to do so fits with my current concerns, but I must confess that I don't
have sufficient knowledge of what Aristotle says elsewhere to begin to defend such a
reading.
33
I don't mean to suggest that Aristotle and Sartre return the same answer to the question
how is it that we can perceive that we perceive. Caston (2002) argues that Aristotle held a
view of consciousness much closer to that of Brentano, according to which every perceptual
act is directed upon itself. Kosman (1975) defends a reading of Aristotle that stresses the
continuity between his position and that of the phenomenologists, in particular Sartre.
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"The reduction of consciousness to knowledge in fact involves our
introducing into consciousness the subject-object dualism which is typical
of knowledge. But if we accept the law of the knower-known dyad, then a
third term will be necessary in order for the knower to become known in
turn, and we will be faced with this dilemma. Either we stop at any one
term of the series - the known, the knower known, the knower known by
the knower, etc. In this case, the totality of the phenomenon falls into the
unknown; that is we always bump against a non-self-conscious reflection
and a final term. Or else we affirm the necessity of an infinite regress
(idea, ideae ideae, etc.) which is absurd....Consciousness of self is not
dual. If we wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate,
non-cognitive relation of the self to itself." (Sartre, 2000: xxviii-xxix)
Sartre's argument in this passage mirrors Aristotle almost exactly, but before
we can see how it will be helpful to reconstruct his argument somewhat.
First off it should be noted that while Sartre frames his discussion in terms
of consciousness, it is in fact self-consciousness that he is discussing. In the
previous section, where I introduced the phenomenologist's conception of
consciousness, I noted that in general they (intentionally) do not distinguish
consciousness from self-consciousness. There we saw Sartre claim that to
be conscious of something is also to be self-conscious. Moreover, there is
further evidence that Sartre is in fact talking about self-consciousness at the
end of the passage where he says "consciousness of self is not dual".
As I have already explained, I take the target of the argument in this
passage to be theories which take self-consciousness to be a relation
between a subject and her conscious mental states. When Sartre talks of
"the subject-object dualism...typical of knowledge" and the "knower-known
dyad", I take him to be referring to the relation of representation a subject
can stand in to her conscious mental states. This representation might be a
second-order representation in virtue of which a subject represents that she
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is in an intentional state M, or it might be a representation of the kind posited
by Brentano - a representation that is somehow directed upon itself in such
a way as to represent its own occurrence.
Sartre says that any view of this kind will fall foul of an infinite regress. He
begins by noting that it will not do to conceive of the representation as a two-
place relation between a subject and a mental state she is in. It is necessary
he tells us, for such an account to introduce "a third term" in order for "the
knower to become known". I take him to mean that it is necessary to
introduce an additional layer of representations in order for the subject to be
conscious that he himself is in a mental state M. To introduce this additional
layer of representation is, Sartre claims, to take the first step on a path that
leads to an infinite regress. We might challenge Sartre on this point, for we
have seen that a Brentanian will conceive of self-consciousness as self-
knowledge, while nevertheless offering a one-level account of self-
consciousness. We shall see however that Brentano's account of self-
consciousness is vulnerable to a different objection, so let us ignore this
possibility for the time being.
Sartre doesn't say why we need to introduce an additional layer of
representations, but we can fill in his reasoning here without too much
trouble. Sartre is rejecting a proposal that takes self-consciousness to be a
two place relation of representation a subject stands in to a mental state.
We can see why this cannot be right by considering how a subject P might
stand in a relation of representation to another subject's Q's mental states.
But of course standing in such a relation of representation wouldn't make P
self-conscious of being in Q's mental state. Suppose the state in question is
a pain state. It is certainly true that we can be conscious of another person's
being in pain by representing that this person is in pain. However when we
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represent that another person is in pain this doesn't for the most part
(ignoring the possibility of sympathetic pain) make us conscious of ourselves
being in pain. The pain I thereby experience belongs to the other person
and not to me. Any account which identifies self-consciousness with a two
place relation between a subject and a mental state will fail to distinguish the
case in which a subject is representing his own mental states from the case
in which he is representing some other subject's mental states. A subject will
not be self-conscious by representing a mental state M, he must also
represent that he is representing M.
Now recall Aristotle's argument. If we explain how we perceive that we
perceive by introducing two perceptual acts, the second of which is directed
at the first, we will have to introduce a third perceptual act to explain how the
second perceptual act is perceived, and so on ad infinitum. Sartre applies
this same argument to the account which equates self-consciousness with
self-knowledge. I have just explained why we must introduce a further layer
of representation (Sartre's "third term") if we are to account for the
knowledge a subject has that he is in a mental state M. Sartre claims that
once we have introduced a third layer of representations we will have to
introduce a fourth layer of representations to explain how the subject knows
that he knows he is in M, and so on ad infinitum.
The way to terminate the regress is to say that there comes a point at
which the subject no longer needs to know that he knows, or in Aristotle's
case, that the subject no longer needs to perceive that he perceives. Each
additional layer of representation has been introduced to explain how a
subject can know that he is in a conscious state M. If we say that there is a
point at which we no longer need to introduce an additional representation
Sartre thinks this amounts to conceding that there is a point at which "the
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totality of the phenomenon falls into the unknown". Just a few passages
earlier in his Introduction Sartre has rejected the possibility that
consciousness could be "ignorant of itself as absurd. A consciousness
ignorant of itself is unconscious, and Sartre (following Descartes) was of the
opinion that there is nothing in the mind of which a subject is not conscious.
There is much about ourselves which, according to Sartre, we choose not to
see, but there is nothing about ourselves of which we are entirely ignorant.
Nowadays, knowing all that we do from cognitive psychology, few of us
will be prepared to join Sartre in his rejection of the unconscious. For those
willing to allow the existence of unconscious mental states there is then, a
way out of the regress Sartre has described. Whether it robs Sartre of his
argument for the dependence thesis remains to be seen.
Before I consider this possibility in more detail we should note that it is not
a possibility that Brentanian's can take up. Brentano also employs an
argument along the lines of Aristotle's in arguing against higher-order
accounts of consciousness which appeal to unconscious mental states to
block the regress that would otherwise ensue. Brentano thinks he has found
another way of blocking the regress without introducing anything like an
unconscious mental state. He appeals instead to mental states which are
directed at themselves and as a result represent their own occurrence.
Brentano may have found a way out of the regress without appealing to
unconscious mental states but it has been argued that he does so only by
presupposing what he is trying to explain.34
Recall that according to Brentano every mental state is directed towards
two objects, a primary object which is usually some worldly state of affairs
34
See Zahavi (1999: 30-1). Zahavi credits this argument to the Heidelberg school of
philosophers, specifically to Cramer and Pothast.
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and a secondary object which is the mental state itself. Consider Brentano's
example of hearing a tone. Brentano claims that when I hear a tone, I am
conscious of the tone and I am also coconscious of my experience of
hearing the tone. Now we might be entitled to ask whether I am also
conscious of this coconsciousness. Brentano replies that I am:
"In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our
minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. What
is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it
has the sound as content within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at
the same time." (Brentano, 1995: 179)
According to Brentano a single mental state can make me:
(1) Conscious of a tone.
(2) Coconscious of my hearing the tone.
(3) Conscious of my being coconscious of my hearing the tone.
Brentano cannot allow that (3) is a distinct object from (2), for if he does he
will have a new regress on his hands: he will have to introduce a further
conscious state which is conscious of being conscious of being coconscious.
Brentano must say that when I am coconscious of my hearing the tone I am
also conscious of my being coconscious. Then self-consciousness isn't
something that is brought about by a mental state's being directed upon
itself. The secondary object is instead already in "possession of self-
awareness" as Zahavi puts it. What (3) describes is a state in which I am
conscious of the tone and of myself hearing the tone. To be conscious of
myself hearing the tone is to be self-conscious. Brentano must say that this
self-consciousness form a part of the secondary object which a mental state
is directed towards when it represents its own occurrence. Supposing this
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possibility is coherent, something I will not challenge here35, it seems that
Brentano finds a way out of Aristotle's regress only by giving us a circular
explanation. I conclude that a Brentanian account of self-consciousness as
self-knowledge fails. Let us turn our attention now to higher-order theories.
Aristotle and Sartre's argument will only prove effective against higher-
order theories if it is assumed that all mental states are conscious. This is
something that all proponents of higher-order theories deny. Thus to pursue
the regress argument against these theories would require us to defend the
claim that there are no unconscious mental states. I am convinced that such
a claim must be false, so rather than attempt to show that higher-order
theories fall foul of a regress I shall offer an alternative line of attack.
I will argue, in the spirit, if not the letter of phenomenology, that reflective
self-consciousness has certain features which cannot be explained by any
act of reflection. These are features that can only be explained by granting
that conscious mental states are already self-conscious prior to any act of
reflection. The features in question will already be familiar to us from our
earlier discussion of reflective self-consciousness, but I shall nevertheless
offer a brief reminder of them.
Recall that reflective self-consciousness attaches to l-thoughts, the
35
Bell (1990: 19-23) argues that Brentano's position must ultimately collapse into
incoherency. Brentano tells us that a representation of a sound without a representation of
an act of hearing is conceivable but that a representation of an act of hearing without a
representation of sound is a contradiction. Thus he conceives of a representational state's
directedness upon itself as being dependent upon its directedness towards some primary
object. Brentano also wants to say that it is one and the same representational state R that
can be directed upon two distinct objects. The representational state R that is directed at a
primary object is one and the same as the representational state R* which is directed upon
itself. But on Brentano's own account of parts and wholes, if x is a part of y then x is not
identical with y. It follows then that Brentano cannot claim both that R* and R are "two
aspects of one and the same unitary phenomenon" the former depending on the latter, and
also claim that R = R*. The claims that R* and R are two parts of the same whole contradicts
the claim that the representational which is directed at a primary object is identical with the
representational state directed at itself.
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judgements a subject makes in self-ascribing a thought or experience. We
saw earlier that when a subject entertains an "l-thought" she cannot fail to
realise that it is herself she is thinking about. Perry's (1979) story of the
supermarket shopper following the trail of sugar illustrates the point well.
Imagine I am in the supermarket following a trail of sugar in search of the
person with a torn bag of sugar in their basket. When I discover it is me with
the torn bag sack of sugar and I think to myself I am making a mess, I know
something that I do not know when I think that the person with a torn bag of
sugar is making a mess. I know that I am thinking about myself. Of course it
is true that I was also thinking about myself when I thought about the person
with the torn bag of sugar, but at the time I had this thought I didn't know I
was thinking about myself. Whereas when I think that I am making a mess, I
cannot fail to know that I am thinking about myself just by having this
thought.
The thought that I am making a mess is an l-thought; it is a thought in
which I self-ascribe an action of which I am now conscious, the action of
making a mess. It is a feature of l-thoughts in general that a subject cannot
fail to know he is thinking about himself. It is l-thoughts to which reflective
self-consciousness attaches. Thus any adequate account of reflective self-
consciousness must explain how a subject cannot fail to know he is thinking
about himself when he is reflectively self-conscious.
l-thoughts are also, to borrow Shoemaker's term, immune to error through
misidentification (henceforth "IEM").36 A subject cannot think, for instance,
that she is experiencing pain and think something false because she is
36 Shoemaker distinguishes what he calls "absolute immunity to error through
misidentification" and "circumstantial immunity to error". The statement "I am in pain" is
absolutely immune to error because its immunity isn't contingent on anything else the subject
believes. The statement "I am seeing a table" is circumstantially immune to error because its
immunity is based on a belief of the speakers that she is currently seeing a table under
normal viewing conditions.
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mistaken about who it is that feels pain.37 Shoemaker argues that l-thoughts
are not subject to error through misidentification because the subject doesn't
identify herself at all when she self-ascribes a thought or experience. That is
to say an individual doesn't need to first identify an individual S that is herself
and then predicate of this individual the property of being in a particular
conscious state. If she did need to identify herself when self-ascribing a
conscious state, there would be a possibility of her erring about who it is that
is in a conscious state when she self-ascribes a conscious state. Yet we
have seen that when one entertains an l-thought, there is no such possibility
of error, l-thoughts are reflectively self-conscious. Thus the second feature
of l-thoughts that an account of reflective self-consciousness must
accommodate is IEM.
Before I consider whether higher-order theories of consciousness can
accommodate these two features I have taken to be essential to reflective
self-consciousness, it is worth noting that a proponent of the dependence
thesis is perfectly able to accommodate them. Consider first the claim that
when I think I am F I cannot fail to know that the subject that I am thinking is
F is myself. The dependence thesis says that F, a conscious state, is also
pre-reflectively self-conscious. Recall that pre-reflective self-consciousness
modifies the way in which a conscious state occurs for a subject. To say that
a state is pre-reflectively self-conscious is to say that the state occurs in such
a way that the subject is conscious of himself being in this state. I cannot fail
to know I am thinking about myself when I think I am in F, because F occurs
37
Not all the predicates I can apply to myself are in this way immune to error through
misidentification. Only those predicates that I can know to apply to myself non-
observationally just by instantiating them are in this way immune to error. The thought I am
bleeding isn't immune to error through misidentification. I might be in a tangle of bodies and
mistake someone else's blood for my own, to use an example of Wittgenstein's (1958: 66-7).
Any thoughts I can form about my own mental and bodily states directly and immediately
without recourse to observation will however be immune to error through misidentification
(see Shoemaker (1968: 562)).
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for me in such a way that I am conscious of myself having F. All I do when I
judge that I am in conscious state F is make explicit the consciousness I
already have of myself. I transform the implicit awareness I have that I
myself am the subject of F into an explicit awareness of myself as the
subject of F.
What about IEM? l-thoughts are IEM, we have seen, because I do not
have to identify myself as the subject of F when I think I am F. According to
the dependence thesis I do not need to identity myself as the subject of F
because F is pre-reflectively self-conscious. I have F in such a way that I am
conscious of myself having F. When I think that I am F I make explicit the
consciousness I already have of myself. I do not need to identify which
individual is the subject of F because when F occurs I am conscious that it is
me having F. Thus we will see how the dependence thesis succeeds where
reflection theories fail. It gives us a way of accommodating both features of
l-thoughts. Let us consider whether higher-order theories can accommodate
these two features beginning with higher-order perception theories.
5. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and the Dependence Thesis
Higher-order perception theories (henceforth "HOP" theories) say that a
subject becomes conscious of being in a mental state M when M is scanned
by an internal monitoring mechanism.38 This monitoring mechanism is
hypothesised to function in much the same manner as the senses which are
directed outwards, except that it has as its function, the monitoring of a
subject's own mental states.
A proponent of HOP theory will say that a subject comes to think that she*
is in M by means of a non-conscious mental state modelled on perception.
38
See Lycan (1990/1997 & 1996) for recent defence of HOP theory.
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Such a proposal immediately runs into trouble if we take HOP theorists at
their word and model the access we have to our own states of mind on
perception as it is ordinarily understood. We can see this by considering just
a few features of perception as it is ordinarily understood by us.39
Each perceptual experience a subject undergoes will supply that subject
with information about a multiplicity of objects. A subject can put this
information to use in identifying the objects of his experience. There are
several ways in which he can do so. He can identify or misidentify an object
as being of a certain kind. He can identify an object perceived at one time
with an object perceived at another time. This is something he might do by
perceiving a resemblance between an object's properties at different times.
Alternatively the object might be one that he is continuously observing in
which case he will be in a position to perceptually track the object over time.
If we are to understand introspective knowledge as a form of perceptual
knowledge, at least some of the features I have just described must also be
true of introspection. Does introspection supply us with information about a
multiplicity of objects? No, it provides us with information about one and only
one object over time, ourselves.40 Does introspection involve the
identification of an object, the person doing the introspecting, in the various
ways described above? No, the judgements we make about ourselves
based on introspection are IEM. If introspection is to be understood as a
mode of perception, it must be a mode of perception which doesn't require
39
Here I am indebted to Shoemaker. See in particular his (1994/1996, lecture 1) and his
(1986).
Martin (1997) argues that the awareness we have of our own bodies is a kind of perception
which supplies us with information about one and only one object at any given moment. I do
not wish to dispute this claim, though some have argued against the claim that bodily
awareness is perceptual in nature (see for instance Gallagher (2003)). Perhaps the
awareness we have of our bodies is best thought of as a kind of perception, but bodily
awareness doesn't make us reflectively self-conscious. Even if some such case can be
made for construing bodily awareness as perceptual in nature, it will be of no help to the HOP
theorist who is attempting to give us an account of reflective self-consciousness.
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that we identify ourselves. For supposing that the relevant mode of
perception does involve something akin to identification of a self we will have
failed to accommodate IEM. FIOP theories will thereby fail one of the tests
we have set for an adequate account of reflective self-consciousness.
In treating introspection as perception, we are looking for a mode of
perception which is such that it supplies information about one and only one
object, and doesn't require the identification of this object. This is a mode of
perception unlike any with which we are familiar. Given these significant
differences, one might wonder what work there is left for the analogy with
perception to do. Perhaps there can be a mode of perception which supplies
us with information about one and only one object - bodily awareness may
satisfy this description. It is however hard to conceive of a mode of
perception that doesn't require the subject to identify the object perceived.
As soon as we say that the subject must identify herself when she
introspects, we introduce the possibility of misidentification, but this brings
the view of introspective knowledge as perceptual knowledge into direct
conflict with the claim that l-thoughts are IEM.
Could HOP theories explain the knowledge I have that I am thinking about
myself when I entertain an l-thought? I shall argue that they can do so only
by presupposing what they are seeking to explain. Thus HOP theories fail
both tests I have set for an adequate theory of self-consciousness.
When I know that I am thinking about myself I know that an identity holds
between the person that is having this thought and the object of this thought.
To see this, recall once again what happens when I discover that it is me
making a mess in the supermarket. I realise that the person having the
thought <1 am making a mess> is identical with the person making the mess.
Let us assume for the moment that HOP theories do take the mode of
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perception by which I have introspective access to my conscious states to
involve identification of myself as the person making the mess, thereby
rejecting IEM. Either I identify myself on the basis of some of my perceived
properties in the same way as I might identify some other person, or else I
receive information about myself which somehow allows me to identify
myself demonstratively. Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn.
If a subject S is to identify herself by means of properties [p1, p2, p3...pn],
she must know that she is the unique possessor of these properties. For we
have seen how it is a feature of introspection that it gives us access to the
conscious states of one and only one subject at any given moment. How
can S know that she is the possessor of these identifying properties? If we
say she knows she has properties [p1, p2, p3...pn] because this fact is
something she perceives we must ask again how S knows that she is
perceiving herself rather than some other individual when she perceives an
individual that has properties [p7, p2, p3...p„]? Perhaps she makes use of
further identifying properties [q1, q2, q3...qn] in order to single out herself as
the person with identifying properties [p1, p2, p3...pn]. If so, we will face the
same question once again: how does S know that she is the person with
identifying properties [q1, q2, q3...qn]2 By now we should see that a regress
has begun. It is a regress which can be ended only by allowing that S can
know she is thinking about herself without any recourse to identification.
What we are trying to explain is how I come by this knowledge. Thus it
would seem that a proponent of a HOP theory must presuppose what he is
seeking to explain or else run the risk of incurring a vicious regress.
There is at least one way out of this mire for a proponent of a HOP theory.
He could deny that the subject needs to be in possession of any
identification information in order to perceive that he* is in a particular
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conscious state. When we identify an object x demonstratively we do not
need to make reference to perceived properties of x which distinguish x from
other objects. When one identifies an object by means of a demonstrative
expression such as "this" or "that" it is necessary that there be what Evans
(1982) describes as an "informational link" connecting one to the object that
one identifies. The subject gets information about the position of her body,
her location in space, and of what she is doing at any given moment. Could
it be that she can exploit information of this kind to identify that she is herself
S when judging that she* is in a mental state M?
When I think about myself by means of "I" there is no possibility of my
failing to refer to myself. This is one of the lessons we can take from
Descartes' cogito. The one proposition Descartes entertains which he
concludes is not subject to doubt is the proposition "I think". No
demonstrative expression has this feature of guaranteed reference. It is
consistent with any use of "this" or "that" that the entity we pick out by means
of these expressions fails to exist, perhaps because it is imagined or
hallucinated. Equally when a subject takes himself to refer to the same
object at different times by means of a demonstrative it is possible for him to
make a mistake. Perhaps the object he refers to at a later time is
qualitatively identical but numerically distinct from the object he referred to at
an earlier time.
These possibilities to one side there is an additional problem which
renders demonstrative identification ill-suited to play the role of "I" in I-
thoughts. It seems perfectly possible for S to single out an object by means
of a demonstrative expression which happens to be S but for S to fail to
know she is referring to herself.41 Yet the HOP theorist is appealing to
41 See Castaneda (1966) for arguments along these lines against analysing first-person
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demonstrative identification to explain how a subject knows that she is
thinking about herself when she thinks an l-thought. Any attempt to model
the subject's identification on demonstrative identification must fail to capture
what it has set out to explain. For recall that we are currently considering
whether FIOP can account for a subject's knowledge that he is thinking about
himself when he entertains an l-thought. I conclude then that HOP theory
fails to give us a satisfactory account of reflective self-consciousness. Let us
turn our attention now to higher-order thought theories (henceforth HOT
theories) having given HOP theories a run for their money.
HOT theorists introduce a distinction between introspective and non-
introspective consciousness which doesn't seem to be available to HOP
theorists. According to HOT theory a mental state is non-introspectively
conscious when it either is or could be accompanied by a HOT. HOT
theorists disagree amongst themselves as to whether a mental state must
actually be accompanied by a HOT or whether it suffices for a creature to be
disposed to produce a HOT.42 I can't see how being disposed to produce a
HOT could make it the case that an experience actually seems or feels a
certain way to a subject.43 For this reason I shall confine my discussion to
reference as a demonstrative form of reference. The very same difficulty arises for the first
proposal which claims a subject can identify herself by means of some identifying properties.
Again it is possible for an individual to single out herself by means of some properties she
has but fail to realise she is referring to herself. See footnote 20 for one of Castaneda's
examples.
42
Dennett (1978) and Carruthers (2000) defend a dispositionalist account of HOT theory,
while Rosenthal (1986; 1990 & 1993) defends an actualist version of HOT theory.
43 Carruthers (2000: ch.9, §3) tries to finesse this difficulty by appeal to consumer semantics
(see Millikan (1984) for the account of consumer semantics Carruthers draws on). A
consumer system is a system that uses a representation in the course of guiding behaviour,
applying recognitional concepts, making inferences etc. Carruthers argues that it is presence
to such consumer systems that confers on a representation its phenomenology. Particularly
important in Carruthers' account is the presence of a representation to a theory of mind
module which is capable of producing HOTs. Being presented to such a consumer system
renders the creature capable of thinking that an experience seems or feels a certain way.
Carruthers' account responds to the problem I have just raised but still the suspicion
remains that there is something magical at work in his account. How can the mere
disposition to think that one is undergoing an experience generate an experience that
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higher-order theories which take a mental state to be conscious if the
creature actually represents that it is itself in this mental state.
HOT theories claim to be able to recognise the special epistemic access a
subject has to his own conscious mental states. This is something they take
themselves to have explained by appealing to the non-inferential access that
a subject has to his experiences when they are accompanied by a HOT 44
Recall that a subject becomes introspectively conscious when he makes a
conscious mental state the target of a further HOT. The HOT that
accompanies a subject's conscious mental state gives the subject
unmediated epistemic access to his own conscious mental states. All the
subject need do in order to know his own conscious mental states in the first
person is make a conscious mental state he is in the object of a further HOT.
This HOT will give the subject direct and immediate epistemic access to his
own conscious mental states.
How on this theory, do I know that it is me I am thinking about when I think
I am in a conscious state F? When a person says 'I am in pain' we take this
utterance of T to refer to its speaker, the person that produced this
utterance. Rosenthal (2002 & 2004) has argued that we should think of T as
functioning in an analogous way in a HOT. When I token a HOT the content
of which is <1 am in a mental state M>, I produce a thought that refers to me,
for it is me that has tokened this thought. "I" works in such a way that each
HOT I have represents a mental state I am in as belonging to me, the person
actually seems or feels a certain way? If phenomenal character is conceived of as
something of which a subject is actually conscious, I cannot see how the appeal to what
consumer systems could do with a representation is ever going to succeed in accounting for
phenomenal character. This is a difficulty that disappears once we think of phenomenology
as something with which a creature is conscious of things in its environment. Then we can
appeal to the presence of a representation to consumer systems to account for how a
representation can be known from the inside. I will make a move along these lines in chapter
7.
44
For an example of this kind of explanation see Rosenthal (1990/1997: 737-8).
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that has produced that HOT. This is not to say that the content of a HOT
should be taken to be <the producer of this thought is in a mental state M> 45
When a subject thinks I am in M he doesn't actually refer to himself as the
thinker of this very thought: the HOT he tokens doesn't describe him in this
way. Nevertheless by tokening a HOT a subject is thereby disposed to think
about himself in this way. This is because "I" works in such a way as to forge
a connection between a token thought and the thinker of this thought. It is in
virtue of this connection holding that the subject is thereby disposed to think
of himself as the thinker of the thought in which "I" occurs.
Can such a view recognise the phenomenon of IEM? Recall that I-
thoughts are IEM insofar as it is not possible for me think that I am in a
conscious state F and think something false because, although someone is
in F, it is not me that is in F. Rosenthal distinguishes between a strong form
of IEM and a weaker variety. A proponent of strong IEM will claim that when
I think I am in F, I cannot be wrong about whether it is I myself that is in F.
The weaker form of IEM says that when I think I am in F I cannot be
mistaken that I am the individual who thinks he is in F. Rosenthal rejects
strong IEM. He claims that if I am labouring under the misconception that I
am Napoleon, I will misidentify myself when I token an l-thought. Since in
these circumstances I will be mistaken about who it is that I am. Rosenthal
infers I must be able to make a mistake about which person it is I am thinking
about when I token an l-thought. Suppose I think I am in pain. If I think I am
Napoleon, Rosenthal claims I will misidentify myself when I think I am in pain
for I will think Napoleon is in pain. It is on this basis, so far as I can tell, that
Rosenthal rejects the stronger form of IEM.
45
Rosenthal (2002) notes that if every HOT was about itself, we would have to say that "each
HOT makes one conscious of that very HOT, and hence that all HOTs are conscious."
(p.331) Yet Rosenthal wants to say that we are only conscious of a HOT when we make it
the object of an act of reflection. This objection was first raised by Natsoulas (1993).
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Rosenthal is right that we can sometimes misidentify ourselves, as I would
do if I were to suddenly think that I am Napoleon. I am not persuaded
however that he has established we can misidentify ourselves when we
token an l-thought. In the case Rosenthal describes I misidentify myself by
thinking about myself as Napoleon, but I do not think Napoleon is in
conscious state F when I think I am in conscious state F. As has often been
noted I can still use "I" to think about myself even if I suddenly find myself
amnesiac, I can for instance think to myself <who am l?> 46 Thus even
though I can be confused about my own identity it doesn't follow that when I
use "I" either in thought or talk, I will be mistaken about who it is I am
referring to.
Rosenthal thinks that when I employ the first-person pronoun to refer to
myself, it is not my use of "I" that singles me out from other individuals.
Rosenthal claims that there is no single way in which we identify ourselves
when we refer to ourselves in the first-person. Instead we appeal to a whole
range of considerations, such as bodily features, events from our past,
various psychological propensities and dispositions.47 What unifies these
disparate factors is that in each case I believe something about myself in the
first-person, but it is not the fact that I think about myself in the first-person in
each of these cases that does the work in singling me out from other
individuals. Rosenthal seems to think that I identify myself by means of all
the propositions I believe about myself. Presumably Rosenthal will say of the
amnesiac case that when I use "I" to refer to myself in such circumstances I
can single out the thinker of the thought in which a token of "I" occurs but I
cannot single out myself.
46
The example is Anscombe's (1994).
47 See Rosenthal (2002: §IV & 2004 §V)
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One will only accept Rosenthal's argument against the stronger form of
IEM if one grants to him that we do indeed identify ourselves by means of
these various beliefs. For then it will be possible for us to hold false beliefs
about ourselves, and hence misidentify ourselves as a consequence of these
false beliefs. I can't see why any advocate of strong IEM will go along with
Rosenthal's account of self-identification. They will deny that in order to
know we are thinking about ourselves when we token an l-thought we must
identify ourselves by means of the various beliefs we have about ourselves.
We know we are referring to ourselves when we token an l-thought because
to token an l-thought is to think about oneself self-consciously. Thus a
proponent of strong IEM will reject any role for first-person beliefs of the kind
Rosenthal describes. If Rosenthal is to justify his rejection of strong I EM he
needs to persuade us of his own account of self-identification. All he has
shown so far as I can tell is that there is an alternative position one can take
on self-identification to that taken by proponents of strong IEM. I cannot find
any reason for preferring his account to the one I have endorsed above.
Rosenthal does allow that l-thoughts have what he describes as a "weak"
form of IEM. A subject cannot think that she is in a conscious state F but be
mistaken about who it is that thinks she is in F. Rosenthal explains: "The
error I cannot make is to think, when I have a conscious pain, for example,
that the individual that has that pain is someone distinct from me..." (2004:
171). Rosenthal explains this immunity to error as being a consequence of
the phenomenon of first-person reference.48 The content of my thought that
I am in a mental state M, refers to me, the individual I could describe as the
thinker of this thought. If when I think I am in pain, I am also thereby
disposed to think that I am the individual who thinks he is in pain, it is not
48
See Rosenthal (2002: 344-9 & 2004: 168-176, pp.173)
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possible for me to make the mistake of thinking that the individual who thinks
that he is in pain is someone else other than me. This is because having the
thought I am in pain makes me disposed to think that I am the person having
this very thought. Weak IEM falls out of the feature of l-thoughts whereby
just by having such a thought I am disposed to think that I am the person
having it.
HOT theory does seem to allow for weak IEM at least. Is accounting for
weak IEM enough to explain what it is for a subject to be reflectively self-
conscious? Strong IEM was introduced to explain one of the ways in which
when a subject tokens an l-thought she is self-conscious. It was argued that
the subject doesn't need to identify herself because when she thinks I am in
M she is conscious of herself, she is self-conscious. Weak IEM falls out of
the disposition a subject has when he thinks about himself in the first person
to think that he is the thinker of this very thought. Thus Rosenthal will have
to say that the subject is conscious of himself - he is self-conscious - in
virtue of instantiating this disposition.
Rather than press Rosenthal on this claim, let us consider whether his
account can handle the second feature of reflective self-consciousness I
described. Recall that when I think <1 am making a mess>, I know that the
person that is making a mess is identical with the person having this thought.
Can HOT theory account for this knowledge? I think not.
The account Rosenthal has given of self-identification is such that when I
think "I am F" I am disposed to think <the thinker of this very thought is F>. I
use the various beliefs I have about myself to determine that I am the thinker
of this very thought. The trouble is that these various beliefs leave plenty of
room for me to wonder whether it is really me that is F. This conflicts with my
claim that l-thoughts do not leave room for doubt of this kind. Just by my
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having such a thought, I know I am identical with the thinker of this thought.
This is knowledge that HOT theory cannot account for. The account HOT
theory has given of self-reference will always leave it open for me to wonder
whether it is me that is F when I think <1 am F>. This is a question which I
have argued shouldn't make sense given an adequate account of reflective
self-consciousness.
I conclude then that HOT theory also fails at least one of the tests I have
set for an adequate theory of reflective self-consciousness. We have
considered three different versions of the reflection theory and found each of
them wanting. I take this to supply support for the dependence thesis. I will
finish up by briefly considering the relevance the argument of this chapter
has for the claim that naturalists cannot admit subjective facts. I will argue
that the account we have given of phenomenal character can help to make
this claim more precise. First of all let me briefly summarise the argument of
this chapter so far.
The aim of the chapter has been to explain why there is something rather
than nothing it is like for a subject to undergo a conscious experience. I
began by arguing that a state is like something for a subject - it has a
"phenomenal character" - when it can be known in the first-person. A state
can be known in the first-person I suggested only because it seems or feels
a certain way to its subject.
We then sketched two possible accounts of phenomenal character, both
consistent with an intentionalist account of phenomenal properties. The first
claimed that a state's phenomenal character is something of which a subject
is conscious. The second claimed that phenomenal character is something
with which a subject is conscious. I went on to argue that higher-order
theories subscribe to the first account of phenomenal character and
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intentionalists to the second. This left us needing to choose between these
two distinct accounts of phenomenal character.
In the latter half of the chapter I introduced the phenomenologist's account
of consciousness as pre-reflective self-consciousness. According to this
account, a state has phenomenal character when a subject implicitly
represents that he himself is in this state. I argued for the phenomenological
account of phenomenal character over that of the higher-order theorist by
defending the dependence thesis: the phenomenologist's claim that a state
can become reflectively self-conscious only if it is already pre-reflectively
self-conscious. We saw earlier in the chapter that when a subject has first-
person knowledge of a conscious state or activity he is self-conscious. The
self-consciousness that accompanies first-person knowledge is reflective
self-consciousness. According to the phenomenologist then, a subject can
have first-person knowledge of a mental state only if M is pre-reflectively self-
conscious. We have also argued that a state can be known in the first-
person only if it seems or feels a certain way to a subject, only if it has
phenomenal character. By defending the claim that reflective self-
consciousness depends on pre-reflective self-consciousness we get an
argument for the phenomenologist's account of phenomenal character. By
arguing that higher-order theories cannot account for reflective self-
consciousness we have also in effect argued that they cannot account for
first-person knowledge. I have claimed this is precisely what they must
explain if they are to account for phenomenal character. Thus the argument
of this section has not only supplied a defence of the dependence thesis. It
has also given us a reason to prefer the phenomenologist's account of
phenomenal character over its rival. Once we think of phenomenal character
as that which makes it possible to know one's own mind in the first-person, it
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will follow that only the phenomenologist can explain what it is for a
conscious state to have phenomenal character. For only the
phenomenologist can explain how a state can be known in the first-person.
I will finish up by returning to the argument that naturalists cannot admit
subjective facts. Recall that it was argued that naturalists give us an account
of reality which abstracts away from a particular subject's point of view as
much as is possible. By taking science as a guide to where there is, the
phenomenologist argued that naturalism must fail to acknowledge all of the
ways in which the reality we experience depends on us for its existence.
Standing behind this sketch of an argument is the assumption that science
trades exclusively in objective descriptions of reality, where a description is
"objective" if it doesn't make reference to a subject or a subject's point of
view. If science gives us objective descriptions of reality, it is inferred that
science must leave out from its description of reality any properties and
entities the existence of which is dependent on subjects and their points of
view.
For many philosophers it has seemed that phenomenal character must be
an example of a property that depends for its existence on subjects of
experience. Something like this view of phenomenal character as an
essentially subjective property stands behind the thought that a scientific
description of consciousness must fail to account for phenomenal character.
The account of phenomenal character which I have advanced in this chapter
tells us why phenomenal character might be thought to be essentially
subjective. It also uncovers an assumption behind the thought that any
property that is essentially subjective must be left out from a scientific
description of reality. Let us take each of these points in turn.
The account of phenomenal character I have proposed says that an
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experience has phenomenal character when it can be known in the first
person, and that a conscious state can be known in the first-person when it
is pre-reflectively self-conscious. To say phenomenal character is essentially
subjective is to claim that necessarily, if there exists an experience E that
seems or feels a certain way then there also exists some subject for whom
experience E seems or feels a certain way. We can see why this might be
true on the account the phenomenologist has given us. Phenomenal
character is essentially subjective on this theory because whenever an
experience seems or feels a certain way, a subject implicitly represents
himself having this experience. It is a subject's representing himself having
an experience that makes it the case that the experience he is having seems
or feels a certain way to him. We must make reference to the subject having
an experience in order to account for phenomenal character because it is the
subject's consciousness of himself having this experience that makes it the
case that the experience has a phenomenal character.
I have said that we can use this account of phenomenal character to
explain why phenomenal character must be missing from an objective
description of reality. I take it that Sartre put his finger on the intuition that
drives this thought when he said that a person's body is 'either a thing
among other things, or it is that by which things are revealed to me. But it
cannot be both at the same time.' (2000: 304) Sartre is claiming here that
when we are aware of ourselves as subjects we are not aware of ourselves
as objects, as one "thing among other things".49 Any objective description of
49
This is a claim that has been argued against at length by Cassam (1997). Merleau-Ponty
holds a position which differs from Sartre's in important respects. He describes self-
awareness as an awareness of a subject-object. Like Sartre, and unlike Cassam, he argues
that the awareness we have of ourselves as subjects is qualitatively different from the
awareness we have of ourselves as objects. This is a distinction he captures by
distinguishing what he calls "the phenomenal body" from the "objective body" (see for
instance Merleau-Ponty's discussion of Schneider in Part 1, ch.3, pp.105). Of course
Merleau-Ponty doesn't think that the phenomenal body is a distinct body from the objective
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reality might be able to capture what we are conscious of when we are
conscious of ourselves as objects. There is nothing about this
consciousness that is particular to me. However when I am conscious of
myself as subject of an experience I am aware of myself qua subject. I am
aware of the ways in which my experiences seem or feel to me. Sartre
thinks it the latter kind of awareness that cannot be described as an
awareness of a thing among other things. It is an awareness that is
particular to me. It is the awareness I have of the way my experiences seem
or feel to me which will be missing from any objective description of the
conscious mind.
This characterisation of what it is for a property to be essentially subjective
puts us in a position to state the phenomenologist's argument against
naturalism more precisely. The argument proceeds as follows:
(P1) Naturalism gives us objective descriptions of reality.
(P2) To be aware of oneself as subject is not to be aware of oneself as an
object.
(P3) A conscious state S has phenomenal character only if the subject
that is in this state is aware of herself as being in S - if she is aware of
herself qua subject of S.
(P4) The objective descriptions of the natural sciences can represent the
awareness we have of ourselves as an object.
(P5) No objective description can represent the awareness we have of
ourselves as subjects.
(P6) Naturalism will leave out from its description of reality, the
awareness we have of ourselves as subjects.
(CON) Naturalism will leave phenomenal character out from its description
of reality.
body. His view is that each of us has one body which is presented to us in two different
ways. What Merleau-Ponty argues against is any attempt to reduce the phenomenal body to
the objective body. In other words, he argues against views which would try to identify the
ways in which I represent my bodies when I am aware of my body as subject the ways in
which I represent my body when I am aware of it as an object.
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The next chapter will argue that naturalism can admit subjective facts. It will
argue against the claim that there is something particular to me about the
experiences I undergo that cannot be given an objective description. Thus I
will be rejecting (P5). Once we have shown that naturalism can admit
subjective facts, this will clear the way for me to make use of the
phenomenologist's descriptions of consciousness in developing a naturalistic
account of phenomenal consciousness.
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Chapter 6
Introduction
I have attributed to phenomenologists the view that the conception of reality
we take from naturalism will prove incomplete by failing to include subjective
facts. My aim in this chapter will be to argue that the phenomenologist is
wrong to claim that a naturalist conception of reality couldn't include
subjective facts. I argued in chapter 3 that it is the existence of subjective
facts which is responsible for the gap in our scientific explanations of the
conscious mind. Supposing this is right, it follows that what the naturalist
must do to close the gap is to show how subjective facts can be assimilated
into a scientific account of the mind. In the final chapter I shall sketch an
account of the conscious mind which attempts to do just that. There I will
argue that the naturalist can bridge the gap by developing an account of the
conscious mind which takes its lead from phenomenological description.
So far the phenomenologist's case against naturalism has rested on the
assertion that naturalists can include in their account of what is real only
those facts that can be represented from no particular point of view. Since
subjective facts are facts that can only be represented from a particular point
of view, the phenomenologist concludes that any naturalistic conception of
reality must fail to include subjective facts.1
1 My definition of "subjective facts" as facts that can only be represented from a particular
subject's point of view may look confused at first glance. It might be objected that when we
talk about representations that can only be produced from a point of view we are talking
about our mode of epistemic access to a fact. It may be true that there are certain modes of
access to the world that are essentially tied to a point of view. It certainly doesn't follow that
there are any facts which are dependent on our taking up a point of view. (Nagel's
discussion of what it is like to be a bat and Jackson's knowledge argument are often
accused of making this kind of error. See for instance Mellor (1991a); Moore (1997, ch.3);
Peacocke (1989); Van Gulick (1993/1997)). I have responded to this kind of worry in chapter
3. Phenomenologists claim that the world we experience is literally shaped by our ways of
representing it. On this view our ways of representing things do not just constitute our mode
of epistemic access to the world. They can also play a role in constituting the objects we
experience. The extent to which one finds this persuasive will of course all depend on the
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I shall argue that the tension that seems to exist between a commitment
to subjective facts and a naturalist conception of reality is only apparent. The
argument I have just sketched rests on an assumption I shall label "the
independence assumption". It claims that a complete and exhaustive
conception of reality will be composed of representations that can be
produced independent of any particular point of view. Thus a naturalist who
is committed to the independence assumption will indeed endorse a
conception of reality that has no room in it for subjective facts.
In chapter 1 I identified two naturalising strategies: naturalisation by
assimilation and naturalisation by elimination. A naturalist who endorses the
independence assumption must adopt the latter strategy; he must seek the
elimination of subjective facts. Flowever, it is generally the case that the
naturalist will seek to eliminate some property or entity only when that entity
or property ceases to serve any explanatory purpose. Thus a naturalist
would seek to eliminate subjective facts only if he could identify a set of facts
represented from no particular point of view which perform all of the
explanatory work of subjective facts. I shall argue that there is no such set of
facts. It follows that the independence assumption must be rejected.
Without the independence assumption the argument the phenomenologist
has given against naturalism fails. So we can conclude that a naturalist
could, in principle, make room for subjective facts. The work of showing that
a naturalist can, in fact, accept a commitment to subjective facts will be
carried out in my final chapter.
In section 1 I outline two arguments given in previous chapters for
believing in the existence of subjective facts. I show how these arguments
considerations phenomenologists advance in favour of this claim. See chapters 2 and 4 for
discussion of these considerations.
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proceed from claims about the kind of representation characteristic of
conscious experience. Section 2 reconstructs the argument the
phenomenologists give for the conclusion that a commitment to subjective
facts is incompatible with naturalism. In Section 3 I outline my strategy for
refuting this argument. This strategy involves first showing how subjective
facts can be assimilated and then developing an argument for the conclusion
that they cannot be eliminated.
Both the arguments that I have given for saying that there are subjective
facts proceed from a claim about the kind of representation characteristic of
conscious experience. One way to show that subjective facts can be
assimilated would be to show that the kinds of representations to which
appeal has been made in arguing for subjective facts can be assimilated.
Section 4 describes more precisely this class of representations. I show how
representations of this kind can meet the requirements for assimilation.
Section 5 argues that representations of this kind play an essential role in
explaining behaviour. I will take this result to establish the ineliminability of
subjective facts. If subjective facts are ineliminable, the independence
assumption must be false. It cannot be the case that a complete and
exhaustive conception of reality will be composed of representations from no
particular point of view. Without this assumption the argument against
naturalism fails. We will no longer have any grounds for thinking that there
is an incompatibility between naturalism and a commitment to subjective
facts. I will have shown that room can be found within naturalism for a
commitment to subjective facts.
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1. Two Arguments for Subjective Facts
In the previous chapters I have given two apparently independent arguments
in defence of the claim that there are subjective facts. The first argument
was given in the course of developing an answer to the question why our
experiences should feel or seem a particular way to us. I shall call it "the
argument from the contents of experience". The answer I returned to this
question identified phenomenal properties with representational properties:
an experience seems or feels a certain way, I said, in virtue of its
representational content. Phenomenologists make a general claim about
how our thoughts and experience get their representational content. They
claim that our intentional states have representational content before we take
up any relation to the world. I have interpreted this idea as claiming that our
thoughts and experiences have a representational content which originates in
our operative and cognitive modes of understanding. These modes of
understanding literally shape or constitute the kinds of situations we can
represent.
How does the argument from the contents of experience get from this
claim to the conclusion that there are subjective facts? Suppose we agree
with the phenomenologist that our operative and reflective modes of
understanding constitute the situations we can represent. A creature could
share a world with us - it could represent what we represent - only by
coming to share our ways of understanding the world. Facts that can be
represented only by coming to share our modes of understanding are facts
that can only be represented from a point of view - the point of view of
creatures who share our modes of understanding. It follows that the facts we
can represent are subjective facts. The argument from the contents of
experiences gives us a reason for believing in subjective facts by appealing
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to the role our modes of understanding play in constituting the world we think
about and experience.
The second argument for subjective facts was sketched at the end of the
previous chapter. I shall label it "the argument from the experience of
content". This argument was developed in the course of returning an answer
to the question of what it is for an experience to seem or feel a certain way to
its subject. I claimed that an experience seems or feels a certain way to a
subject when it is knowable in a first-person way. I proceeded to argue that
an experience can be known in this way only if it is also already pre-
reflectively self-conscious (henceforth "PRSC"), which is to say that an
experience can be known in a first-person way only if I am aware of myself
qua subject of this thought or experience.
We saw Sartre assert that the awareness I have of myself qua subject is
different in kind from the awareness I have of myself qua object. To be
aware of oneself qua subject is, Sartre thinks, to be aware of oneself in a way
that no one else can be aware of you. It is this point that will form the basis
for the argument from the experience of content. Before we can see how we
must unpack what Sartre has in mind.
In chapter 5 I characterised PRSC in terms of two types of properties
which I shall refer to as "Pi" and "P2" respectively. Whenever a subject is
PRSC properties of these two types will be instantiated. The first property,
Pi, we can characterise as the property of representing some object or state
of affairs. The second property, P2, is a property of P-i which modifies the
way in which the subject is representing an object or state of affairs. P2
makes the subject simultaneously aware of herself undergoing an experience
and of the object she is experiencing.
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This characterisation of PRSC can help us to explain the sense in which
to be aware of oneself qua subject is to be aware of oneself in a way that no
one else can be aware of you. Only I can instantiate P2 and in the process
be aware of myself instantiating property Pi - the property which consists of
being in a representational state which purports to represent an object x. If
anyone else instantiates this property P2, they will be aware of themselves
being in a state which instantiates Pi. Instantiating P2 will not suffice to make
them aware of me undergoing an experience purporting to represent some
object x. It follows that I have a way of being aware of myself that is
available only to me and to no one else but me.
The latter conclusion forms the basis for the argument from the
experience of content. Suppose there is a fact which holds when a subject is
undergoing a conscious experience as of x. According to the above
characterisation of PRSC, this fact will obtain only if two representational
properties are instantiated, Pi and P2. When P2 obtains the subject will be
aware of herself being in a state which instantiates Pi. The way that S will
thereby represent herself is a way in which no one else can represent her.
When S represents herself in this way, she represents a fact that can only be
represented from her point of view. If anyone else were to instantiate P2 they
wouldn't represent S undergoing an experience as of x, but would instead
represent themselves. Thus the fact that obtains when a subject undergoes
a conscious experience as of x will, on this account of conscious experience,
be a subjective fact. It will be a fact that can only be represented from a
subject's point of view.
The argument from the contents of experience, and the argument from
the experience of content seem to take very different routes to the conclusion
that there are subjective facts. There is however an important connection
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between them. Each argues from a different feature of the structure of
conscious experience. The first argument proceeds from a claim about how
our perceptual experiences get their intentional contents. The second argues
from a claim about the modes of representation characteristic of our
conscious experience. In both cases it is claimed that there is something
about the intentional structure of consciousness that warrants an appeal to
subjective facts.
There is a further connection between the two arguments worth
mentioning before I turn to the main concern of this chapter, the anti-
naturalist conclusion phenomenologists draw from the existence of subjective
facts. In chapter 2 I explained how our operative understanding shapes the
contents of our experience when we are skilfully dealing with things. This
account was based on a description of our existence as persons skilfully
acting in pursuit of some project or goal. I will argue that the descriptions
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty give of PRSC also derive from descriptions of our
existence as persons acting in the world. What these descriptions highlight is
an aspect of our existence as persons neglected by Fleidegger, namely our
embodiment.2
Heidegger as I have been interpreting him describes our being-in-the-
world as consisting of our knowledge of how to find our way about in the
world. The understanding I have of myself and my own existence is shaped
by the activities in which I engage, and the public understanding of those
activities.3 Merleau-Ponty and Sartre in no way wish to contradict this
description of our existence. Instead they wish to supplement it. What their
2
For a critique of Heidegger along these lines see Alweiss (2003)
3
Here I am drawing on Division 1 of Being and Time. In Division 2 Heidegger will describe
the understanding we have ourselves derived from others as "inauthentic". He will explain
how an individual can take up an authentic relation to herself. The existential concerns of
Division 2 however do nothing to remedy Heidegger's neglect of the body.
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notion of PRSC adds to Heidegger's account of being-in-the-world is an
emphasis on the role embodiment plays in shaping our operative
understanding.
Merleau-Ponty describes how each of us experiences the world through
his or her body. He identifies what I have been calling "operative
understanding" with this understanding I have of things through my body.
One of the ways in which I can perceive a thing's spatial properties, for
instance, is by being prepared to act on that thing in appropriate ways.4 In
advance of taking hold of an object, I will for instance scale my grip in way
that is appropriate to the object I am reaching for. In directing my behaviour
appropriately towards a thing, I manifest a peculiar kind of bodily
understanding of that thing. In order to perceive a thing as requiring certain
movements of me, I must have some sense of which movements of my body
will be appropriate to that thing and which will not, as well as of the possible
movements open to me more generally. This selection from the possible
repertoire of behaviours involves some understanding on my part; it involves
an understanding of which movements will be appropriate for grasping the
object of my perception. This understanding forms an important part of what
I have been calling "operative understanding". It forms a part of the body of
knowledge I put to use in successfully negotiating the world while going
about my day to day business.
4
In fact Merleau-Ponty will describe two senses we have of a thing's spatial properties,
"spatiality of position" and "spatiality of situation" (1945/1962: 100). This is a central theme
in his discussion of Goldstein's patient Schneider in Book 1, ch.3. For further discussion of
this distinction see Kelly (2002). Kelly explains how Merleau-Ponty's distinction fits with a
hypothesis that the neuroscientists Milner and Goodale (1995) make about the workings of
the visual system. Based partly on their work with a patient suffering from Carbon Monoxide
poisoning, Milner and Goodale hypothesise two distinct streams of visual information flow in
the brain, the ventral and dorsal stream. Kelly argues that this finding fits with Merleau-
Ponty's claim that there are two distinct ways of understanding a thing's spatial properties.
The first is essentially bodily and is drawn on in reaching and grasping for a thing. The
second is cognitive and is drawn on in making reports and judgements about a thing's spatial
properties.
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This construal of our embodiment as shaping our understanding of
entities and their properties helps us to make sense of the peculiar claim
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre make repeatedly that our bodies shouldn't just be
understood as physical objects.5 What Merleau-Ponty and Sartre are denying
here is that our bodies are simply empirical items in the world with the same
status as any other empirical item. My body isn't simply an empirical item in
the world for it is the condition of the possibility of my understanding. It gives
form to my perceptual experiences.
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre share in common an account of the subject
according to which 'the body is the subject of perception' (Merleau-Ponty,
1962: 206). We have just seen Merleau-Ponty claim that it is through our
bodies that we experience a thing's spatial properties. It is my body that
experiences, and understands a thing's spatial properties as I reach and
grasp for a thing. If it is my body that is the subject of my experiences, we
can say that I am aware of myself qua subject by being aware of things
through my body. To say that the body is the subject of conscious
experience is to say that it is a subject's body that is aware of the objects of
her experience. The body isn't just the means by which a subject
experiences objects: it isn't merely an instrument which affords access to the
things in a subject's environment. A subject's experiences literally belong to
her body; it is a subject's body that undergoes those experiences.
5
Recall Sartre's claim that either my body 'is a thing among other things, or else it is that by
which things are revealed to me. But it can not be both at the same time.' (1943/2000: 304)
Merleau-Ponty famously rejects the distinction Sartre is insisting on here between what we
might call the "lived body" and the "perceived body". He points out that when one hand
touches the other the body is perceiver and perceived at one and the same time. (See the
discussion of so-called "double sensations", (1962: Part 1, ch.2, pp.93). For Merleau-Ponty
this kind of experience highlights a more general truth, that the body can be both the subject
and the object of our experiences. My embodied existence transcends the distinction
between subject and object insofar as it contains elements of both.
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This account of subjectivity as embodied tells us what it is for an
experience to be PRSC. We can say that a subject S is PRSC when S is
conscious of her own body undergoing an experience at the same time as
she is aware of the object or state of affairs her experience purports to
represent.6 On this understanding of PRSC to be aware of oneself qua
subject is to be aware of one's own body undergoing an experience.7
The two arguments I have given for subjective facts converge in Merleau-
Ponty's conception of our subjectivity as essentially embodied. Both
arguments for subjective facts turn out to be grounded in an appeal to our
being-in-the-world. The sense I have of my embodiment forms a central part
of the knowledge I draw on in successfully going about my day to day
business. It is a core part of my being-in-the-world which, I have argued,
forms the background that makes possible a subject's operative and
reflective understanding. We have just seen that this sense I have of
embodiment consists in the awareness I have of my body undergoing my
experiences. It is this bodily form of awareness that I have been calling
PRSC. It follows that for Merleau-Ponty PRSC is a core aspect of a subject's
being-in-the-world.
6
This is an idea that will be taken up in much more detail in the next chapter, where I will
present empirical work which strongly supports this characterisation of conscious
experience.
7
Sartre has a different take on PRSC to the one I have just presented. For Sartre the kind
of self-consciousness I have when I am PRSC is purely negative. In order to be presented
with an object in experience Sartre claims I must be conscious of myself as not being the
object of my experience. See the discussion of "presence" in Part 2, chapter 3 (1943/2000).
There Sartre will tell us at length how "The thing...is that which is present to consciousness
as not being consciousness." (op cit: 174) Sartre denies that it is possible for me to be
aware of an object X without also being aware that I am not X. All there is to a subject's
PRSC for Sartre is awareness that the object of his awareness is something other than
himself. To be aware of this fact Sartre thinks requires that the subject also be aware of
himself. Merleau-Ponty is deeply critical of this view of PRSC. Indeed it forms the basis for
a more general disagreement between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty about the nature of the
relation between mind and world. Where Sartre conceives of this relation as holding
between two radically different kinds of entity - being-in-itself and being for-itself, Merleau-
Ponty will insist in keeping with his view of PRSC, that the human body is both a being-in-
itself and a being-for-itself.
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Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's description of our embodiment we can say
that the two arguments for subjective facts are related in the following way.
The first argument takes our operative understanding in general and makes
an argument for subjective facts based on this phenomenon. It is our being-
in-the-world that makes possible our operative understanding. The second
takes a specific aspect of our operative understanding, namely the sense we
have of our embodiment, and argues for subjective facts from this feature.
Now we have reminded ourselves of the reasons that have been given for
subjective facts let us consider once again how these considerations are
employed by the phenomenologist to arrive at their anti-naturalist
conclusion.8
8
I have been arguing that PRSC should be understood as the mode of representation
characteristic of conscious experience. Kelly (2002) argues that we should think of the
distinction between attitude or mode of representation and content as breaking down in the
case of behaviours that draw on what I have been calling "operative intentionality" (and Kelly
following Merleau-Ponty calls 'motor intentionality'). One reason Kelly think this distinction
breaks down is because he thinks that states with operative intentionality do not have
propositional content. The skilful activity just is the representation in the case of states that
have operative intentionality. In discussing Milner and Goodale's patient D.F. he tells us 'she
seems...not to be able to represent the orientation of the slot at all except by means of
posting the card through it' (op cit p.388). Simplifying Kelly's reasoning somewhat, the idea
seems to be that there will only be room for making a distinction between a representation's
mode and content in cases where representational content is propositional. States that have
operative intentionality have non-conceptual content and non-conceptual content is non-
propositional. Therefore the traditional distinction between mode and content doesn't hold
for operative intentional states.
My characterisation of PRSC seems to conflict with Kelly's conclusion. I think the
existence of PRSC may give us a way of making the traditional distinction between mode
and content without treating operative intentional content as a variety of propositional
content. Unfortunately I cannot argue for this claim here. This point to one side, what Kelly
has done is give us a further way of making precise the connection between the two
arguments I have given for subjective facts. What his argument highlights is the way in
which the activity we are engaged in shapes operative intentional content at the same time
as it shapes our modes of representing. To be aware of oneself qua subject is to experience
the world through one's body. To understand an object operatively in terms of one's
dealings with it is likewise to experience that thing through one's body. Kelly shows us how
PRSC and operative understanding can be understood as one and the same phenomenon.
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2. The Anti-Naturalist Argument
Merleau-Ponty presents his version of phenomenology as uncovering a
sphere of our existence which remains hidden so long as we continue to
think about the world in naturalistic or scientific terms. He describes
phenomenology as a 'return to that world which precedes' scientific
theorising and 'to which every scientific schematisation is an abstract and
derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in
which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.' (1962:
ix)
Merleau-Ponty seems to be saying here that there is something
phenomenology can uncover which we can never come to know through our
scientific modes of theorising. What he seems to have in mind is the thought
that there are certain unreflective modes of understanding (which I have
characterised as operative modes of understanding) that we abstract away
from when we take up the standpoint of the scientist. Science only ever
gives us an abstract form of knowledge, the kind of knowledge we can attain
by adopting the detached impersonal method of inquiry characteristic of the
natural sciences. What we leave behind are our concrete, engaged ways of
understanding the world. According to the existential phenomenologists it is
these modes of understanding which are basic or fundamental. Indeed we
saw back in chapter 2 how the existential phenomenologist will try to argue
that our reflective modes of understanding depend on our pre-reflective
modes of understanding, in the sense that the former couldn't exist without
the latter.
At the end of chapter 2 I explained how Heidegger thought of being-in-
the-world as something like a transcendental condition which makes possible
both reflective and operative intentionality. What exactly are "transcendental
221
Making Room for Subjective Facts
conditions"? In Kant's philosophy transcendental conditions define the limits
or the boundaries of our knowledge. According to Kant we can have
knowledge of an objective world only insofar as our experiences have the
form of space and time imposed upon them, and only insofar as we can think
in accordance with the pure concepts of the understanding. What these
phenomenologists share in common with Kant is the idea that our experience
and thought must be conditioned in certain ways.9
Heidegger's claim that an entity's being depends upon our modes of
understanding is intended to be a transcendental claim. The idea is that our
practices, concerns and interests which taken together comprise our being-
in-the-world, constitute the condition of the possibility of understanding
something as something. For Heidegger it is our understanding of something
as something that is necessarily conditioned. Our operative and reflective
modes of understanding must of necessity conform to certain conditions, and
it is these conditions I am calling "transcendental".
Doesn't a claim along these lines commit existential phenomenology to a
variety of transcendental idealism? I don't think so.10 Heidegger tells us in
his 1927 lectures on Kant:
'Physical nature can only occur as intraworldly when world, i.e. Dasein,
exists. Nature can, however, very well be in its own way without
occurring as intraworldly, without human Dasein, and hence a world,
9
They depart from Kant in rejecting his idea of a necessarily unknowable, thing in itself. This
is just as well, for there is a long tradition extending back to Hegel which argues that to say
we cannot know the thing in itself is to say something self-stultifying. See Moore (1997: ch.6)
for a recent, characteristically clear formulation of this objection.
Heidegger insists that there is no sense in which a thing has being or an identity of its own
independent of our modes of understanding. Our understanding of being shapes both what
an entity is, as well as determining whether it is. Thus there would seem to be no room in
Heidegger's ontology for the existence of something - a thing in itself - that is not subject to
our modes of understanding.
10
Blattner (1994) argues for a reading of Heidegger as a transcendental idealist. See
chapter 2, §5 for a fuller defence of the position I take in this section. I discuss Blattner's
reading briefly in footnote 24 of that chapter.
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existing; and it is only because nature is by itself occurrent that it can also
confront Dasein within a world.' (Heidegger (1997: 19) quoted by Carman
(2003: 157))
Heidegger is conceiving of the "world" in this quotation as the place in which
we perceive and act. He is claiming that the world understood in this way
couldn't exist without us and our modes of understanding, but nature
certainly could, and would. Heidegger is making a distinction between the
"world" understood as a totality of ready-to-hand things, and "nature"
understood as a totality of present-at-hand things. Now of course entities
only exist as present-at-hand or as ready-to-hand when we understand them
as such. However we can understand Heidegger as claiming that the entities
which we understand as present-at-hand are the very same entities which
exist independently of us and our modes of understanding. Thus there will
be no room for an unknowable thing-in-itself which is a defining feature of
any form of transcendental idealism.
Central to the existential phenomenologist's anti-naturalism is the denial
that the only sense in which an entity can truly be said to exist is as
something present-at-hand, existing independently of us. Naturalists say that
science provides a complete and exhaustive account of what exists, but
science gives us descriptions of entities as they exist independently of us.
Thus the entities and properties which will appear on the naturalist's list of
what there is are those properties and entities that exist independently of us.
The existential phenomenologist complains that this is to level-off all the
others ways in which an entity can be said to exist. In particular it ignores all
of the entities and properties the existence of which essentially involves us.11
11 Sellars (1963) can profitably be read as grappling with a version of this problem. Sellars
sides with the naturalist in this debate.
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Why agree that the only entities and properties naturalists admit into their
ontology are entities and properties which exist independent of us? The idea
I take it is that scientific theories aim to represent the world independent of
any particular point of view. It is assumed that in doing so they aim to
represent a reality that is there anyway, existing independently of us. The
scientist will detach herself as much as possible from her own personal
perspective on this reality in order to achieve a view of reality as it exists
independent of her perspective.12 The reason why the scientist attempts to
describe the world from no point of view is so that she can describe the world
as it exists independently of us and the peculiar interests and concerns which
characterise our point of view on reality.
What the phenomenoiogist objects to in naturalism is the idea that to form
a true conception of reality we must abandon our ordinary modes of
understanding and represent the world from no point of view. I shall label
this the "independence assumption". The independence assumption says
that a true conception of reality will be composed of representations from no
particular point of view.
Existential phenomenology diagnoses two errors inherent in the
independence assumption. First of all, as already mentioned, naturalists are
charged with mistakenly supposing that an entity's being is exhausted by
what can be discovered by the natural sciences. The existential
phenomenoiogist will insist that science only ever accounts for the existence
an entity has independently of us. In the process, it overlooks all the ways in
which an entity's existence is dependent on us.
12
This is the conception of scientific practice employed by Nagel in his (1986) and
elsewhere. A similar idea is found in Williams' idea of an absolute conception, see Williams
(1978: 64-8). For a recent defence of the possibility of achieving an absolute conception see
Moore (1997, ch.4).
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The first objection rests on the idea that our modes of understanding
literally shape an entity's being. To understand an entity as something it has
been claimed that we must represent that entity from a particular point of
view, the point of view constituted by our being-in-the-world. Entities are
understood as having a particular identity which marks them out from other
entities only in virtue of the practices, concerns and interests definitive of our
being-in-the-world. It follows that there are ways in which entities exist which
essentially involve us and our being-in-the-world. This contradicts the
naturalist's claim that the only entities and properties which truly exist are
those described by the natural science whose existence in no way involves
us.
Second, it is argued that the naturalist forgets how all of our
understanding, including the reflective understanding which the naturalist
prioritises, is dependent on us and our being-in-the-world. It is the second
objection that all of our modes of understanding are conditioned by our
being-in-the-world that is doing much of the work in the case the existential
phenomenologist presents against naturalism. The naturalist, it is claimed,
forms a conception of reality composed of representations produced
independently of any particular point of view.13 It has been argued that every
representation we can produce independent of a particular point of view will
in fact presuppose the point of view constitutive of our being-in-the-world.
Thus there is something which cannot be represented by theories formed
from no particular point of view, and that is our being-in-the-world.
We can reconstruct the anti-naturalistic argument as follows:
13
I gave an account of how this is possible in chapter 2. The idea was that in taking up a
reflective standpoint we first decontextualise entities and their properties and then
recontextualise them using the models and theories of the natural sciences. This process of
recontextualising gives us knowledge of entities as they are independent of us, I suggested.
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(1) Let us assume for a reductio the independence assumption - the
claim that a complete and exhaustive conception of reality will be
composed of representations formed independently of any particular point
of view.
(2) There exists a point of view on reality, such that any representation we
produce can only be produced from this point of view. The existential
phenomenologist calls this point of view "being-in-the-world".
(3) Any conception of reality, including that which we form from the
natural sciences, will derive its intelligibility from the point of view
characterised by our being-in-the-world.
(4) There is something that cannot be represented independent of any
particular point of view, and that is our being-in-the-world.
(5) Hence there is something that a conception of reality formed from no
point of view can never include but must always presuppose.
Premise (5) contradicts premise (1)
(6) The independence assumption is false.
(7) Naturalists are committed to the independence assumption.
Conclusion: Naturalism must fail to provide a complete and exhaustive
conception of reality.
I will argue that premise (7) is mistaken - the naturalist needn't endorse the
independence assumption. Without the independence assumption the
phenomenologist has no argument for the conclusion that naturalism is
incompatible with a commitment to subjective facts. A naturalism that
accepts the existence of subjective facts is a naturalism that can accept
much of what is important in phenomenology.
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3. Making Room for Subjective Facts
In chapter 1, we saw that there are two ways to naturalise an entity or
property. I labelled these two strategies for naturalisation "elimination" and
"assimilation" respectively. I will begin with a reminder of the difference
between the two strategies for naturalising a putative property or entity.
The first strategy we can call "Naturalisation by Assimilation" (NBA for
short). In chapter 1 I took a proponent of NBA to be committed to showing
the following:
(NBA): For any putative natural phenomenon P there is (1) a set of
conditions [c^ c2, c3... cn] specifiable without reference to P, and (2) P is
realised by this set of conditions.
What is the nature of the realisation relation which NBA seeks to identify?
The notion of realisation is intended to characterise the relation between P
and the set of physical conditions the presence of which is sufficient for P. In
particular realisation talk is introduced to accommodate the possibility of P
being realised by a variety of distinct physical conditions. If P can be realised
by distinct physical conditions, we cannot take P to be type identical with any
of its realisers. For it will always be possible for P to occur in the absence of
any one of its particular realisers.14
The notion of P standing in a relation of realisation to physical conditions
buys a degree of autonomy for our non-physical descriptions of P. The
realisers of P might form such a heterogeneous class that we make no
explanatory gain by describing P at the level of the conditions that realise P.
Where this is not true and we can replace P with a description of the physical
14
Indeed it may even be possible for P to occur in the absence of any of the realisers we
have identified thus far. Of course if materialism is true, there must be some physical
conditions which P is realised by. However it may well be that we can never exhaustively
specify P's class of possible realisers.
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conditions that realise P without any explanatory loss, the appropriate
naturalising strategy to adopt is that of naturalisation by elimination ("NBE"
for short). A proponent of NBE is committed to the following claim:
(NBE): For any explanation in which P occurs, the set of physical
conditions [c-i, c2, c3... cn] that realise P can be substituted for P without
any explanatory loss.
The independence assumption requires the naturalist to seek the elimination
of subjective facts. It says that a complete and exhaustive conception of
reality can be formed from representations that are from no particular point of
view. This is to say that a complete and exhaustive account of reality will not
include a commitment to facts that can only be represented from a subject's
point of view. A naturalist who accepts the independence assumption cannot
allow for the existence of subjective facts. S/he must attempt to eliminate
subjective facts.
Generally naturalists only adopt NBE when appeal to some putative
natural phenomenon P can be shown to serve no explanatory purpose. If the
appeal to subjective facts can be shown to do genuine explanatory work,
there will be no need for the naturalist to eliminate them. Of course I will
only be able to demonstrate the real explanatory work subjective facts can do
by demonstrating concretely how a naturalist could assimilate facts of this
kind. This is something I won't attempt in the remainder of this chapter. It is
a challenge I shall take up in my final chapter. The remainder of this chapter
will explain how NBA is consistent with a rejection of the independence
assumption. I will begin by arguing that naturalists could assimilate
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subjective facts. Flaving done so, I will offer a reason for thinking that
subjective facts cannot be eliminated.15
4. Location Dependent Representation
The two arguments I have given for subjective facts - the arguments from the
content of experience, and the experience of content - have both proceeded
from claims about the kind of representational states characteristic of
conscious experience. I am going to concentrate on the argument from the
experience of content for the remainder of this chapter. My first aim will be to
characterise a kind of representational state that might make a subject aware
of herself at the same time as it makes the subject aware of something in the
world. I appealed to representational states of this kind in explaining what it
is for a state to be phenomenally conscious. Suppose I can show that
representations of this kind can be assimilated by naturalism. Then I will
have demonstrated that at least one of the reasons I have given for believing
in subjective facts is consistent with naturalism. This will still leave us
needing to show that a naturalist pursuing assimilation can accept the
argument from the contents of experience. I will make such an argument in
the first part of my final chapter.
The argument from the experience of content says I have a way of
representing myself which is available only to me and to no one else. Any
15
This argument will however rely on the account I have given of conscious experiences as
PRSC. On the assumption that this theory of consciousness is correct, I will have given an
argument for the conclusion that subjective facts can earn their explanatory keep. However
it remains to be shown that this account of consciousness can really earn its explanatory
keep. Since my aim is solely to refute the anti-naturalist argument this assumption is
harmless. I am assuming the phenomenological account of conscious experience solely in
order to show the naturalist need not accept the independence assumption. My aim is to
show that pace the anti-naturalist argument, a naturalist could and should accept the
existence of subjective facts. The work of describing what a naturalistic theory of subjective
facts might look like must wait till my final chapter.
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account of the type of representation characteristic of conscious experience
must accommodate this feature. It must explain how my experiences
represent me in a way that no one else can represent me.
Our theory of representation for conscious experience must also capture
the difference between experiences that are PRSC and experiences that are
made to be RSC (reflectively self-conscious) through an act of introspection.
Introspection on an experience of the blue sky for example, will make a
subject conscious that she herself is experiencing the blue sky. Through her
act of introspection the subject will become explicitly conscious that she
herself is undergoing an experience of this kind. Reflective self-
consciousness is however no part of an ordinary conscious experience. The
subject won't normally be explicitly conscious of herself when she is
undergoing a conscious experience. Nevertheless I have claimed that there
is a kind of self-consciousness that normally accompanies our ordinary
conscious experiences. I have claimed that a subject is always implicitly or
peripherally conscious of herself at the same time as she is explicitly
conscious of what she is experiencing. An account of the type of
representation characteristic of conscious experience must in addition
identify a type of state that can make the subject explicitly conscious of
something in the world and implicitly conscious of herself.
The type of representation we are attempting to describe has content
essentially tied to a subject's point of view. Let us begin by considering the
more general phenomenon of representations that are essentially tied to a
point of view. I shall call this class of representations "location dependent
representations" ("LDRs" for short). Having identified how LDRs work, we
can then apply what we have learned to the case of representations whose
contents are essentially tied to a subject's point of view.
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A representation R is "location dependent" if there can be no difference in
the location from which R was produced without there also being a difference
in R's content. Photographic representations qualify as LDRs. There can be
no difference in the location from which the photograph was produced - the
time and place at which it was taken - without there also being a difference in
what the photograph depicts. Taking the photograph from a particular place
(a particular location) will capture one part of a scene that will be captured in
a different way, or perhaps not at all, if one varies the place from which the
picture is taken. Taking the photograph at a particular time will determine the
kind of light that is captured in the photograph.
LDRs represent in two kinds of way. They have contents which purport to
represent some object or state of affairs explicitly. I shall argue that an LDR
also implicitly represents the location from which it has been produced.
Consider by way of illustration the following example. Scattered around town
in Edinburgh are brass plaques placed in the pavement which represent to
tourists the best places for taking photographs of the city.16 All the
photographs taken from one of these plaques, will share a similar content,
they will depict similar scenes. Indeed it is not too misleading to say that the
fact that a photograph's depicts a particular view of the castle is dependent
on the photograph's having been taken from one of Edinburgh's
recommended vantage points. Now I want to say that the location from
which a photograph is taken is implicitly represented in the photograph. It is
implicitly represented because taking a photograph with a particular content
depends on the photograph being taken from a particular location. Taking a
picture from a brass plaque facing Edinburgh's castle will entail (other things
being equal) a picture of a particular view of the castle.
16
Thanks to Denis Walsh for the nice example.
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Clearly a photograph does not represent the location from which it was
taken in the same way as it represents a view of the castle. The brass
plaque a tourist stood on to get his picture of the castle does not figure in
what we see when we look at the resulting photograph of the castle. The
location from which the photograph was taken does not itself form a part of
the scene the photograph depicts.
Still I want to say that the brass plaque is implicitly represented in the
resulting photograph of the castle. The scene a photograph explicitly
represents is one that belongs to the location from which it is taken. If I want
to take a photograph which is roughly of the same view, I will be able to
produce one (other things being equal) by finding the brass plaque from
which this photo was taken. I will thereby be able to produce a photograph of
roughly the same type.
One way to think about what I am calling implicit representation is to think
of LDR's as having a content which include what Perry (1986) has described
as "unarticulated constituents". An unarticulated constituent forms a part of
the content of a thought or utterance even though there is no part of the
thought or utterance which designates this constituent. The example Perry
gives to illustrate this phenomenon, is the statement 'it is raining'. This
statement conveys information about the place at which the utterance is
made. Yet there is no expression or component of this utterance, which
designates or stands for this place. Somehow the statement conveys
information about a place without this place forming a part of what is
represented.17 Perry says this is possible because the representation has as
a part of its content, an unarticulated constituent.18 I say this is possible
17
At least this will follow if we suppose that what is represented is a function of a sentence's
component words and what those words stand for.
18 See for instance Perry (1986/2000: 172).
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because the location from which this utterance is produced is implicitly
represented by the utterance.
Location dependent representations form an interesting class of
representations insofar as they demonstrate how a single representational
state can represent in two distinct ways. An LDR represents an object or
state of affairs explicitly, and the location from which it has been produced
implicitly. In this respect LDRs are just like conscious experiences which I
have claimed also represent in two ways. A conscious experience explicitly
represents some object or state of affairs, and implicitly represents the
subject undergoing this very experience.
There is however an important difference between LDR's and conscious
experiences. The location from which the representation is produced in the
case of conscious experiences will be the location of the subject's body.
Following Merleau-Ponty and Sartre I have claimed that a subject just is his
or her body. Our subjectivity is constituted through the sense we have of our
embodiment. It follows that what conscious experiences implicitly represent
isn't merely the location from which the experience is had. Conscious
experiences implicitly represent a subject.
What we need if we are to give a representational account of PRSC is a
way of capturing the difference between implicitly representing a location and
implicitly representing a subject. My experiences cannot carry this
information in the same way that a photograph can carry the information that
it was taken from a particular location. I said that a photograph carries this
information insofar as what is depicted in the photograph entails that it was
taken from a particular location. Certainly it is going to be true that what my
conscious experiences represent entails that these experiences have been
produced from a particular location, the location of my body. This fact about
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my experiences only suffices to show that they implicitly represent a location.
It doesn't establish the sense in which they carry information about me qua
subject of an experience.
According to Merleau-Ponty to represent oneself qua subject is to
represent one's body undergoing an experience. It is to represent one's
body as the owner of an experience. That my body is undergoing an
experience isn't among the things my experiences explicitly represent. If my
experiences explicitly represented that my body was undergoing an
experience, I would be introspectively aware of my experiences the whole
time, which I am patently not. Somehow then my experience must carry the
information that my body is undergoing an experience without this being
among the facts my experience explicitly represents.
I mentioned above how we might think of my being implicitly represented
in experience by analogy with Perry's notion of an unarticulated constituent
(see Perry (1986/2000)). Pursuing this analogy we might say that a subject
represents his body as the owner of his experiences when a subject's body
forms a part of the contents of one's experiences as an unarticulated
constituent. Perry's example is the utterance 'it is raining' which contains the
indexical expression 'here' as an unarticulated constituent. Towards the end
of his paper Perry suggests that we might understand perception as carrying
information about ourselves in a similar way. He suggests that a subject
could figure among the things that this subject is experiencing on a given
occasion, but as an unarticulated constituent.19 When a ball is coming
towards me, for instance, I duck. How do I know to duck - because my
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While this seems promising enough, it cannot be the whole story about
what it is for me to implicitly represent that my body is undergoing an
experience. Thinking of my body as forming a part of what I experience as
an unarticulated constituent only captures the sense in which my body could
be among the objects of my experience on any given occasion. In order to
account for PRSC we must explain what it is for me to implicitly represent my
body qua subject. To do this we must account for the ways in which by
implicitly representing my body in every experience I thereby give form to the
objects of my experience. Recall my earlier example of how I understand a
thing's spatial properties - a thing's having a particular shape say - through
the sense I have of my embodiment. If we are to account for my implicitly
representing my body in experience, we must explain the ways in which my
implicitly representing my body plays an active role in shaping the
experiences I undergo.
This is one of the remaining questions that will be taken up in the final
chapter. In particular we will need to say much more about how one gains a
sense of subjectivity by being in a state which implicitly carries information
about one's own body. I have said enough for now for us to see how, on the
view of conscious experience I have been arguing for, a theory of
representation for conscious experience must go.
Consider the two requirements I laid down at the beginning of this section.
The first said that a satisfactory theory of representation for conscious
experience must recognise the sense in which my experiences represent me
in a way that no one else can represent me. On the account of
representation just sketched this is true because only my experiences
implicitly represent my own body. Anyone else will have experiences that
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represent their own body. They will not have experiences that implicitly
represent my body.
The second requirement called for us to develop an account of
representation which registers the significant differences between being
PRSC and being RSC. Again the notion of implicit representation can help
us to meet this requirement. A subject will be RSC through an act of
introspection. Through this act of introspection, the subject will come to
explicitly represent that she herself is undergoing a particular experience.
When an experience is PRSC, the subject doesn't explicitly represent that
she is undergoing an experience. She nevertheless enjoys an experience
that carries this information. She does so because she is in a state which
implicitly represents that her body is in a state explicitly representing some
object or state of affairs.
Among the tasks facing a naturalist who seeks to assimilate subjective
facts is the development of an account of what it is for a subject to be
implicitly represented in experience. If we can explain in naturalistic terms
what it is for an experience to represent a subject's point of view we will be
on our way to giving an account of subjective facts in naturalistic terms.20
The remainder of this chapter has the goal of showing that such an account
could in principle be given, pace the phenomenologist's anti-naturalist
argument. In the remainder of this chapter I will employ the technical
machinery I have just introduced to explain how we can at last set aside the
phenomenologist's doubts about naturalism.
20 Of course, giving an account of implicit self-representation will form only one strand in a
naturalistic account of subjective facts. We will also need to tell a naturalistic story about
being-in-the-world more generally and about how our existence as persons can shape the
kind of world we live in. I will attempt to outline the beginnings of such a theory in the next
chapter.
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5. Refuting the Independence Assumption
The reconstruction I have given of the phenomenologist's Anti-Naturalist
argument derives its force from the premise which claims that the naturalist is
committed to "the independence assumption". I take the motivation for this
premise to be a view of science as describing a reality as it exists
independently of us.21 To describe such a reality it is assumed that the
scientist must detach herself as much as possible from her particular
subjective take on the world. She must try to produce representations that
are objective - representations whose contents do not vary from location to
location.22
In the remainder of the chapter I shall assume that it is right to think of the
naturalist as offering a conception of reality where this conception is
composed of objective representations. Now consider NBA once again
which says that for every putative natural phenomenon P there is a set of
conditions which can be described without reference to P which realise P. I
take the proponent of NBA to be committed to the view that wherever we
have a subjective fact there will be (1) some set of conditions which realise
this fact, and (2) these conditions can be given an objective representation.
21 Of course this is a controversial view of science. It is one that will for instance be rejected
by anti-realists. One response to the anti-naturalist argument as it has been presented
above would be to reject the independence assumption by arguing for an anti-realist
conception of scientific practice. However, I have been arguing that existential
phenomenologists can be read as committed to some form of realism. Thus I am reluctant
to pursue this line of response. Instead I shall be arguing that contrary to appearances the
independence assumption is quite compatible with a commitment to subjective facts.
22
Moore (1997: ch.2) has characterised the kinds of representations in terms of two
features, which he labels "comprehensiveness of coverage" (henceforth "CC") and
"comprehensiveness of appeal" (CA). A representation has CC when it combines 'various
things that are known into a single representation' (Moore, 1997: 21). Such a representation
tells us how distinct representations can be true. Moore persuasively argues that this is
amongst the fundamental goals of science. A representation has CA the less it relies on any
particular point of view. Representations of scientific laws are a central example of
representations that have CA. Representations of this kind are examples of shared
conceptions of the world which anyone can come to participate in just by acquiring mastery
of the necessary concepts.
237
Making Room for Subjective Facts
When I say that every subjective fact is realised by a set of conditions that
can be given an objective representation, I mean the following. A subjective
fact is a fact that can only be represented from a subject's point of view.
Take a fact that meets this description, for instance the fact that I am
undergoing a conscious experience. A proponent of NBA is committed to the
claim that this fact - the fact that I am undergoing a conscious experience -
is realised by a set of conditions that can be objectively represented.23
Suppose something along these lines can be shown for the class of
representations in terms of which I have characterised conscious experience.
Then we will have shown that subjective facts can be assimilated. To refute
the independence assumption all we will need to do is show that subjective
facts cannot be eliminated.
Let us begin by considering the case of LDRs that are not conscious
experiences. At least some of our indexical thoughts and utterances -
thoughts and utterances expressed using expressions like "I", "here" or "now
- will fit this description.24 These thoughts and utterances have contents that
vary depending on when, where, and by whom they are produced.25 There
is however every reason to believe that the facts our indexical thoughts and
utterances represent can meet the two conditions for assimilation set out
23
Notice that this is not to say the fact that I am undergoing a conscious experience is itself
a fact that can be given an objective representation. There may well be explanatory gains to
be made from appealing to subjective facts that are lost one we appeal to the facts that can
be given an objective representation. Indeed this is exactly what I shall argue when I attack
the independence assumption later in this chapter.
24
Some of our indexical thoughts and utterances will be about conscious experiences, in
which case they will be LDRs in which the location that is implicitly represented is a subject.
25 When I say that "I am happy", for instance, I utter a sentence whose content purports to
refer to me, and the way I feel at the time I utter this sentence. An utterance of this sentence
is true if the speaker of this very sentence is happy. This sentence as uttered by me may
express a truth, while the very same sentence "I am happy" may be used by someone else
to say something false. If we are to establish whether the sentence is true or not we must
establish who has uttered the sentence. The truth of this utterance depends in part on facts
about its speaker. It is in this sense that indexical representations can be said to have
contents that depend on a location or point of view.
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above. The facts our indexical thoughts and utterances represent will
generally be facts that can be given an objective representation.
To see this we need to first make a type-token distinction for indexicals.
This distinction corresponds to a distinction Kaplan makes between content
and character. What Kaplan calls "character" attaches to types of indexical
thoughts and utterances, and what he calls "content" applies to tokens of
those types. A sentence's character is, according to Kaplan, a function from
the context in which the sentence is used ("the occasion of use") to truth
conditions which specify a token sentence's content.26 If for instance, I say
that I am sitting, the character of the sentence I have uttered will enable us to
determine that what I have said is that <JK is sitting>. The character of this
sentence tells us that sentences of this type represent whoever it is that has
produced them at a particular time. Since I am the speaker of this sentence,
this particular token represents me.
Is the situation that obtains when JK is sitting, a situation realised by
conditions which can be given an objective representation? To this question
we can surely return a positive answer. The situation in this case consists of
a certain person JK standing in a relation of sitting to some object, say a
chair, at the time of this utterance. Is this situation realised by conditions that
can be given an objective representation? There is nothing about the
description I have just given of this situation which requires one to take up a
26
Kaplan describes 'character' as a function from an occasion of use to a singular
proposition. A proposition is "singular" when among the constituents of which the proposition
is composed is the referent of a singular term. According to Kaplan, singular terms do not
pick out their referents via the propositions of which they are part but instead refer directly to
the individuals they designate. However, it should be noted that singular terms are only able
to refer directly to the individuals they designate because of their character. It is in virtue of
its character that a singular term refers to the particular individual it does on each occasion
that it is used. I can remain neutral as to whether we should understand representational
content in terms of singular propositions or not.
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particular location. We can safely say that for this indexical representation
the fact that is represented is one which can be assimilated by the naturalist.
What about conscious experiences? Is the fact that I am undergoing a
conscious experience a fact which is realised by a set of conditions that can
be given an objective representation? Certainly there is nothing in the
phenomenologist's anti-naturalist argument to suggest that this is not the
case. However we will not really be in a position to assess this question
adequately until we have some substantive proposal before us about the
conditions that realise subjective facts. I conclude for now that the
phenomenologist has given no reason for thinking that the following is not the
case. Wherever there is some subjective fact, there is a set of natural
conditions that realise this fact which can be given an objective
representation.
Of course the naturalist won't seek assimilation if subjective facts do no
explanatory work. I will finish up by arguing that subjective facts play an
essential role in explaining behaviour.
It is something of a commonplace nowadays that indexical
representations play an essential role in explaining behaviour. To see this
consider again Perry's familiar example of following a leaking bag of sugar. It
is only when I realise that it is me that is making a mess that I am caused to
stop and rummage through my shopping basket. No objective representation
or location independent representation I can produce will suffice to cause this
action on my part - only the representation that it is me who is making the
mess will motivate me to act in this way.27 An objective representation will
27
The role that location dependent representations play in motivating action isn't peculiar to
what we might call first-person representations, representations the contents of which
purport to refer in the first-person. Say I want to watch something on television at 8pm, but I
also want to get some reading done before it starts. The belief that causes me to stop
reading and turn on the television is the belief that it is now 8pm. This belief differs in
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only suffice to cause me to act in this way if it is combined with a belief that I
am the person that this representation purports to refer to.
Perry's point (following Castaheda) is that the content of any indexical
representation will be such that I do not need to form this further belief that I
am the person this representation has as its referent. This is something I
already realise just by representing myself in the first person. Thus my
representation that I am making a mess represents something different from
the representation that the shopper with a torn bag of sugar is making a
mess even though I am the shopper with the torn bag. The representation
that I am making a mess suffices on its own to pick me out whereas the
representation that the shopper with the torn bag of sugar is making a mess
won't suffice to pick me out until I know that I am this shopper.28
Now consider the theory of conscious experience I have endorsed.
According to this theory conscious experiences are a variety of LDR, in which
the subject is implicitly represented. Indexical representations just are LDRs.
Perry has given us an argument for the conclusion that LDRs play an
essential role in explaining behaviour, a role that cannot be played by any
objective representation. Assuming that conscious experiences are LDRs,
content from the belief that the program starts at 8pm. Having the latter belief doesn't make
me stop reading; I have this belief all the while that I am reading. It is only when I believe
that it is now 8pm that I act. The same conclusion applies to the indexical "here". Suppose I
am lost but I have a map which tells me how to get to the university. The map will not help
me unless I know where I am; once I know that I am here where "here" picks out a particular
location on the map, then I can use the map to plot a route to the university. The map is
useless to me in planning a course of action until I know my own location on it. These kinds
of examples and many others are explored by Perry in his classic (1979) paper and more
recently in his (2000: ch.'s 5 &6)
28
This was something we saw in chapter 5 when we discussed first-person thought. There it
was argued that when I ascribe some property to myself in the first-person, I do not first
ascribe this property to an individual and then establish that this individual is me. The
judgement I form in thinking about myself is to borrow Evan's terms "identification free" (see
Evans 1982: ch.7, pp.181). For further discussion see my discussion of reflective self-
consciousness in chapter 5, pp.17-18.
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we can say the same of conscious experience. We can say that conscious
experiences also play an essential role in explaining behaviour.
If this is right then subjective facts cannot be eliminated. The argument
from the experience of content sought to establish the existence of subjective
facts based on considerations to do with the mode of representation
characteristic of conscious experience. Perry has shown that
representations of this type (LDRs) play an ineliminable role in explaining
behaviour. It follows that subjective facts cannot be eliminated. If subjective
facts cannot be eliminated, the independence assumption is false. For the
independence assumptions requires the naturalist to eliminate subjective
facts. Without the independence assumption, the anti-naturalist argument
set out above fails.
I shall argue in the next chapter that there are certain conditions which
can be described in the terms of the natural sciences which make possible
our being-in-the-world. I shall call these conditions "enabling conditions" for
without these conditions our existence wouldn't be possible. Suppose that
these enabling conditions exist, does it follow that our being-in-the-world is
something that can be described independently of any point of view? No. All
that follows is that our being-in-the-world is realised by conditions that can be
described independently of any point of view.
NBA doesn't require us to say that every fact obtains independently of us.
The first worry behind the anti-naturalist argument was that a naturalist
conception of reality will include only those entities and properties that can be
described from no particular point of view. NBA allows for the existence of
entities and properties that depend on us so long as the existence of these
entities and properties is entailed by the existence of other entities and
properties described by the natural sciences. NBA can thus allow the
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conclusion that the entities and properties which populate our world can be
understood in many ways, some of which contribute towards shaping the
existence of those entities and properties.
All that needs to be the case is the ways we have of existing which in turn
shape the reality we inhabit are entailed by the kinds of conditions that can
be described by the natural sciences. If this can be shown, the naturalist can
allow that there are many ways in which entities exist some of which depend
on us. She can accept this as a truth about us and the world we live in
without giving up on the idea that there are conditions which make all of this
possible which can be represented objectively.29
The project of naturalising phenomenology which I will take up in the next
chapter recognises that our ways of representing the world originate in our
ways of existing as persons. It attempts to identify what the conditions are
that enable us to exist as we do, where these conditions are understood as
forming a part of a single objective reality, the natural world. A naturalised
phenomenology will agree that our being-in-the-world makes possible our
ways of representing reality, which in turn shape many of the objects of our
experience. However, a naturalised phenomenology will also insist that our
existence is that of an animal, and that qua animals we form a part of the
natural world. Hence there are conditions which underlie our existence and
make it possible which can be described in the terms of the natural sciences.
A conclusion to this effect requires concessions from both the naturalist
and the existential phenomenologist. It requires the naturalist to concede
that our ways of representing the world originate with our being-in-the-world.
29 With the added qualification, of course, that the latter representations are produced against the
background of our being-in-the-world.
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Moreover the naturalist must recognise that these ways of representing the
world can literally shape the objects we experience.
The existential phenomenologist must likewise make concessions. He
must recognise that there are certain conditions that must be in place if we
are to exist as we do, and these are conditions that can be described by the
natural sciences. While it is true that without our being-in-the-world there
could be no intelligible representation whatsoever, it is also true that in the
absence of certain conditions describable by science there could be no
being-in-the-world. This in no way denies that entities can exist in many
ways, some of which depend on our modes of understanding. It is to insist
that in the absence of certain conditions we couldn't exist, and nor could we
understand anything, and that these conditions are ones that can be





So far I have shown that naturalists could, in principle accept the existence of
subjective facts, but it remains to be shown how they can do so. This chapter
will take up the remaining challenge. I have set out two lines of arguments in
defence of the claim that there are subjective facts. First it was argued that
we must appeal to subjective facts to account for the contents of experience.
A large part of the chapter will be taken up with developing a naturalistic
account of the contents of experience. The second argument for subjective
facts - the argument from the experience of content - was given in the
course of returning an answer to the question of why there should be
something rather than nothing it is like to be a conscious creature. I argued
that all conscious experiences are also pre-reflectively self-conscious. Thus
the second goal of this chapter will be to sketch a naturalistic account of pre-
reflective self-consciousness.
In the first section I shall explain how I understand the project of
naturalising phenomenology. Some naturalistically inclined
phenomenologists have proposed the use of phenomenology in the design of
experiments. Subjects are instructed in the methods of phenomenology
which they then put to use to arrive at first-person data. This first-person
data is then employed to interpret data from brain scans recorded during the
experiments.1
While this strikes me as a fascinating and potentially fertile approach to
the study of consciousness, what I have in mind by naturalised
1
For a recent discussion of this kind of approach see Gallagher (2003b). The inspiration
behind this methodology comes from Varela's idea of a Neurophenomenology, see Varela




phenomenology is something different. I have argued that a naturalistic
theory of mind must make room for subjective facts, if it is to successfully
close the explanatory gap. I have given two reasons for believing in the
existence of subjective facts. Naturalised phenomenology as I shall
understand it has as its goal the assimilation of subjective facts.
In section 2 I return to the account of intentionality I have given in chapter
4. There it was argued that there is a distinctively phenomenological species
of intentionality. A similar notion of intentionality has recently received
discussion under the heading of "phenomenal intentionality". Phenomenal
intentionality is taken to be a species of narrow content which supervenes on
a subject's neurophysiological states. In section 3 I will argue that some
caution is required in treating phenomenal intentionality as a variety of
narrow content. Sections 4 and 5 examine whether the enactive view of
perception can supply an account of phenomenal intentionality.2 I argue that
it can but only supplemented with a richer account of how we can perceive
what J.J. Gibson called "affordances". I will also argue that such an account
can remain neutral on the question of whether phenomenal intentionality is a
species of narrow content.
Central to what I called the argument from the contents of experience is
the thesis that intentionality originates in our being-in-the-world. If the theory
of intentionality I have advanced is to be shown to be consistent with
naturalism, I must show how the notion of being-in-the-world can be
assimilated within a naturalistic theory of mind. In particular I must make
sense of the claim that our understanding of being can literally shape or
2
The enactive approach to the study of visual perception has as its origins in J.J. Gibson's
ecological theory of perception. The term was first used in Varela et al (1991) and has
recently found a powerful defence in the work of O'Regan and Noe, see for instance their
(2001) and Noe (2004).
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constitute the objects of our experience. In section 6 I argue that this
conception of experience calls for a radical overhaul in how think about the
function of perception. We can no longer think of perception as serving the
function of detection. Instead we must instead understand perception as
serving a function for an animal in the context of a particular environment or
milieu. This understanding of perception is, I shall argue, in conflict with any
view which takes perception to be detection. However such a revision in our
understanding of perception will clear the way for a naturalistic account of
being-in-the-world.
In section 7 I take up the challenge to the naturalist to supply an account
of pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the final part of this chapter I return to
the idea that the subject is implicitly represented in experience. I suggest
that recent work on the role of motor imagery in skilful behaviour may provide
us with the beginning of a story to tell about what it is for a subject to be
implicitly represented in experience.3
By the end of this chapter I will have introduced empirical research which
indicates that much of what the phenomenologist claims about the nature of
conscious experience can be assimilated by naturalism. If the argument of
this chapter is correct, there is a view of the mind already available to the
naturalist which has found room for subjective facts. I have argued that
making room for subjective facts is the key to closing the explanatory gap. It
follows that cognitive scientists and neuroscientists have already begun to
discover the tools for closing the explanatory gap. To the extent that it is has
seemed otherwise to some philosophers, this is perhaps because they have
failed to attend to the phenomenology of conscious experience closely
3
However we shall see that there is some reason to doubt whether this can be the whole
story, for there is reason to think that a conscious experience could be PRSC even in the
absence of motor imagery.
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enough. They have brought to bear prejudices which are not borne out by
close attention to phenomenology.
1. The Project of Naturalising Phenomenology
Let us begin by returning to the idea of a naturalised phenomenology
introduced in passing in my introduction. Francisco Varela (1996) sets out
the following working hypothesis for the project of naturalising
phenomenology. According to Varela phenomenology should be understood
as standing in a relation of "reciprocal constraint" to the sciences of the
mind.4 Phenomenology supplies detailed descriptions of conscious
perceptual experience and the ways in which it is given form by our being-in-
the-world. A naturalised phenomenology, according to Varela, will use these
descriptions as data for uncovering new third-person descriptions of the
physiological basis for consciousness.5 Phenomenology constrains the
science of consciousness by supplying it with descriptions of conscious
experience which it is the task of science to explain. At the same time the
descriptions phenomenology supplies of experience, are also constrained by
what the science of the mind has to tell us about the nature of perception.
Varela characterises phenomenology as providing a disciplined method
for studying consciousness from a first-person perspective. Varela proposes
that scientists train subjects in the use of the phenomenological reduction.
Subjects can then use the phenomenological reduction as a window onto
their own minds, in order to obtain first-person data. Varela conceives of a
science of consciousness which uses this data in conjunction with third-
person data from neuroscience to construct models of conscious experience.
4
See Varela (1996: 351)
5
See Gallagher (2003b); Lutz and Thompson (2003) and Borrett, et al (2000) for accounts of
naturalised phenomenology along these lines.
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The distinctive contribution the practice of phenomenology can make is to
contribute data to the science of mind that might otherwise go unnoticed.
This general methodology has recently been put into practice by the
neuroscientist Antoine Lutz.6 Lutz and his colleagues exposed subjects to a
3D perceptual illusion. Subjects were asked to fixate for several seconds on
a dot pattern containing no depth cues. At the end of this period the pattern
was changed to one with binocular disparities. Subjects were asked to press
a button as soon as they perceived the emergence of a 3D shape. EEG
signals were recorded throughout the trail. Immediately after subjects had
pushed the button, they were asked to describe their experience. In these
reports subjects would use what Lutz calls "phenomenal categories" which
the subjects had devised for describing their experiences during a prior
training session. During this training session, subjects were asked to direct
their attention to their own mental processes during the task and to the 'felt-
quality' that accompanied the emergence of the 3D image (Lutz and
Thompson, 2003: 43). Lutz characterises this redirection of attention to
experience as it is lived through, as corresponding to the phenomenological
reduction. Thus he thinks of the phenomenal categories the subjects were
later to make use of in their reports, as corresponding with perceptual
invariants discovered through the practice of something akin to the
phenomenological reduction. 'In dialogue with the experimenters', he tells us
'(subjects) define their own stable experiential categories of phenomenal
invariants to describe the main elements of the subjective context in which
they perceived the 3D shapes.' (op cit, 44)
6




Following the experiments, the reports the subjects made using these
phenomenal categories were used to interpret the EEG data. Lutz
hypothesised that each phenomenal invariant would be 'characterised by
distinct dynamical neural signatures before stimulation' reflecting the degree
to which the subject was ready for the emergence of the 3D shape. These
'signatures would' it was hypothesised 'condition the neural and behavioural
responses to the stimulus', (op cit, 45)
Lutz et al did indeed find interesting correlations between the phenomenal
categories subjects employed in their reports and patterns in brain activity as
measured using EEG before the stimulus. They found that the states of
preparation in subjects 'modulated...both the behavioural response and the
dynamical neural responses after the stimulation'. In addition they found that
the 'shape of the synchrony patterns' while varying across subjects 'were
stable in individual subjects throughout several recording sessions', (op cit,
p.46)
While I certainly do not mean to diminish the importance of the work that
Lutz and his colleagues are carrying out, it doesn't seem right to me to
describe this work as phenomenological. This research is better thought of
as establishing the importance for the scientific study of consciousness of
data arrived at through the careful use of introspection.
As I understand Husserl, he employed the method of bracketing in order
to describe the different kinds of intentionality characteristic of
consciousness, and how these different kinds of consciousness constitute
the world we experience and think about. Husserl uses the term
"constitution" to capture the sense in which consciousness contains the




Lutz's experiment certainly isn't studying anything akin to constitution as
Husserl understands it. Perhaps Lutz was thinking of the emergence of the
3D figure as something akin to constitution. However the reason subjects
come to perceive a 3D figure in this experiment is because of the binocular
disparities present in the dot pattern they perceive. The subjects do not
come to perceive a 3D figure through constituting acts of consciousness of
the kind Husserl describes. Lutz may have devised a disciplined method for
studying variations in subjective experience. He may have also discovered
interesting correlations between these variations in subjective experience
and brain activity. Striking as these findings are, they don't have very much
to do with phenomenology as it was practiced by Husserl, and the existential
phenomenologists.
I take phenomenology to have an important contribution to make to the
scientific study of consciousness through the descriptions it gives of
intentionality, and how our conscious experiences come to exhibit
intentionality. It is these descriptions of intentionality which naturalists must
assimilate if they are to provide a satisfactory account of consciousness. The
phenomenologist's account of intentionality entails the existence of subjective
facts. It follows that naturalism can assimilate the account of consciousness
we find in phenomenology only if it can assimilate subjective facts. It is this
task that will occupy our attention across the next two sections.
2. The Phenomenal Intentionalitv Thesis
Naturalistic theories of intentionality have often supposed that 'if intentionality
is real, it must really be something else'.7 They have supposed that it must be





intentionality in non-intentional terms. Fodor (1987) captures the spirit of
much work in this area when, in discussing what it will take to integrate
intentionality into the natural order, he says: 'what we want at a minimum is
something of the form 'R represents S' is true iff C where the vocabulary in
which C is couched contains neither intentional nor semantic expressions.'
(op cit, p.32) I shall call accounts of intentionality which seek to identify non-
intentional or non-semantic conditions necessary and sufficient for a state to
count as a representation, "reductive" accounts of intentionality.
Reductive accounts of intentionality have thus far proven to be something
of a failure. Their defects can be brought out by thinking of cases in which
our thoughts or experiences fail to refer to anything. In cases of reference
failure, there is nevertheless something that the thought or experience has
the goal of representing correctly. What reductive accounts have so far failed
to explain is what it is for a representation producing system to have a goal of
this kind. 8 No one has yet succeeded in identifying conditions which are
necessary and sufficient for an organism to have the goal of representing
correctly.
Must a naturalistic account of intentionality also be a reductive account of
intentionality? I have claimed that naturalistic accounts come in two
varieties; they either eliminate or assimilate some putative natural
phenomenon. I am assuming that elimination isn't the appropriate strategy to
adopt when looking for an account of intentionality. The appeal to intentional
content does essential explanatory work in explaining our behaviour which
cannot be done by explanations which do not attribute content-bearing states
to an agent.9 That leaves naturalisation by assimilation. Must a naturalist
8
For a persuasive defence of this conclusion see Walsh (2002).
9
Many philosophers have attempted to argue for this conclusion, satisfactorily to my mind.
See for instance Dretske (1988); Fodor (1989); Florgan and Woodward (1985); Rudder-
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seeking to assimilate intentionality aim for a reductive account of
intentionality?
I will present a theory of intentionality which explains how our conscious
experiences get their content by reference to certain skills or capacities of a
perceiving animal. A reductive account of these skills and capacities would
seek to characterise them in non-intentional terms. We will see that the
skills and capacities in question must be understood as the skills of a
particular animal acting in pursuit of certain goals. I doubt that there is any
way of accounting for intentionality in naturalistic terms that doesn't somehow
advert to a representational system and the goals it has, though this is not
something I can attempt to argue for here. Still I think the naturalist can
assimilate intentionality. The practical understanding I shall appeal to in
explaining how an experience get its content attributes to an animal skills and
capacities which are susceptible to explanation by cognitive scientists and
neuroscientists. This practical understanding cannot however be understood
apart from the goals and purposes of the organism which the animal acts to
bring about. So even though we might not be able to give a wholly reductive
definition of intentionality, we are nevertheless beginning to understand how
intentionality could be realised by conditions describable by the sciences of
mind.
The question I will take up in what follows concerns what it is for a
conscious perceptual experience to have an intentional content.10 I will not
be proposing a more general account of intentionality. The intentional
Baker (1987 & 1995). To enter into this debate here would take me to far away from my
concerns in this chapter which is to offer a naturalistic account of the conception of
conscious experience I have proposed in previous chapters.
10 I will be seeking to give a naturalistic account of what I called in chapter 2 "operative
intentionality". I shall argue that perceptual content is operative intentional content. I will not
attempt to account for what I called "cognitive intentionality", the kind of intentionality
belonging to propositional attitudes.
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content that our conscious experiences carry is importantly different from
beliefs, desires and other of the so-called propositional attitudes in that there
is good reason to think that it is, at least partially, non-conceptual.11 A child
or animal, for instance, could very well perceive Clyde playing the piano or
smell the toast burning (to borrow two examples from Dretske (1993/1997))
even if it did not possess the concept of a piano or of burning toast. More
generally we can say that a conscious experience E has non-conceptual
content if a creature can undergo E while not possessing the concepts
required for specifying what it is that E represents. Supposing that
experiences do have non-conceptual content, then the question arises of
what it is for an experience to have a non-conceptual content. In particular
what is it for a creature to represent P rather than Q when the creature lacks
the concepts required for specifying what it is representing? This is one of
the two questions that will occupy me for the remainder of this chapter.
The phenomenologist takes a perceptual experience to have an
intentional content which is constitutively determined by its phenomenology.
The first thing to note is that an experience's having a particular
phenomenology need not place a requirement on the subject with respect to
the possession of concepts. I take it that an infant and I share something in
common when we smell the burning toast. We both undergo experiences
with a phenomenology characteristic of smelling burning toast, though only I
possess the concepts required for saying what I am experiencing.12
11
Whether an experience's representational properties could be entirely nonconceptual is an
interesting question which I cannot take up here. Bermudez (1995) draws upon work in
developmental psychology to argue that an experience could have a content that is entirely
nonconceptual. Peacocke (1994) disagrees, arguing instead that a representation has
different layers of content some of which are nonconceptual and others of which are
conceptual. Peacocke has however since changed his mind, see the appendix to his
(1994/2003).
2
There is a large question as to whether possession of concepts changes the character of a
subject's experience across the board. McDowell (1994, lecture III) seems to want to claim
that the fact that human beings are speakers of a language transforms the kinds of
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I don't mean to deny that concept-possession might be a necessary
condition for enjoying some kinds of experiences. Think about the wine-
taster who can discriminate qualities in the wine he is drinking that escape
my palate. Arguably he is in possession of recognitional concepts that I
haven't myself mastered, and this gives him a richer appreciation of wine
than I myself enjoy. This is not to say that I don't enjoy wine, but it is to say
that I don't enjoy wine in the same way as a wine-taster. He enjoys an
experience with a richer phenomenology than me as a consequence of the
recognitional concepts he has acquired.
An experience's phenomenology, I argued in chapter 4, is a joint product
of (a) the entities and properties in the world which the experience seems to
present to a subject, and (b) the ways in which an experience presents those
entities and properties, (a) and (b) correspond to the contents of experience
and mode of presentation respectively. Consider my experience of a round
plate that looks elliptical to me. On the one hand my experience presents to
me a plate that is shaped round. This is not however how the plate is
represented in my experience. The way in which the plate is represented is
such that it looks elliptical to me. I have suggested that my experience of
something that is round but that looks elliptical is the joint product of the
experiences we can enjoy as compared with other animals. (He adopts this thesis from
Gadamer, see his lecture VI.) McDowell acknowledges that our experience shares
something in common with that of non-human animals, which he characterises as
'perceptual sensitivity to our environment' (McDowell, 1994: 64). However he claims that we
exhibit this perceptual sensitivity 'in a special form. Our perceptual sensitivity to our
environment is taken up into the ambit of the faculty of spontaneity, which is what
distinguishes us from them.' (op cit, 64) This leads McDowell to deny that there is a
common component to the experiences we enjoy and those of non-human animals. I would
like to agree with McDowell that the possession of concepts and a language may transform
our experiences without denying that there is a layer of content to our experiences which is
non-conceptual. I am also sympathetic to the claim that the kinds of experience enjoyed by
animals may be very different from our own, though I am less inclined than he to put this
difference down to the role of language and concept-possession. Rather the difference
between the experiences of animals and our own has more to do with what non-human
animals are interested in representing, for more on this point see my discussion in section 6.
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factors described in (a) and (b). My experience presents me with a round
plate. However the way in which it does so is by presenting me with
something that looks elliptical.13
An experience can of course have the phenomenology it does without
successfully representing anything in the subject's environment. My
experience can present to me something that seems to be a cat say when I
am in fact experiencing a fox. I can even see something that seems to me to
be a cat when there are no animals of any kind around whatsoever.
Nevertheless in both these cases my experience purports to represent a cat.
My experience purports to represent a cat insofar as it has certain
representational properties - the properties characteristic of experiences that
represent cats - in virtue of which it is assessable for truth or falsity.
Now consider again the claim I have attributed to phenomenologists
which says that an experience's intentional content is constitutively
determined by its phenomenology. This is to say that an experience is
assessable for truth or falsity in virtue of what it is like to undergo this
experience, where what it is like to undergo an experience is analysed in
terms of the two conditions I have just described. I shall label this proposal
"The Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis".
All theorists are agreed that sensory experiences have intentional
features in virtue of which they are assessable for truth or falsity. What
differentiates the phenomenal intentionality thesis from other theories of
intentionality is the claim that a sensory experience is assessable for truth or
13
My claim that there is a way in which an experience presents a plate say, when it looks
elliptical doesn't require me to introduce any non-representational properties. A plate looks
elliptical, I shall claim because of factors to do with the context in which it is being perceived.
In this case it is because the plate is being viewed from a particular angle that it looks
elliptical. The fact that it is being viewed from this angle forms a part of the viewing




falsity just in virtue of what is like for a subject to undergo this experience.
Most naturalistic theories of intentionality suppose that there is some relation
to the world which accounts for an experience having the intentional features
it does. This relation might be causal covariation under ideal conditions, or a
relation to the world that holds when the consumer systems that make use of
representations to generate actions are functioning properly.14 The
phenomenal intentionality thesis denies that a subject must stand in any
particular relation to the world in order to be assessable for truth for falsity.
All that is required for an experience to have the intentional features it does is
for there to be something it is like for the subject to undergo this experience.
What makes it the case that an experience has the particular correctness
conditions it does is fully determined by the ways in which this experience
presents the world as seeming to its subject.
Perhaps an example will help. Consider my experience as of a white
rabbit. My experience presents me with a creature that is furry, has floppy
ears and bucked teeth, is coloured white etc. These descriptions capture
some of the ways in which my experience presents the rabbit as appearing.
This experience will be accurate if there is indeed a rabbit present in my
environment having the features I have just described. What is it for my
experiences to have these intentional features? I claim my experience has
these intentional features in virtue of the ways in which it presents the world
as seeming to me. The world seems to me to contain a rabbit, and this is
what makes it the case that I am undergoing an experience which represents
the presence of a rabbit.
14
For the first kind of view see Stampe (1977) and for proponents of the second kind of view
see Miilikan (1984) and Papineau (1993).
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In chapter 4 I distinguished between a strong and a weak reading of the
phenomenal intentionality thesis. According to the strong reading, there is no
relation to the world which our experiences depend on for their content. On
this view an experience can present the world as seeming to be a certain
way whether or not the world of material things exists.15 The weaker reading
denies that there exists a particular relation to the world which a subject must
stand in if s/he is to represent an object x. This is consistent with saying that
a subject must stand in some relation to the world if her experience is to have
the content it does.
In what follows I will be developing a naturalistic account of perceptual
intentionality which endorses the weaker reading of the phenomenal
intentionality thesis. I will propose an account of perceptual intentionality
which takes the contents of perception to be constitutively determined by
phenomenology while at the same time allowing that an experience's
phenomenology may depend on factors outside the subject's head. In the
next section I will say something about why I think a naturalist seeking an
account of phenomenal intentionality ought to favour the weaker reading of
the phenomenal intentionality thesis over the stronger reading. My aim will
be to bring out exactly in what sense an experience's phenomenology could
involve things in the subject's local environment.
Before I consider the strong reading in detail it is worth noting that if it
were correct, the project of assimilating phenomenal intentionality into a
naturalistic account of the mind would turn out to be very difficult undertaking
indeed. Not only would we have to explain how the brain generates
15
Loar (2003) and Horgan and Tienson (2002) both endorse the strong reading of the
phenomenal intentionality thesis. In chapter 4 we saw that some caution is required in
attributing the strong reading to Husserl even though he did on occasion come close to
defending such a position. For an interpretation of Husserl which does attribute the strong
reading to him see for instance Dreyfus (1982) and Mclntyre (1982).
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phenomenal consciousness - Chalmers' hard problem. We would also have
to explain how the brain could generate states that exhibit intentionality
intrinsically.16 I shall present an account of phenomenal intentionality which
shows how it might be possible for the brain to achieve this. However the
biological plausibility of this account increases considerably once we allow
that the brain might not be doing all of this work on its own. I will argue that
an account of phenomenal intentionality ought to allow room for the
environment and a creature's embodiment to also play a role in generating its
intentional states.
3. Against the Strong Reading of the Phenomenal Intentionalitv Thesis
It is natural to think that an experience has the phenomenal character it does
regardless of whether the experience is veridical or not. The infamous
argument from hallucination rests on the possibility of a subject undergoing a
hallucinatory experience which is qualitatively indistinguishable from a
veridical experience.17 To say that two experiences are "qualitatively
indistinguishable" is to say that a subject undergoing the two experiences
would be unable to detect any difference between them. To illustrate
consider a subject enjoying a veridical experience of an apple. We seem to
be able to conceive of this subject's brain being tampered with so that when
he blinks the apple could be destroyed without the subject noticing any
change in his experience. In order for our subject to continue to undergo an
experience as of an apple all that seems to be necessary is for us to hold
16
Horgan and Tienson (2002) end there paper by noting the following implication of their
view: 'conscious intentional states are intrinsically, by their very nature, directed toward
whatever they are directed toward. Thus, the hard problem includes this: why should a
mental state that is grounded in this physical or physical/functional state be by its intrinsic
phenomenal nature directed in this precise manner? And this is a very hard problem
indeed.' (Horgan and Tienson 2002: 530)
17
See Valberg (1992) for an excellent discussion of the argument from hallucination.
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constant whatever neurophysiological activity realises his experience. Thus
it would seem that a subject could undergo an experience with the
phenomenology characteristic of a veridical experience of an apple without
standing in a relation to any existing apple. If what it is like to undergo an
experience does suffice to determine an experience's intentional features, it
would seem that an experience can have the intentional features it does
independent of any relation a subject stands in to the world.18
This argument relies on the questionable assumption that there are neural
correlates of conscious experience with contents that, in a sense to be
explained, 'match' the contents of experience.19 Noe and Thompson (2004)
define a neural correlate of consciousness as a minimal neural
representational system N such that (1) N is sufficient for the occurrence of
some experience E and (2) there is a match between the content of N and
E.20 There are really two claims that the above argument assumes, both of
which can be challenged. The first assumption is that there is a system of
neural activity, N which is sufficient for the subject to undergo his experience
as of an apple. I'll call this "the neural substrate assumption". The second
assumption is that this neural substrate has a representational content which
matches the content of the conscious experience a subject enjoys. I'll call
this the "matching content assumption".
18
This is a conceivability argument and like any argument of this is kind it is subject to the
normal kinds of worries one might have about the relation between conceivability and
possibility. Wilson (2004: ch.10) exploits a point of this kind in arguing against the
phenomenal intentionality thesis. He attacks the notion of phenomenal intentionality
because he takes it to entail individualism - the view that intentional content is to be
individuated narrowly. I shall be defending a notion of phenomenal intentionality which is
compatible with Wilson's attack on individualism. Thus I can fully concur with his attack on
Horgan and Tienson's strong reading of the phenomenal intentionality thesis without giving
up on the idea of phenomenal intentionality altogether.
1
Here I will draw on arguments to be found in Noe & Thompson (2004).
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The neural substrate assumption implies that a subject's embeddedness
in a particular kind of environment plays no role in determining an
experience's phenomenology. A subject could be a brain in a vat and enjoy
experiences with just the same phenomenology. Many philosophers have
believed that something along these lines is true, but whether they were right
would seem to be an empirical question. One empirical possibility that surely
shouldn't be ruled out from the armchair is that the representational vehicles
underlying our experience extend into the world. This is to say that the
conscious experiences we enjoy could be the result of dense and continuous
interactions taking place between body, brain and an animal's surrounding
environment.21 On this understanding of conscious experience, the
environment in which an animal is embedded will make a significant
contribution to the character of a subject's experience. It will form a part of
the feedback loop which on this view is the minimal sufficient condition for a
subject's enjoying a conscious experience.
The moral is that only further empirical research will enable us to
establish whether there is a neural substrate which suffices to give us the
kinds of experiences we enjoy. It is empirically possible that there is no
neural substrate sufficient to generate conscious experience, but that instead
our experiences are identical with representational vehicles that extend into
the world.
One more comment on the superficial appearance of conceivability that
attaches to hallucination scenarios. Whatever plausibility attaches to these
thought experiments may well derive from the fact that something else, a
21
Hurley (1998: ch.6); Noe (2004, ch.7 & 2005); Rowlands (2002 & 2003: ch.10); Thompson
and Varela (2001); and Wilson (2004, oh.9) all defend an externalist account of the vehicles
of conscious experience, "externalist" in that it takes the vehicles in question to extend into




demon or some other kind of deity, a super-intelligent scientist, a
supercomputer, is enlisted to construct an environment which resembles our
own. It is an empirical question whether it is our brain which ordinarily
constructs this appearance for us or whether the environmental setting in
which a creature is embedded itself plays an ineliminable role in giving us the
kinds of experiences we enjoy. If the latter, then brain-in-the-vat stories are
only conceivable to the extent that some other virtual environment can be
created to play the role currently played the environments we inhabit.22
This brings me to the matching content assumption. The matching
content assumption says that for any given experience E there is a system of
neural activity N with a representational content that matches E's
representational content. What does it mean to say that E and N match in
content? Returning to the subject looking at the apple, the idea is just that
by keeping the activity in neural system N constant, we could continue to
cause in this subject an experience as of an apple. The experience as of an
apple we manage to reproduce is, we are to suppose, qualitatively
indistinguishable from a veridical experience of an apple. Thus we can say
that N and E match in content if whatever features E represents, N also
represents. Given that we can produce an experience E just by holding the
activity constant in N, it is natural to think that a match in content of this kind
does indeed obtain.
However again there are empirical reasons for being suspicious of such a
claim. The matching content assumption seems to commit us to the
existence of a system of neural activity which is the bearer of a
representational content as rich as the contents of experience. The first point
to note is that there is some controversy about how rich the contents of
22
Noe (2004, ch.7: 218) makes what I think is the same point.
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experience are. When Ernst Mach (1886) drew a picture of himself stretched
out in his armchair, the picture he drew was of a visual field, uniform and high
resolution in its detail. However there are number of reasons for doubting
whether this accurately reflects what our visual fields are like.23 Consider our
visual perception of colour, for instance. We hardly perceive the objects at
the margins of our visual field to be coloured at all, whereas the objects that
are at the centre of visual field appear to be coloured in splendid detail. Alva
Noe tells us:
'Rods and cones are not evenly distributed across the surface of the
retina. Outside the high resolution central (foveal) region, there are
increasingly few cones. As a result of this, the eye is nearly colour-blind
in its parafoveal region. Despite these defects we do not experience the
world as black and white at the edges.' (Noe, 2004: 37)
Consider for example my experience of the colour of the carpet I am standing
on which is a uniform muddy brown. Do I experience the muddy brownness
of the carpet at the periphery of my visual field just as much as I experience
its muddy brown at the point in my visual field which I am currently fixating?
Suppose we say I do. In order to explain how this could be we have to
hypothesise mechanisms in the brain which correct for the limitations in the
image of a scene that falls on our retina at any moment. It is the matching
assumption that commits us to a hypothesis of this kind. If we suppose that
what we experience is a scene uniformly detailed in the information it gives
us about the colours of things, it is tempting to think this is because there is a
system of neural states with a content that matches that of our experience. It
is this system of neural states which gives me an impression of the carpet I
23
Here I am indebted to arguments in Noe (2004, oh.2).
263
Naturalising Phenomenology
am currently standing on as being uniformly muddy brown all the way around
me.
There is however another possibility. Perhaps our experience doesn't
represent a world that is high resolution and uniform in its detail from the
centre of our visual fields to their margins. All the detail is there in the world
ready to be tapped as when we need it, simply by the movement of our head
or body, so why do we need to construct detailed representations of the way
things are in the world at each moment? Surely we need to represent only
as much detail as is required for what we are doing. What we visually
perceive at any given moment may be function of what we have our gaze
fixed upon at the time.24
That something along these lines might be true is borne out by the
phenomena of change-blindness. Usually when a change takes place in a
visual scene our attention is alerted to the change by some kind of flicker of
movement. This led to the prediction that if we could some how be
prevented from noticing the flicker of movement we could also fail to notice
changes, even when they were happening right in front of our eyes.25
In one striking study Simons and Levin (1998) showed that subjects could
fail to detect a change in a person they are giving directions to. Hayhoe,
Bensinger & Ballard (1998) asked subjects to perform a copying task
involving blocks. In this experiment subjects regularly failed to notice a
change in the model they are copying. Perhaps the most well-known study
of this kind (Simons and Chabris 1999) subjects were given the task of
24
O'Regan (1992) has suggested that a creature's local environment may be thought of as
functioning as kind of external memory which is available to be made use of by the senses,
just as (some of) our memories are available for recall, as when we need them. This idea is
also discussed in O'Regan and Noe (2001: 946).
25




watching a basketball game and watching the number of times one or the
other team takes possession of the ball. Many subjects performing this task
failed to notice the presence of a man in a gorilla suit strolling through the
centre of play.
The most conservative reading we can give of these studies suggests that
if our brains are in the business of producing detailed representations of our
environments from moment to moment, the information these representations
carry may not be available for the formation of memories and the making of
verbal reports. To the extent that we think we have a conscious experience
of a scene in all its glorious detail, this conservative reading would have it
that we are mistaken. What we consciously perceive in a visual scene at any
given moment will be as much or as little as we are attending to in the visual
scene at that moment.
A more radical reading of these experiments takes them to count as
evidence against the brain constructing rich internal representations of our
environment from moment to moment. On this reading, we fail to detect the
changes in these cases because those changes aren't represented by us. I
am not going to attempt to decide between these two ways of thinking about
the change blindness results. Either way change-blindness seems to have
significant implications for the matching assumption. The change-blindness
experiments seem to conflict with the following claim:
(1) Conscious experiences seem to present us with a world in all of its
detail, and this detail is reproduced by the representations our brains
construct of a visual scene.
This is just a statement of the matching assumption. Thus at first glance the
change-blindness would seem to come into conflict with the matching
265
Naturalising Phenomenology
assumption. There are at least two ways of responding to the falsity of (1).26
We could say:
(2) We are mistaken about how our experiences seem to us (see Dennett
(2002)). There is no detail in our conscious experience, we just think
there is. What the change blindness experiments show is that we don't
see that world in all its detail. They highlight just how wrong we can be
about our conscious experiences. It seems to me that this interpretation
of change-blindness is quite consistent with the matching assumption.
One could say that there is a neural representational system N the
content of which matches the contents of visual experience. We might
say that mistakes arise when we come to say or judge exactly what it is
we are seeing, and it this mistake that the change-blindness experiments
have brought to light.
There is another possible response however, which isn't consistent with the
matching assumption. It says:
(3) There is as much detail in our conscious experiences as there has
always seemed to be but there is very little in the way of detailed
information in the representations our brains produce. Our experiences
seem to present us with a world rich in information, and this is exactly
what they do. All of the detail we seem to experience is out there in the
world. Our sense that we experience this detail is a reflection of the fact
that this detail is there for us to explore using our senses. Thus, the
matching assumption is false. Our experiences are richer in content than
the neural representations which enable those experiences.
26
Actually there is a third possibility I can think of. We could say that neither our conscious
experiences nor our neural representations are detailed in the information they give us about
a visual scene. The change blindness experiments show that we are mistaken about the
character of our experiences. They show this by showing that there are changes that take
place which our brains do not represent. If this is right our neural representations are as
impoverished in the information they carry as our conscious experiences. Thus the matching
assumption holds. The difficulty this response faces is that it doesn't explain the mistake it
attributes to us, whereby we take our experiences to present a visual scene to us in all of its
detail. The advantage of (2) and (3) is that they at least attempt to do justice to the ways in
which our experiences ordinarily present the world.
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In what follows I will assume that the sense we have of seeing the world in all
its detail isn't an illusion. I am going to assume that this is a datum that
needs to be explained. What the change blindness experiments show is that
we don't perceive all of the information there is in the world in one go.27 The
results of these experiments provide evidence against the claim that the brain
is constantly engaged in constructing what we might call a snapshot of a
scene. While a snapshot would capture all of the detail in a scene including
any changes that might take place from moment to moment, the
representations our brain produces do not seem to be like this. The
possibility I want to take up next is that the brain doesn't generate
phenomenal intentionality on its own. Rather our experiences get their
phenomenal intentionality from a variety of practical understanding or
knowledge that accompanies all of our conscious experience. This
understanding might consist in part of knowledge of how movement will affect
the ways in which an object is sensed by us. While it is undoubtedly true that
the brain constitutes a necessary or enabling condition in this account of
phenomenal intentionality I shall propose, the account I will give is consistent
with saying that neural activity isn't a sufficient condition for phenomenal
intentionality. Thus the account I shall give of phenomenal intentionality is
incompatible with the strong reading of the phenomenal intentionality thesis.
4. Husserl and Merleau-Pontv on Phenomenal Intentionalitv
In the last section we encountered a puzzle. Our experiences seem to
present us with a world elaborate in its detail, and yet the visual
representations our brain constructs do not seem to reproduce anything like
all of this detail. What we need to explain then is why it seems to us that we
27
Here I am following Noe, Pessoa and Thompson (2000) and Noe (2004: ch.2).
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experience all that detail given that it doesn't look like this is something made
available by the internal representations our brain produces.
A good starting point for addressing this question is to return to a related
puzzle which we saw Husserl raise in chapter 4. There we saw Husserl point
out that an object is never fully given in experience: there is always more to
an object than it presents to us at any given moment.
'In principle a physical thing can only be given "one-sidedly....A physical
thing is necessarily given under simple modes of appearance...but what
is "actually" predelineated is accompanied by a horizon, by a more or less
vague zone of indeterminateness.' (Husserl, 1913/1972 §44, 100)
What Husserl has in mind is the uncontroversial fact that when I look at a
house say, what I see of the house will depend on where I am standing in
relation to it. Furthermore, I cannot see the entire house at once. All I see of
the house at any given moment will be the sides of the house that are visible
to me, and there will always be other aspects of the house that aren't visible
to me at the time. I nevertheless have a sense of the whole house as
present to me in my perception.28 How can this be?
I take it that the puzzle Husserl has raised exactly parallels the question
raised by the change blindness studies. These studies suggest that although
we experience a world which seems elaborate in its detail, not all of this
detail is reproduced in the visual representations our brains construct.29 How
28
If you are not persuaded of this, consider the difference in what it is like to see something
you know to be a stage prop, a two-dimensional fagade, and a genuine house. We can even
suppose that the two-dimensional fagade is an exact replica of the front of a house. Still
there is a difference in what it is like to look at something one knows to be the fagade of a
house and what it is like to like to look at a genuine house. The difference resides not in
what one is currently presented with in experience but in what one would expect to see if one
were to move around the thing. In the case of a fagade one expects to see something that is
flat, whereas in the case of a genuine house one expects to find other sides of the house
that were previously hidden from view come into one's line of sight.
29
To be more precise, if all of this detail is reproduced in the internal representations the
brain is busy producing, not all of this information is made available to consciousness.
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is it that our experiences give us a sense of a world that goes beyond what
we are representing at each moment?
The answer Husserl returns to this question doesn't seem to me quite
right, but it will nevertheless be instructive to consider where he goes wrong.
Husserl thought that the parts of the object that are not currently perceived
are nevertheless represented in experience. Those aspects of the object
which are not currently seen form what Husserl calls a 'horizon of
indeterminateness' (see the above quote). In every perceptual experience
Husserl tells us that 'the sides of the object which are actually perceived refer
to sides which are not yet perceived but which are only anticipated...as
aspects to come in perception.' (Husserl, 1931/1973: §19, 82)
Husserl's view seems to be that based on the side of the thing currently in
view we form anticipations about the other sides of the thing that would come
into view through our exploration of the thing. For Husserl the hidden
aspects of things are not materially present in experience but they are
nevertheless represented in the form of hypotheses about what I would see if
I were to change my relation to the object. These hypotheses can be either
confirmed or falsified by my further exploration of the thing. What is it for me
to have an experience as of a lemon for instance when I am seeing only the
lemon's facing side? Husserl would have us believe that I perform something
akin to an act of interpretation whereby I take the part of the thing I am
seeing to belong to a lemon. This interpretation I give can be confirmed or
disconfirmed by further exploration of the lemon. Perhaps it's a wax lemon,
and I discover this by taking hold of it and feeling its weight, or by trying to cut
into it.
Is it really the case that the hidden sides of a thing are represented in the
form of expectations or hypotheses I have about what I would see if I were to
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change my spatial relation to a thing? Certainly if this were true it would
explain why I have a sense of seeing a world in all its elaborate detail. I
experience the world in this way as a result of the many expectations I am
constantly forming about what my local environment contains.30 Husserl's
reply makes the object of perception into a sum of the actual and possible
views one can take on it. The lemon as it is perceived by me is nothing but
the actual parts of it I am currently presented with in my experience of it, and
the other possible views which I hypothesise I could take on the lemon were I
to alter the spatial relation I stand in to it. The intentional content of my
experience - its purporting to represent a lemon - is in no way dependent on
the existence of the lemon. I could form the hypothesis that the thing I am
presented with is a lemon, and thereby undergo an experience that presents
me with what seems to be lemon, no matter whether the lemon existed or
not.
Of course this could be the way perceptual intentionality works - it could
be that this is how perceiving creatures come to stand in an intentional
relation to the objects of their experience. If so, it will turn out that
phenomenal intentionality is indeed an intrinsic property of our conscious
experiences. We have a sense of a thing's presence including the parts of it
30
This is slightly misleading. Husserl is well aware that we cannot be constantly engaged in
forming hypotheses about the absent aspects of a thing. He makes a distinction between
what he calls "active" and "passive" synthesis by way of acknowledging this point. (See for
instance the recently translated series of lectures from 1918-1926 devoted to this distinction,
see Husserl (1970/2001). One of the last works Husserl wrote (1948/1973) also contains
extensive discussions of this distinction.) Husserl describes the simplest forms of perception
as involving what he calls "passive synthesis". Active synthesis by contrast is what a person
engages in when he makes judgements about the objects of his experience - when he
judges that the cover of the book is coloured red, say. Husserl claims that the process of
forming hypotheses about a thing's hidden sides can also be passive, in that it needn't
involve a person actively forming beliefs or making judgements about a thing's hidden
properties. The expectations we form about what further exploration would reveal of a thing
can be driven purely by our past and present encounters with a thing. We can, as a result of
our past experiences of houses say, take the front side of the house we are looking at to
indicate the presence of other sides of the house which are not currently visible to us.
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that aren't currently in view, through the generation of hypotheses. Of course
we have to take the side of a thing that is currently in view to 'refer' (in
Husserl's words, see above) to other possible views one could take on the
object. The hypotheses I form about the objects of my experience aren't
completely unconstrained. However the representation that results is one
that is formed independently of the relations I happen to stand in to the world.
Suppose we were to treat this is a serious empirical hypothesis about how
we come to have experiences of the presence of three-dimensional material
things given that what we start out with is a one-sided point of view on a
thing. Understood in this light we could take Husserl to be claiming that our
brains could achieve the representation of a full-fledged material thing
independently of our relation to that thing or any other thing.31 This is
something our brains could achieve through the formation of expectations or
anticipations about what further exploration of the thing would reveal. If we
were to take Husserl's descriptions of perception and turn them into an
empirical hypothesis we could say that the brain is constantly engaged in
producing something like a simulation of reality. This simulation is then
tested out on the world through our actions.32
Merleau-Ponty offers a different solution to our problem of how we can
have a sense of being presented with a whole object when we are sensing
only a part of it. Whereas Husserl takes the hidden sides of a thing to be
31
This is of course not what Husserl was saying; we saw in chapter 1 that Husserl was most
definitely not a materialist.
32
For a recent proponent of such a view see Metzinger (2003: 50-62). He tells us that in his
opinion: 'some of the best work in neuroscience' (here he cites Singer 2000 and Leopold and
Logothetis 1999) 'suggests a view of the human brain as a system that constantly simulates
possible realities, generates internal expectations and hypotheses in a top-down fashion,
while being constrained in this activity by....a constant stimulus-correlated bottom-up stream
of information, which then finally helps the system to select one of an almost infinitely large
number of internal possibilities and turns it into a phenomenal reality.' (Metzinger, 2003: 51)
This seems to me more or less what Husserl would say if he took the brain to be responsible
for constituting our experiences of the world rather than the transcendental ego.
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perceptually absent, Merleau-Ponty takes them to be in an important sense
positively present in experience. Sean Kelly (2004) characterises the
difference well:
'Husserl thinks that it is indeterminate, from the point of view of the
current visual experience, what the features of the back-side of the object
are. Merleau-Ponty by contrast thinks that my current visual experience
contains something that is itself an indeterminate presentation of the
back. For Husserl, it is not yet determined what I see; for Merleau-Ponty
what I see is indeterminate.' (Kelly 2004: 81)
Merleau-Ponty claims that the hidden sides of the object form a part of what
my experience represents, not only in the form of anticipations or
expectations, as we have seen Husserl claim. A thing's hidden sides affect
the movements I would direct towards it in reaching and grasping for that
thing, for instance. In virtue of the role the hidden sides play in guiding my
movements, Merleau-Ponty thinks we should say that the thing's hidden
sides are presented in my experience now. They are not represented in the
form of expectations I have about what my future exploration of thing would
uncover. Rather they form a part of what I experience in the here and now.
Merleau-Ponty talks of 'an indeterminate vision, a vision of something or
other33' which 'is not without some element of visual presence.' (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962: 6)
That the hidden sides of a thing are indeterminately present in experience
is something that Merleau-Ponty thinks is borne out by the fact that the
movements I direct towards the thing are sensitive to the hidden parts of the
33
Kelly (2004: 80-1) argues that the phrase 'vision de je ne sais quoi which is translated by
Colin Smith as 'vision of something or other' ought to instead read 'vision of I do not know
what'. He argues for reasons that will become clear in a moment that this better captures
Merleau-Ponty's claim that 'we must recognise the indeterminate' - the hidden sides of a
thing, say-'as a positive phenomenon' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 6)
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thing. How can the parts of an object which are currently not visible to me
nevertheless make a contribution to how I direct my movements towards a
thing? Merleau-Ponty's answer to this question appeals to a bodily
understanding I have of the thing. There is a sense in which I understand a
thing's shape, size and weight through the knowledge I have of how to direct
my movements towards that thing. This knowledge doesn't consist in my
having reliably formed beliefs about exactly which movements would be
appropriate to the object of my perception. In particular it doesn't involve my
believing that the thing has certain hidden properties that are not currently in
view, and that these hidden properties make certain behaviours appropriate
and others inappropriate. Rather the knowledge in question is practical
knowledge; it is knowledge of how one ought to act given the object that one
is currently seeing.
As will come as no surprise by now, I intend to follow Merleau-Ponty. I
will claim that it is by virtue of our possession of practical knowledge that our
experiences have the phenomenology they do. I have said that our
conscious experiences have their intentional features in virtue of their
phenomenology. Thus it will follow that an experience has the intentional
features it does in virtue of our practical knowledge.
I will argue for this thesis in two stages, corresponding to the two
components in terms of which I have characterised an experience's
phenomenology. Recall that I have said an experience's phenomenology is
determined by (1) the objects and properties an experience seems to present
and (2) the ways in which those objects and properties are presented in an
experience. I will set about showing that each of these aspects of an
experience's phenomenology can be constitutively determined by a subject's
practical knowledge. I will look in part to the enactive theory of perception for
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an account of the practical knowledge in terms of which I shall account for an
experience's phenomenology.
5. The Enactive Theory of Perception
According to the enactive theory, perception isn't something that just
passively happens to us; it is something we, as perceiving creatures, do. Our
perceptual experiences are something we act out through our movements.
Perception is no longer understood as a process that takes place in the brain.
The brain is of course a necessary condition for perceiving but it may not be
a sufficient condition, as was argued above. Perceiving is instead taken to
be a skilful activity of the whole animal which gets played out through the
animal's interactions with its environment.
Alva Noe (2002 & 2004, ch.3) has suggested that we should think of the
practical knowledge we draw on in perception as knowledge of how the
appearance of an object will change with our movements. Each movement
will bring about a change in what the object presents to us. As we move
around a table, for instance, what we experience of the table will change with
our movements. We can think of our visual perception of the table's shape
as constituted by our knowledge of all the changes our experience of the
table's shape can undergo as we move relative to it. Part of what it is for an
experience to present what seems to be a table then is for us to know how
the appearance of the table will change as we move around it. This practical
knowledge is constitutive of our being presented with what seems to be a
table in experience.
One objection one might raise against Noe's proposal is that it fails to do
justice to Merleau-Ponty's point that the hidden sides of the object are
present in experience albeit indeterminately. Doesn't Noe account for the
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experience I have of a thing's hidden sides in terms of the anticipations (the
practical knowledge) I have about what I would see of the thing if I were to
move around it? Didn't Merleau-Ponty show us that this description gets the
phenomenology wrong misdescribing the hidden sides of a thing as sensibly
absent when in fact they are positively present? The hidden sides of a thing
are positively present in my experience through the readiness or
preparedness I exhibit to take hold of the thing in a certain way.
As an illustration of the phenomena Merleau-Ponty has in mind think about
how my body is prepared and ready when I reach for the handle of a mug
that is pointing away from me.34 I relate to the mug through my taking hold of
it, through the movements I direct towards it when I reach for it in order to
take a drink. My doing so gives me a sense of the presence of its handle
even though I am not currently seeing the mug's handle. Of course I can get
it wrong and direct my reaching behaviour towards its handle when it has no
handle. In this case I will have misrepresented the mug. The fact that I can
misrepresent the mug in this way suggests that the handle was a part of my
original experience, even though it wasn't any part of the view I had on the
mug at the time.
What this objection shows us is that the knowledge which is constitutive of
an object's seeming to be present in experience isn't just knowledge
concerning the changes the appearances of a thing will undergo with our
movement about it or its movement relative to us. We also have to account
for the knowledge a creature has of the possibilities for action a thing affords.
This knowledge of which actions are appropriate and which actions are
inappropriate to the object of our experience can also contribute to what it is
for an object to seem to be present in experience. This knowledge doesn't
34
This is a favourite example of Sean Kelly's.
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however look to be accounted for in terms of knowledge of sensorimotor
contingencies.
Returning to the mug with its handle turned away from me, I am ready to
deal with the mug before I direct my movement towards it. As Merleau-Ponty
puts it, (discussing a different example) 'from the outset the grasping
movement is magically at its completion.' (1962: 119) The hidden sides of a
thing can be said to be present in my experience insofar as I am ready to
deal with the thing, including its hidden sides, in my bodily interactions with it.
I am, in other words, drawing upon what I have called my "operative
understanding" of the thing when I experience the thing's hidden sides. This
operative understanding prepares me for my dealings with the thing, and
enables me to undergo a perceptual experience of thing in its full bodily
presence even though I am not presented with the thing in its entirety at any
given moment.
The idea that what we perceive are the actions a thing affords is an idea
we find in Gibson's ecological theory of visual perception. Gibson (1979,
ch.8) says that the environment of an animal affords opportunities for actions
and it is these opportunities that we perceive on any give occasion. Gibson
is insistent that visual perception works in such a way that we can pick up on
a thing's affordances directly and immediately. There is no need, Gibson
claims, for an animal to reconstruct a scene in its brain based on information
made available by the retinal image. Gibson claims instead that the structure
of the light in an environment - what he calls "the ambient optic array" -
uniquely specifies the layout of surfaces around the perceiving animal.35
35
The perceiving animal is stationed at a point in space at any give time and surrounding
this point is light. The light surrounding the perceiving animal, Gibson calls 'the ambient
optic array'. The light is 'ambient' because it literally surrounds the perceiving animal. The
'optic array' is composed of the light that the animal's eyes receive from surrounding objects.
As I am sat here there are various objects arranged around me on my table, and straight
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The environment the ambient optic array carries information about isn't
only composed of surfaces and objects. We also perceive the objects
around us as affording us opportunities to do things. According to Gibson the
ambient optic array exhibits certain systematic features. He distinguishes
between "structural" and "transformational" invariants. The structural
invariants in an ambient optic array are a consequence of certain stable and
recurring features in the layout of an environment. Transformational
invariants relate to ways in which the pattern of light changes with an
animal's movements. Gibson claims that each structural invariant is an
affordance. Whenever an animal perceives the layout of its environment,
what it perceives are, in part, the opportunities an environment with this
layout affords for its movement. When, for instance an animal perceives the
brink of a cliff, what the animal sees is a surface one side of which can be
walked on and the other side of which affords falling off and injury. It
perceives such a surface because of a structural invariant in its optic array.
Similarly a human being who perceives a red post box sees something that
invites the posting of letters. The post box only has this significance, it only
invites us to mail letters, because we belong to a community in which letters
get written and are transported from one person to another by means of a
mail service. Nevertheless, Gibson claims that as the kind of animal that
inhabits an environment containing post boxes, we can directly perceive
something as a post box. When we do so, what we have done is picked up
on a structural invariant in the optic array of creatures like us.
ahead of me is a picture. All these objects are reflecting light some of which is received by
my left eye, some of which is received by my right eye. This light is structured in such a way
as provide me with information about the unchanging layout of my surrounding environment
at this time. For further discussion of the ambient optic array see Gibson (1979, ch. 5).
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If Gibson is right and we can directly and immediately pick up on the
opportunities for action our environment affords this is only because we are
drawing upon what I have called our operative understanding. It is our
operative understanding for instance that enables us to know that red pillar
boxes afford the posting of letters. Some of the simple examples Gibson
offers like perceiving a tree to afford shelter, or to be climbable, or perceiving
a surface to afford support, do not seem to involve much in the way of
operative understanding. Nevertheless I want to say that to pick up on the
information contained in the ambient array directly and immediately is to be
drawing on one's operative understanding. It is only because one is in
possession of this understanding that by perceiving invariant structures in the
ambient optic array one can also perceive opportunities for action.
Noe (2004: ch.3, §9) has offered the following helpful suggestion about
how to interpret Gibson's claim that the ambient optic array carries
information that specifies the layout of one's environment:
The ambient optic array, simply put, is how things look from here in these
conditions. The sense of the Gibsonian claim that the ambient optic array
specifies the environment (unlike the pattern of irradiation on the retina),
is that how things look from here in these conditions specifies how they
are, or rather, it does so for a suitably knowledgeable animal, one in
possession of and ready to apply sensorimotor skill.' (2004: 104)
This seems to me exactly right. The claim is threefold.
(1) What Gibson calls the structured invariants present in the ambient optic
array can be identified with how the environment appears to us at any given
moment.
(2) How the environment appears to an animal at any moment specifies how
things are in its local environment. This is a statement of the phenomenal
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intentionality thesis according to which an experience's phenomenology is
constitutive of its intentional features.
(3) An animal's possession of practical knowledge (what Noe refers to as
'sensorimotor skill') determines how the environment appears to an animal
on any given occasion.
Noe errs slightly in his characterisation of this practical knowledge. His
description of the practical knowledge we draw upon in perception doesn't
really bring out the ways in which our embodiment can shape our perception
of an object and its properties.
Noe characterises our perception of affordances in terms of the
possibilities for movement that a thing affords. To perceive is (among other
things) to learn how the environment structures one's possibilities for
movement...' (Noe, 2004: 105) He goes on to mention in passing that we
also perceive a thing as affording possibilities for action. However the
account he gives of practical knowledge in terms of knowledge of
sensorimotor contingencies only tells us what it is to perceive the
opportunities for movement a thing affords. I shall argue that movement is
only one of a class of actions we can perceive a thing to afford.
Noe characterises knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies as
knowledge of the systematic ways in which how things look, sound, smell or
feel depends on one's movements. There are sensorimotor contingencies
that specifically relate to our sensory apparatus. These include the fact that
'when the eyes rotate, the sensory stimulation on the retina shifts and distorts
in a very particular way, determined by the size of the eye movement, the
spherical shape of the retina, and the nature of ocular optics.' (O'Regan and
Noe, 2001: 941) We know what effects our eye movements have on what
we are seeing. This constitutes one kind of sensorimotor contingency of
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which we have knowledge. We also know that 'the flow pattern on the retina
is an expanding flow when the body moves forward, and contracting when
the body moves backward.' (op cit) This is another example of a kind of
knowledge we have about how our movements can effect what we see.
Another set of sensorimotor contingencies relate to the visual attributes of
the objects we are sensing. The visual quality associated with a thing's
shape is, O'Regan and Noe suggest 'precisely the set of all potential
distortions that the shape undergoes when it is moved relative to us, or when
we move relative to it. Although this is an infinite set, the brain can abstract
from this set a series of laws, and it is this set of laws which codes shape.'
(O'Regan and Noe, 2001: 942) They go on to add 'the structure of the laws
abstracted from the sensorimotor contingencies associated with flat,
concave, and convex surfaces, corners and so on, will be a neural-code-
independent indication of their different natures.' (op cit)
What we perceive on any given occasion is on this view the result of our
drawing on knowledge of how our sensory experience of a thing will change
with our movements. This only partially characterises the practical
knowledge we are drawing on in virtue of which things seem to us the way
they do. In addition we have a knowledge of which actions are appropriate to
the object of our perception and which are inappropriate. When we see a
heavy box which we are about to lift for instance we prepare our body to deal
with the box differently from how we would be ready to deal with the box if we
perceived it to be light.
As another example of the phenomena I have in mind consider Milner and
Goodale's patient D.F.36 Despite D.F's not being able to visually identify an
object's features she is nevertheless 'capable of responding differentially' to
361 am indebted here to Kelly's discussion of D.F., see his (2002) & (2003).
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features like an object's size, shape and orientation. She is able for instance
to post a card, or insert her hand through a slot set at different angles, even
though she cannot report on the angle of the slot. The understanding D.F.
has of the slot is a bodily understanding. She understands the slot only
through her dealings with it.
I claim that the understanding of a thing we have through our embodiment
also plays a constitutive role in determining the ways in which a thing
appears to us. We don't only perceive the possibilities for movement a thing
affords. We also perceive its possibilities for action in a much wider sense.
Crucially we can perceive the opportunities for action a thing affords only
because we are in possession of a certain kind of practical knowledge. What
we learn from Merleau-Ponty (with Sean Kelly's help) is that there are bodily
ways of understanding an object which contribute towards this practical
knowledge. These bodily forms of understanding also contribute to
determining the content of our perceptual experiences.
I will conclude this section by considering how the second aspect of an
experience's phenomenology, the modes of presentation characteristic of our
perceptual experiences, might be determined by our practical knowledge.
Consider as an example of this second aspect of an experience's
phenomenology, perceptual constancy phenomena. Suppose I am looking at
a wall painted mint green. What my experience represents is a wall coloured
green, yet some parts of the wall appear darker than other parts. I say that
these disparities in the appearance of the wall are due to the wall being
presented differently under different lighting conditions. Some parts of the
wall are better lit than others and this is why some parts of the wall appear
lighter than other parts. Now the puzzle that this kind of phenomena raises is
how it can be that we see a wall that is uniformly coloured mint green when
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some parts of the wall appear to be darker than other parts. How is it that the
wall can be perceived to have a constant colour when some parts of it appear
different from other parts?
Noe (2004) characterises this problem in the following terms: 'We
experience the presence of a uniform colour which, strictly speaking, we do
not see. Or rather, the actual uniform colour of the wall's surface is present
in perception amodally, it is present but absent, in the same way as the
tomato's backside, or the blocked parts of the cat.' (2004: 128)
Again Noe takes the solution to this puzzle to lie in our knowledge of
sensorimotor contingencies. Noe distinguishes between two kinds of
sensorimotor contingencies both of which he takes to be relevant to
determining our experience of a thing's apparent colour. The first kind relate
to The way sensory stimulation is affected by changes in a perceiver's
geometrical relation to an object...the way stimulation varies as a result of
the perceiver's manipulation of an object (e.g. turning it in relation to a light
source).' (Noe, 2004: 129) The second kind relate to 'patterns of
dependence between sensory stimulation and the object's movement, or the
object's changing relation to its surrounding.' (op cit, p130)
Noe's answer to the puzzle of how we can perceive a wall to have a
uniform colour even though this is not what we are presented with in
perception, appeals to the knowledge we have of sensorimotor contingencies
of these two types. A thing's apparent colour can vary in all kinds of ways
some of which have to do with our movement, others of which relate to
variations in lighting conditions and in the colour of the background and
surrounding objects.37 Noe hypothesises that nevertheless we have
knowledge of how all these factors combine to determine an object's
37
See Noe (2004: 132)
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apparent colour at any moment. Our understanding how a thing's apparent
colour will change as viewing conditions change explains how we come to
have experiences which present us with coloured things, Noe suggests.
Again it seems to me this is only part (albeit an important part) of the
story. Once again we can look to Merleau-Ponty via Kelly (1999& 2004) to
supply the rest of the story. Merleau-Ponty thought that the lighting
conditions form a part of the context or the background against which a thing
appears coloured. He insists that the lighting conditions can play a positive
role in determining the kind of experience we enjoy. However it contributes
to the way we see things only indeterminately.38 For Merleau-Ponty
(according to Kelly) the lighting context enters into our experience through
our knowledge of how best to see an object. We know where to move our
eyes in order to achieve the best view of an object's colour. We know for
instance that dark colours are seen best in bright light, and that bright colours
are seen best in dimmer light.39 What is it for us to see the wall as coloured
mint green all over? Merleau-Ponty will say it is for me to know given the
current lighting conditions, where I would need to look in order to gain the
best view of the object's colour.
Again Merleau-Ponty appeals to a kind of knowledge that is essentially
related to my embodiment to explain colour experience. In this case I have
knowledge of how the light would have to change in order to see the colour of
the thing best of all. Kelly (2004) explains the idea as follows:
To speak mathematically, I experience the light not as a determinate
quantity but in terms of the direction, and perhaps even the slope, of the
38
Notice the similarity with the position Merleau-Ponty has taken on a thing's hidden sides -
these also enter into experience only indeterminately, by means of the experience we have





improvement curve. If we think of the improvement curve as the curve
that measures the quantity of light against the quality of the viewing
conditions, then what my experience tells me at any given moment is
whether more or less light will improve my view, and also perhaps, how
drastic the improvement will be. In this way the lighting plays a positive
role in my experience but is never registered determinately.' (Kelly, 2004:
85-6)
It is an interesting question which I cannot enter into here in any detail, the
extent to which Noe and Kelly have offered competing explanations of the
kinds of practical knowledge which might determine the contents of my colour
experience. Noe's position looks to me to be not dissimilar to what Husserl
might have said on this question. Recall how Husserl took the hidden sides
of a thing to be present in experience only in the form of hypotheses about
what we would see if we were to change our relation to a thing. Noe's
position on our perception of a thing's colour looks to me to involve a similar
claim. Noe seems to be suggesting that an important part of what it is to
experience a thing as having a uniform colour involves us drawing on our
knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies so as to form hypotheses or
expectations about how a thing's colour will change under different viewing
conditions.
If this is the correct way of reading Noe, it would seem that we do indeed
have two competing accounts. Husserl and Noe say that what we might call
the perceptual context enters into perception only by contributing to the
hypotheses we frame about how our perceptual experiences of a thing will
change with our movements. Merleau-Ponty and Kelly say that the lighting
context can enter into perception through our bodily understanding of under
what lighting conditions the object can be best seen.
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I cannot attempt to decide between these two explanations here. It
suffices to note that there are two hypotheses here about how our
experiences get their phenomenal intentionality. Both hypotheses can be
understood as empirical hypotheses. Thus I take myself to have presented
the beginning of a story about how the naturalist might go about assimilating
the phenomenologist's idea of phenomenal intentionality. I have proposed
an account of phenomenal intentionality which appeals to certain kinds of
practical knowledge to account for why the environment appears at it does to
an animal on any given occasion. The idea is that being in possession of
certain kinds of practical knowledge is what makes it the case that the world
appears to us at it does. Admittedly there is more work to be done in
explaining just how it is that being in possession of this practical knowledge
suffices to make it the case that our experiences present the world as
appearing thus and so. This is a task for my future research. On the
supposition that possession of this practical knowledge is something that can
be given a functional-physical description I take it I have sketched the
beginnings of a story about how a naturalist might go about integrating
phenomenal intentionality into her thinking about minds.
In the next section I will explain how possession of practical knowledge
does look like something that can be explained in functional-physical terms. I
will begin by connecting the account I have presented of phenomenal
intentionality thus far with the conclusion that there are subjective facts. We
will see that the existence of phenomenal intentionality requires us to revise
our thinking about the nature and function of perception. However this
revised conception of the function of perception finds support in recent work
on perception in cognitive science and neuroscience. Thus the shift in our
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thinking about perception required if we are to admit subjective facts, is a
shift already taking place within the science of mind.
6. Why Perception isn't Detection
Once we concede that there exists a kind of intentionality which is
constitutively determined by a subject's practical knowledge in the way I have
just described, it is a short step to the conclusion that there are subjective
facts. The practical knowledge I have invoked above is nothing other than
what I have been calling "operative understanding". In chapter 2 we saw how
it is in virtue of our operative understanding that we are able to perceive a
thing as calling for or drawing from us certain actions. To perceive an entity
in this way is precisely to understand that entity as an entity of a certain kind.
It is to understand the entity as an entity that calls for certain actions.
Consider Heidegger's hammer as an illustration of this point. In order to
perceive a thing as a hammer, as a thing which can be used to fasten
together two piece of wood say, one must draw on one's understanding of
how a hammer is to be used. One must represent the hammer in a certain
way, in a way that is determined by one's operative understanding of
hammers. Now consider someone who hasn't the faintest idea about how to
use a hammer or what hammers are for. This creature won't perceive the
hammer in the way that we perceive it: the creature won't perceive the
hammer in terms of how it is to be used. By hypothesis she doesn't know
how hammers are used. Thus she cannot represent a thing as a hammer. It
follows then that there are things that can be represented only by a creature
with the requisite operative understanding.
Someone might object that this doesn't establish the existence of things
that can be represented only given the right operative understanding. It only
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establishes the existence of ways of representing that require possession of
an operative understanding. The creature can perfectly well perceive
something that is a hammer, assuming her senses are all functioning
normally. What she cannot do is represent the thing she perceives as a
hammer. What she lacks is the recognitional concept for hammers, and this
is why she cannot perceive the thing as a hammer.
By way of an initial response to this objection, I would reply that she not
only lacks the ability to recognise hammers. She doesn't know what to do
with hammers. This is why the existential phenomenologist claims that she
doesn't perceive something that is a hammer, something that has the being
of a hammer. A longer response requires us to go back to the notion of
operative understanding introduced in chapter 2. I introduced the notion of
an operative understanding in the course of describing the way of existing
characteristic of persons which Heidegger calls "being-in-the-world".
Operative understanding was taken to be one of the structures constitutive of
our way of existing as persons. This is to say that operative understanding
forms a part of what it takes for an animal to be a being-in-the-world. When a
creature has the required operative understanding she comes to inhabit a
world, a world that contains hammers, for instance, and the other tools of
trade characteristic of carpentry. Before she acquires the necessary
operative understanding she doesn't live in a world in which anything can
appear to be a hammer. She doesn't live in a world in which there are
hammers because things of this kind have no significance for her.
For the remainder of this section I want to consider how the latter idea
finds support from within naturalism. The claim to repeat is that our ways of
existing as persons can literally shape the world we inhabit. Let us begin by
contrasting this idea with a rival view of the relation between an animal and
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its environment. This rival view finds its clearest articulation in a natural way
of thinking about perception. According to this view the senses function to
provide the brain with information about what is going on in the animal's
environment (or in the animal's body, in the case of proprioception). On this
view a brain state is about a thing x in virtue of some relation between the
animal whose brain it is, and some event in the animal's environment. The
senses are taken to be the brain's window onto the world. The function of
the senses is simply to provide the brain with information about what is
where.
This view is based on the reasonable claim that were the senses not
playing this role for the brain, the animal wouldn't know how things stood
either with respect to its local environment or in its own body. I shall call this
the "detection view" of perception, so-called because it construes the function
of the senses to faithfully report back to the brain how things are in the world
external to the brain.
The detection view of perception conflicts with the story I have been
telling according to which what we perceive are opportunities for action. On
this view the job of the senses isn't simply to report back to the brain about
what is where. In addition the senses tell an animal what it should do. This
is a job the senses can perform because it is a part of the animal's way of
existing to know how to find its way about in the world. This is to say that
the animal knows how to make use of the things it perceives to achieve its
goals.
Kathleen Akins (1996) has presented a similar view of the senses in
attacking what I have called the detection view. Akins characterises the
senses as fundamentally "narcissistic"; the animal is constantly posing the
question 'how does all of this relate to me?' and it is the job of the senses to
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deliver an answer to this question. Akins gives a nice example to illustrate
her proposal, she asks us to think about the function of thermoreception.
Given the detection view we would expect the thermoreceptive system to be
answering the question 'what is my skin temperature at x' where 'x' picks out
a particular region of my body. However it turns out this fails to capture what
our thermoreceptive systems do.
There are four different types of thermoreceptors, two of which respond
only to extreme conditions of very high and very low temperatures causing in
us sensations of pain. When the conditions are not in this way extreme, we
rely on thermoreceptors for our sensations of warmth and cold. Akins begins
by noting that we have many more cold receptors than warm receptors.
Moreover, some parts of the body have more receptors than other parts, and
the ratio of cold to warm receptors likewise varies from one part of the body
to another. Akins goes on to note that how each receptor responds to a
temperature change will depend upon the starting temperature. When a part
of the body is already cold, applying a cold stimulus to this part of the body -
say you run your hands under a cold tap by accident - will evoke a dramatic
response. A warm stimulus will however evoke a gradual decrease in activity
in the cold receptors. The reverse is true of warm receptors. If you put
already warm hands under a hot tap the warm receptor will burst into life, a
cold stimulus will produce a gradual decrease in activity.
What bearing does this have on the detection view of the senses? First it
doesn't look right to say that the function of thermoreceptors is to report back
to the brain, the temperature of particular bodily regions. One and the same
bodily temperature can give rise to a variety of sensations. Akins makes the
point as follows: 'thermal sensations are a function of the firing rates of a
neural population and because the absolute number and ratio of the two
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different receptors (the cold and warm receptors) differ from one part of the
body to another, exactly the same skin temperature can give rise to a variety
of sensations.' (Akins, 1996: 351, my addition in brackets) Furthermore, the
response that does occur in a particular part of the body at a particular time
will depend on the starting temperature in that part of the body. The felt
change in temperature for a specific temperature change will depend upon
the starting temperature of the skin. If the temperature of a warm spot is
increased at the bottom of its response range, the dynamic burst (very
roughly, the firing rate of neurons) will be very small; if it is warmed at the top
of its response range, the burst will be very large.' (op cit, my addition in
brackets)
On the basis of points like these, Akins mounts a convincing case against
a detection view of thermoreception. She establishes that the function of
thermoreception cannot be to record absolute temperature or temperature
change at bodily regions. Akins sums matters up nicely:
'What the organism is worried about, in the best of narcissistic traditions,
is its own comfort. The system is not asking, 'What is it like out there'? -
a question about the objective temperature states of the body's skin.
Rather, it is doing something - informing the brain about the presence of
any relevant thermal events. Relevant of course to itself.' (Akins, 1996:
349)
When we are considering the function of perception the question to ask is not
what the senses ought to be detecting. The question we should ask is rather
what should the senses be doing, where what the senses should be doing
will be decided by the interests of the animal at that time. What the animal is
doing will tell us what it needs to be representing. Of course to know what
implications the things it is sensing have for action requires skill on the part of
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the animal. It will require the animal to draw on its operative understanding.
Thus at first glance Akins' narcissistic view of the senses would seem to fit
comfortably with the view of perception I have been presenting from
existential phenomenology.
The existential phenomenologist however advances a further claim which
doesn't obviously find support in Akins. They claim that not only is it the case
that an animal perceives what it is in its interest to perceive, where those
interests will be dictated by what the animal is engaged in doing at the time.40
They claim in addition that the objects an animal perceives have an existence
which is shaped by the animal's interests. I will argue next that this is an idea
that also finds support in psychology and neuroscience.
Akins says: 'Each and every sensory system, no matter how sophisticated
or simple, is tied to a set (sometimes a very large set) of behavioural tasks.
No matter what else the senses do, in the end, they must inform movement
or action.' (1996: 352) There are at least two ways of understanding the
claim that each sensory system is tied to set of behavioural tasks. The first
reading takes the tie to be instrumental. The information supplied by each
sensory system is, on this understanding, made available to other systems
that control and generate motor behaviour. The close ties between
perception and action on this understanding, just consist in perceptual
information being used directly to control motor behaviour.
There is however another more radical way of understanding the close
ties between perception and action. On this understanding, perception just is
a kind of activity, a probing or exploring of the environment. On this
40
Akins' point seems to be that we must understand the function of perception in the context
of the behaviours it services. She notes a little later in her paper (p.354) the significant
connections there are between the parts of the mammalian brain dedicated to seeing and
other parts of the brain dedicated to motor behaviour. This provides important support for
the idea of perception as being for the selection of action.
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understanding the connection between perception and action isn't just
instrumental; the connection is constitutive. What it is for an animal to sense
its environment is just for the animal to engage in a certain kind of activity,
the activity of exploring the environment by means of its senses. This is the
view we find defended in existential phenomenology. The existential
phenomenologist takes there to be a constitutive connection between
perceiving and acting. He takes perception to be a mode of skilful
engagement with the world.
Now suppose we grant that perceiving is an activity in which the animal
engages. It follows that the objects of perception will always be understood
by the animal in terms of the implications they have for movement and action.
This is to say that the ways in which an object figures in our perceptual
experience will be partially determined by the animal's operative
understanding. The claim that the connection between perception and action
is constitutive would seem to imply that the objects of an animal's perceptual
experience are indeed shaped by an animal's operative understanding.41
This claim that perceiving is a kind of action is one we find outside of
existential phenomenology. It is supported by work in cognitive science,
neuroscience, and robotics research as well, and has recently been
41
Someone might be willing to grant that there is a constitutive connection between
perception and action but not be willing to grant that our perceptual experiences shape the
objects of our experience. He might say that the object as it is represented is shaped by our
ways of existing so there is a constitutive tie between our ways of representing the world and
our ways of being. He might however add that there is no such tie between the object itself
and our existence.
This is a difficult point which we have found ourselves returning to repeatedly. I don't
have anything new to add which I haven't already said elsewhere in response to this kind of
objection. I would say however that the weaker claim the objector concedes is enough to
establish the existence of subjective facts, as has already been noted earlier (see the final
section of chapter 3). For to concede that there are objects or facts or whatever that can
only be represented by a creature that has the required operative understanding, is to
concede that that there are facts which can only be represented from a subject's point of




defended by a handful of philosophers of perception.42 It is a central idea in
both Gibson's ecological theory of perception and in the enactive account of
perception. Ballard (1991) has suggested that 'vision is best understood in
the context of the visual behaviours that the system is engaged in' (1991:
57). So far this is compatible with an instrumental understanding of the
relation between vision and action, where vision is made use of, perhaps
directly, in the control of behaviour. However this is not what Ballard has in
mind. He makes clear that the behaviours he has in mind are integral to the
activity of seeing itself. Vision as he describes it is active and exploratory. In
particular he emphasises the role that gaze control has in visual processing,
where gaze control is a collection of processes that enable us to keep the
fovea of the eye fixed on a particular target while either we move or the thing
our gaze is fixed upon moves. Ballard's account of vision doesn't eschew the
role of information processing in vision as did Gibson and his followers.
Rather Ballard gives an account of vision where use is made of the animal's
behaviour to simplify the kinds of computations its visual system performs.
Rodney Brooks' work in robotics also suggests a view of perception as
constitutively tied to action. Brooks' robots are composed of subsystems or
what he calls "layers" each of which is dedicated to carrying out a particular
activity or task such as detecting and avoiding obstacles, wandering around,
scanning surfaces etc. Each layer operates independently of the other
layers, the overall behaviour of the robot being under the control of one or the
other of its layers. To understand what takes place in each layer we have to
consider what the layer is doing. What the layer is dedicated to doing will
42
For a review of work in cognitive science, robotics and neuroscience which supports this
picture see Clark (1997 and 2000: ch.'s 5 & 6). Also see Hurley (1998: ch.'s 9 & 10);
Haugeland (1998, ch.9); Noe (2004, ch.'s 1 and 2); Rowlands (1999, ch.5 and 2003, ch. 10);
Thompson (1995) and Thompson and Varela (2001).
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often require the use of perception. However the contribution made by
perception cannot be understood apart from the activity each layer is
dedicated to carrying out. Each activity involves a pattern of interactions with
the world. Brooks says in discussing a simple creature built to avoid
obstacles:
'...there need be no clear distinction between a "perception subsystem", a
"central system" and an "action system". In fact, there may well be two
independent channels connecting sensing to action (one for initiating
motion, and one for emergency halts), so there is no single place where
"perception" delivers a representation of the world in the traditional
sense.' (Brooks, 1991: 144)
Consider the layer in a robot of this kind dedicated to initiating motion.
Clearly it has to be making use of what it perceives if it is to avoid obstacles.
However the use the creature makes of perception cannot be understood
apart from what the robot is doing, which is initiating motion, in the case of
the layer we are considering. Thus Brooks is a clear example of someone
whose empirical work is predicated on the assumption that perception and
action are constitutively tied.43
As a final example, consider the account Thompson (1995 & 2000) gives
of the function of colour perception. Thompson wants to steer a middle
course between views of colour perception which take its function to be the
detection of surface reflectance properties, and views which take colour to be
something the brain projects onto the world. Thompson points out that there
are significant differences in colour vision throughout the animal kingdom.
43
In fact Brooks willingly endorses the idea that an animal can shape the environment it lives
in. Commenting on work in Al which attempts to model special purpose problem solving he
has this to say: '...as UexkOll and others have pointed out, each animal species, and clearly
each robot species with their own distinctively non-human sensor suites, will have their own
Merkwelt (perceptual world).' (Brooks, 1988: 141)
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Normal human perceivers are trichromats, which is to say that they possess
three different types of cone photoreceptor. Our colour space - the space of
different colours we can discriminate between - is three-dimensional. Birds,
fishes, amphibians and reptiles are by contrast tetrachromats, they possess a
fourth type of photoreceptor. These animals enjoy experiences of colour
which are tetravariant, having another hue dimension in addition to ours.
Thompson hypotheses that given this difference in the visual apparatus of
these creatures, they will be able to perceive novel hues we cannot see.
Thompson takes these differences to indicate that there is no common
property which vision in these different animals has the function of detecting.
Thompson agrees with Akins that when we are thinking about the function of
colour vision the question to ask is "what does colour vision do for the animal
in its environment." (Thompson, 2000: 165)44 Thompson comes up with the
following answer:
'...the primary role of colour vision may be to enact a perceptual quality
space that integrates physically heterogeneous environmental properties
into a small number of perceptual equivalence classes. These relatively
stable perceptual categories would facilitate the identification of aspects
of the environment and then guide behaviour accordingly.' (Thompson,
2000: 182)
Thus for Thompson the purpose of colour vision isn't to detect physically
invariant surface reflectance properties. It is to make available to the
perceiving animal, stable perceptual categories that can be used to meet the
animal's needs in the course of its perceptually guided activities. So it turns
44
He cites a co-authored paper Thompson, Palacios & Varela (1992) in support of this claim.
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out that the same thing can have different colours - it can have one colour for
me and a different colour for a tetrachromatic pigeon, say.45
I conclude then that the argument from the contents of experience for
subjective facts is one that a naturalist could buy. A commitment to
subjective facts follows from the empirical hypothesis that action and
perception are constitutively connected. Whatever empirical work supports
this hypothesis, I claim will also support the existence of subjective facts. For
perception and action can be constitutively tied only if the animal is drawing
on practical knowledge which tells it what the implications for action are of
the object it is perceiving. A creature that makes use of its practical
knowledge in this way is, I claim, a creature that lives in a world shaped by its
existence.
The remainder of my chapter will take up the second reason that was
given for introducing subjective facts. This was the phenomenologist's claim
that every conscious experience is also pre-reflectively self-conscious. It will
turn out that we are already well on our way to having an answer to this
question. For I shall argue eventually that the kind of operative
understanding that has been appealed to in developing an account of
phenomenal intentionality can only be had by a creature that has access to
its conscious experiences. A creature that has this kind of access is pre-
reflectively self-conscious.
7. The Feeling of Ownership
I will begin with a brief reminder of the thesis to be defended - the claim that
every conscious experience is also PRSC. This thesis was introduced in
answering the question of what it is for an experience to be phenomenally
45
See Thompson (2000: 183) for more on this point.
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conscious. An experience is phenomenally conscious when there is
something the having of the experience is like for a subject.
I claimed that there is something an experience is like for a subject when
the occurrence of this experience is itself experienced by the subject. There
is something the experience is like for its subject when that very experience
is something the subject experiences. Consider my experience of the blue
sky: this experience presents the sky to me as seeming a certain way only if
the experience is itself experienced by me. When I do not experience my
experiences they do not seem any particular way to me: they lack a
subjective character.
Whenever an experience is itself experienced by a subject, I shall say that
this experience is accompanied by a feeling of ownership. The feeling of
ownership accompanies an experience when a subject has a sense of
himself having that very experience. A subject's experiencing himself having
an experience is an experience of ownership. For "to have" and "to own" are
different ways of describing one and the same relation. Thus, when a subject
experiences himself having an experience, he also experiences himself as
the owner of the experience that is happening to him.
Now I have said that there is something an experience is like for a subject
only when the experience is itself experienced. Thus, we can say that there
is something an experience is like for a subject only if it is accompanied by a
feeling of ownership.
An experience which is accompanied by a feeling of ownership is an
experience that is had self-consciously. The kind of self-consciousness that
is characteristic of the feeling of ownership should be distinguished from what
we might call "reflective consciousness". A subject need not introspect or
reflect on himself in order to be consciously aware that he himself is having
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an experience. What I am calling the feeling of ownership accompanies our
experiences without us actively or deliberately doing anything. Merleau-
Ponty makes the point well:
"At the root of all our experience and all our reflections, we find...a being
which immediately recognises itself, because it is its knowledge both of
itself and of all things, and which knows its own existence, not by
observation and as a given fact, nor by inference from any idea of itself,
but through direct contact with that existence." (Merleau-Ponty 1962:371)
Thus we need to distinguish between a subject's being reflectively conscious
of himself having an experience and what I labelled in chapter 5, a subject's
pre-reflective consciousness. It is pre-reflective and not reflective
consciousness that must be explained if we are to explain what it is for an
experience to have subjective character.
Pre-reflective consciousness is a kind of peripheral or implicit
consciousness a creature has of itself. Consider the sentence 'Smith is
conscious of her thinking that she herself is feeling nervous'.46 This sentence
reports a state of affairs in which Smith is conscious of herself having a
particular thought. Moreover, the thought she is having about herself is a
distinct state of mind from the feeling of nervousness she is experiencing.
The thought the subject has about herself takes as its object the feeling of
nervousness. Now contrast this state of affairs with that reported by the
following sentence: 'Smith is self-consciously feeling nervous'. Here, the
state of mind reported is not distinct from Smith's feeling of nervousness.
Rather, Smith's self-consciousness modifies the feeling of nervousness she
experiences.
46
Here I am drawing on a useful distinction Kriegel (2003 and 2004) makes between
transitive and intransitive self-consciousness.
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Going back to Brentano, we can say that Smith is primarily conscious of
her feeling of nervousness and she is only peripherally or secondarily aware
of herself having this experience. Thus, the difference between reflective
and pre-reflective consciousness concerns the way in which the subject is
self-conscious. When a subject is reflectively conscious of herself having an
experience, she is attentively or focally aware of herself and the state of mind
she is in. Whereas, when a subject is pre-reflectively conscious she is only
inattentively or peripherally aware of herself having an experience.47
A subject is pre-reflectively self-conscious when her experiences are
accompanied by a feeling of ownership. If this is right, a naturalistic answer
to what I have earlier called "the experience of content question" - the
question why there is something rather than nothing it is like to undergo a
conscious experience - will lie in an explanation of what it is for an
experience to be accompanied by a feeling of ownership.
The feeling of ownership is such that the subject does not experience
himself simply as a material thing existing alongside other material things, but
instead experiences himself as a material thing that is the owner of various
experiences. The subject experiences himself qua subject. If we are to
explain what it is for an experience to be accompanied by a feeling of
ownership, some explanation must be given of what it is for a creature to
represent itself qua subject.
8. Towards a Naturalistic Account of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness
In chapter 6 I introduced a variety of representational state which I claimed
could make a subject implicitly aware of herself qua subject at the same time
as making her explicitly conscious of something in her environment. What I
471 am indebted to Kriegel (2004) for this way of formulating the distinction.
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shall set about doing in what remains of this chapter is explaining just what it
is for a subject to be implicitly aware of herself qua subject. I will suggest
that we can understand this awareness as part and parcel of a subject's
exercising her operative understanding. PRSC and operative understanding
form parts of a single package. Indeed I shall argue that a subject couldn't
possibly perceive an object as having implications for her actions if she
weren't in this way conscious of herself qua subject of this experience.
I characterised PRSC as a form of bodily self-awareness in chapter 6. I
said that a subject is continuously aware of her body qua subject of her
experiences. Let us begin then by clarifying just what this continuous
awareness consists in. It would be a mistake to understand it as a form of
perceptual awareness. Perceptual awareness is intentional - it is awareness
directed towards an object. Yet PRSC isn't intentional. A subject's body isn't
among the objects he perceives whenever he undergoes a perceptual
experience, though of course it might be on some occasions. I claim instead
that a subject is aware of her body as that with which she perceives things.
To give an example, consider the kind of awareness that accompanies one's
experience of running one's fingers across a piece of cloth. When one
moves one's fingers across the cloth, one's fingers do not figure among the
object of which one is aware, unless one deliberately attends to them. You
will nevertheless be aware of your fingers as that with which you are making
contact with the cloth.
I suggest then that we think of PRSC as an awareness of one's own body
as that with which one perceives. This characterisation of PRSC can help us
understand why it should be that the feeling of ownership accompanies each
of our experiences. The idea is that whenever a conscious perceptual
experience occurs we are aware of our body as that with which we are
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perceiving things. Why should this kind of awareness form a constant
backdrop to all of our experiences? I want to finish up by suggesting that it
does so because of the role that our practical knowledge plays in constituting
the appearance of things.
When one is behaving skilfully one has a sense of which actions are
appropriate to what one is doing and which are not. One selects from
amongst a number of possible actions which of them is appropriate to the
task at hand. It is characteristic of skilful behaviour that one doesn't need to
give any thought to what one is doing. One simply knows how to act. One is
ready to deal with things, and this readiness consists in an important part in
what I have earlier characterised as a bodily understanding we have of the
things we perceive. For the most part then my body is ready to take hold of
the things with which I deal. This kind of readiness my body exhibits at any
given moment is, I have argued, an important determining factor in why
things appear to me as they do at any given moment.
Now I want to suggest that my body can exhibit this kind of readiness to
deal with a situation appropriately only because I am aware of my body as
that with which I perceive things. Consider what happens when I play a
tennis serve. To what extent are the movements I make something for which
I can take credit? They are certainly not something I know that I am doing as
I make them. The serve happens too quickly (or it would if I was any good at
tennis) for me to know that I am making certain movements. Still these
movements are under my control. They are not under my reflective control:
they are unreflective or as I have been putting it "pre-reflective". The tennis
serve is under my control in that there is something my movements are
directed towards bringing about, namely getting the ball to land in the right
part of the court. Insofar as this activity is under my control, and I take it that
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it will be under my control if I am a skilled tennis player, I must be conscious
of it. The consciousness I have of it is precisely a consciousness of my body
as that with which I am acting. It is through this consciousness I have of my
body that I am ready to move in ways appropriate to taking a tennis serve.
I conclude then that the two questions I have been attempting to answer
about the nature of consciousness meet up in the notion of practical
knowledge. My experiences have the intentional content they do in virtue of
my practical knowledge. I am able to exercise this practical knowledge only
because I am PRSC. PRSC gives me a kind of access to what I am
experiencing in virtue of which I am ready to deal with the familiar things
which fill my environment. Now clearly there is much more to be said here,
but I have at least begun to sketch an answer to the question of what it is to




I have been arguing that naturalistic accounts of the mind have run into an
explanatory gap because they have failed to recognise the existence of
subjective facts. If naturalists are to close the explanatory gap it will only be
by making room for subjective facts. My aim in this chapter has been to take
up the two arguments that have been given in support of subjective facts,
and show how they can be made to fit within a naturalistic account of the
mind. In doing so my aim was to show exactly how a naturalist could go
about admitting the existence of subjective facts. I take it that I have given
an answer which points in the right general direction one might head in, were
one to set about naturalising phenomenology. More significantly still I have
shown that the phenomenologist's opposition to naturalism is unfounded.
For I have shown that the naturalist can easily take on board a good many of
the key claims the phenomenologist makes in describing the structure of our
conscious experiences.
There is still much work to be done of course. Central to the account I
have sketched is the idea of our practical knowledge or operative
understanding accounting for phenomenal intentionality. If this account is to
get off the ground, I must explain in much more detail just how it is that being
in possession of the right kind of practical knowledge can have as a
consequence that the world comes to appear in certain ways. There is also
much more to be said about the account I have sketched, all too briefly, of
PRSC in the final sections of this chapter. One question I was unable to
pursue but would have liked to have examined is the relation between this
PRSC and certain primitive forms of self-awareness which psychologists in
the Ecological tradition such as Neisser (1988) have introduced, and which
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philosophers have recently begun discussing under the banner of
nonconceptual self-consciousness (see for instance Bermudez (1998)).
Another intriguing avenue I would like to explore in the future is the
relation between PRSC and our consciousness of time. Husserl claimed that
every conscious experience has a temporal structure such that it contains a
retentional reference to past moments of experience, an openness to the
present, and a protentional anticipation of moments of experience that are
about to happen. The idea that consciousness has this temporal structure
was to prove immensely important for the existential phenomenologists too.
Heidegger for instance was to argue that temporality forms the very structure
of our being-in-the-world. Thus there is a significant theme here in
phenomenology which connects with many of the ideas I have introduced but
which I have been unable to tackle within the confines of this project.
Even more intriguing is the possibility of developing a naturalistic account
of the claim that our experience, and maybe even our very existence, has
this temporal structure. Varela (1999) for instance makes use of data from
neuroscience to develop a model of how an experience could have this
retentional-protentional structure. While Van Gelder (1999) shows how this
idea fits with a dynamicist approach to thinking about mind in recent cognitive
science.
There are many large questions which remain to be pursued. Still I have
begun the work of developing an account of mind which allows us to
understand appearances as essentially subjective as well as taking them to
be a part of the fabric of reality. Now that the phenomenologist's arguments
against naturalism have been revealed to be without substance, the way has
been cleared to begin to develop a naturalised account of phenomenology.
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